Franchise Contracting: The Effects of The Entrepreneur's Timing Option and Debt Financing

We solve a sequential‐moves game that involves three players: the franchisor, the entrepreneur, and the banks. The franchisor chooses the contract terms (a one‐time franchise fee and a royalty rate for on‐going payments). The entrepreneur dynamically decides when to sign this contract, open a store, and apply for debt financing to cover the initial investment. In response to the entrepreneur's application, banks competitively determine loan rates. We find that the franchisor should use royalty cash flows and not the franchise fee to extract value from the entrepreneur. This is a new explanation of empirical evidence that franchise contracts favor royalties over franchise fees. To account for the possibility of the entrepreneur's bankruptcy and bankruptcy costs, the franchisor should decrease the royalty rate. However, despite a lower rate, the threshold for the entrepreneur to open the store is higher in the model with financing than in the model without financing. This threshold is much higher than it would have been for the integrated system, which in turn is higher than the static break‐even‐NPV threshold. If a franchisor ignores financing considerations, she will suffer from having to wait longer for the store opening and from a higher bankruptcy probability. We predict that the franchisor is the main beneficiary of the entrepreneur's greater initial wealth and that the franchisor will benefit more if she assumes a greater share of the store's operating costs.     

Resolving conflict over salespeople’s brand adoption in franchised channels of distribution

Many franchise-based retail outlets offer both the franchisor-owned brand and brands of competitors or independent suppliers. As salespeople may influence customers’ brand choices considerably, an important concern for franchisors is how to raise salespeople’s selling preferences for the franchisor-owned brand. However, the channel administration literature suggests that salespeople may not automatically favor the franchisor’s brand over other brand lines. While a large body of research examines franchise–channel relationships, previous investigations have conspicuously overlooked this channel conflict. In proposing a conceptual model grounded in the behavioral sciences, this study analyzes how franchisors can induce salespeople to advocate their brand by fostering the intention to promote the franchisor-owned brand (IFOB) in customer interaction. The results of an empirical field study show that individual brand promotion depends on factors such as salespeople’s identification with the franchisor and their tenure with the organization, as well as on the franchisor’s prestige and administration of the franchise. Moreover, we find that franchisees’ IFOB transfers to salespeople, but only if franchisees display a charismatic leadership style. We discuss these findings in light of extant theory and empirical evidence and derive several managerially relevant implications for the administration of franchised retail channels.     

Knowledge attributes and the choice of knowledge transfer mechanism in networks: the case of franchising

In this paper we develop a knowledge-based view on the choice of knowledge transfer mechanisms in franchising that integrates results from the information richness theory. Starting from the information richness theory we argue that tacitness of system knowledge, operationalized by codifiability, teachability and complexity, determines the information richness of the knowledge transfer mechanisms of franchising firms. We examine the following hypotheses: (1) If the franchisor’s knowledge is characterized by a high degree of codifiability and teachability and a low degree of complexity, knowledge transfer mechanisms with a lower degree of information richness are used; (2) If the franchisor’s knowledge is characterized by a high degree of complexity and a low degree of codifiability and teachability, knowledge transfer mechanisms with a higher degree of information richness are used. We test these hypotheses by using data from 52 franchising firms in the Austrian franchise sector. The data provide support for the hypotheses.     

Making Franchising Work: A Framework Based on a Systematic Review

There is a large and fragmented literature that examines the nature of franchising. This paper aims to collect all the empirical evidence on the factors that make franchising work and to integrate this evidence in a framework. A narrative synthesis was performed of 126 peer‐reviewed empirical journal articles. This review shows how the outcomes of franchising are determined by five major clusters of factors: ownership structure, business format design, contract design, behavior of the franchisor and the franchisee and their interaction, and the age and size of the system and its units. It identifies what franchisors and franchisees need to do to be successful and which evidence gaps and conflicting results remain. To yield better outcomes for both the franchisor and the franchisee, they should work on a recognizable brand name and a good working relationship; in addition, they should have suitable skills and attitudes as well as contractual exclusive territories. For further improvement of franchisee outcomes, high‐quality franchisor support, decentralized decision‐making, selection tools and fair contracts are essential. The effects of a high franchise proportion, active ownership, knowledge exchange and standardized operating instructions are contingent on other structural and contextual factors in the system. Conflicts and tying should be prevented. Hardly any research has been undertaken into which franchise designs are valued by customers. The authors have launched a research agenda for further research, from various theoretical perspectives, into the interactions between system elements, actors and contexts.     

Pricing-based practices,conflicts and performance in franchising

Pricing management is complex in hybrid organizations like franchising, as much of the raison d’être of franchising is built upon maintaining chain uniformity. However, franchisees and franchisors may have very different views on what the optimal prices are at a given unit. The aim of our research is thus to assess how resale pricing decisions are made and implemented in franchised chains and what the business consequences are. Our research question is then “Which pricing-based practices reduce conflicts between franchisors and franchisees and so enhance performance?” Based on a questionnaire-based survey of 406 franchisees in the largest European franchise market, France, the results of our analyses show that resale pricing in franchised chains is of crucial importance not only vis-à-vis customers, but also vis-à-vis franchisees, particularly concerning their satisfaction, store performance, and intention to acquire additional stores. On the franchisor part, pricing is essential in terms of brand performance and brand name value. Regarding the franchisor-franchisee relationship, pricing is crucial in terms of the occurrence of conflicts.     

“高新技术——创业资本系统”发展过程的效益分析——毁损解策略情形

从毁损解策略出发,对双边道德风险情形下的高新技术-创业资本系统的发展过程进行了分析。具体地,分最大化企业家或创业资本家的期望绝对效益两种情况,严格证明了均衡契约;研究了均衡契约和系统组元的努力关于资本注入额度的单调关系;利用数值分析方法,描述了系统的整体期望效益(包括绝对效益和相对效益)关于资本注入额度的单调关系,并与其在整体解策略下的实现进行比较。     

The Choice of Governance Modes of International Franchise Firms — Development of an Integrative Model

This paper examines the evolution of the international franchise research with special focus on the governance modes of the international franchise firm and develops a new model for the franchisor's choice of the international governance modes. International governance modes in franchising refer to wholly-owned subsidiaries, joint venture franchising, area development franchising and master franchising. Although many studies on the governance modes of the international franchise firm have been published in the last two decades, no prior study develops an integrative framework that investigates the determinants of the international governance modes by combining organizational economics and strategic management perspectives. Specifically, this study explains the governance modes of the international franchise firm by applying transaction cost theory, agency theory, resource-based and organizational capabilities theory and property rights theory.     

Plural forms versus franchise and company-owned systems: A DEA approach of hotel chain performance

Plural form tends to be the most popular organization form in retail and service networks compared to purely franchised or purely company-owned systems. In the first part, this paper exposes the evolution of researchers’ state of mind from the way of thinking which considers franchising and ownership as substitutable organizational forms to theories which analyze the utilization of both franchise and company arrangements. The paper describes the main attempts to explain theoretically the superiority of plural forms. In the second part, the paper discusses the hypothesis which says that there is a relationship between the organizational form of the chain and its efficiency score. It is demonstrated through the application of a data envelopment analysis method on French hotel chains that plural form networks are in average more efficient than strictly franchised and wholly owned chains. The Kruskal–Wallis test which is a distribution-free rank-order statistic is used to statistically verify this relationship. The result does not permit the rejection of the null hypothesis regarding whether an organizational form is more efficient than another one. Hence, this paper opens prospects for researches aiming at testing the organizational form effect on different samples and with other methods.     

Calibrated Incentive Contracts

This paper studies a dynamic agency problem which includes limited liability, moral hazard, and adverse selection. The paper develops a robust approach to dynamic contracting based on calibrating the incentive properties of simple benchmark contracts that are attractive but infeasible, due to limited liability constraints. The resulting dynamic contracts are detail‐free and satisfy robust performance bounds independently of the underlying process for returns, which need not be i.i.d. or even ergodic.     

A Model of Entrepreneurial Autonomy in Franchised Outlets: A Systematic Review of the Empirical Evidence

Entrepreneurial autonomy among franchisees is a persistent management challenge. There is a lack of empirical synthesis of its drivers, its consequences, and how it can be integrated with the standardization requirements in franchise systems. Various theoretical and empirical studies have stressed that merging franchisee autonomy with the franchisor's desire for uniformity is extremely difficult. This paper aims to provide a systematic review of the relevant empirical studies in order to identify a range of influences, controls, outcomes and associated moderating and mediating factors that offer a better representation of what contributes to the understanding of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. By drawing together findings from a broad range of theoretical perspectives, the evidence was used to develop a comprehensive model of entrepreneurial autonomy in franchised outlets. The model not only provides a structure that brings together prior studies, but also identifies the less researched areas that can advance the management literature on the notion of autonomy in franchising. The research and practitioner implications of the review and its limitations and possible directions for future studies are discussed.     

Organizational Form and Strategic Alignment in a Local Authority: A Preliminary Exploration using Fuzzy Clustering

Configurational theories assume that organizational form has important implications for the degree of alignment between top and middle management on strategic priorities. Taken in combination, the structure, process and environment of an organization are thought to have a deep pervasive influence on top management’s attempts to achieve the coordination and control required to attain organizational goals. The preliminary analysis described in this article employs fuzzy c-means clustering to explore the relationship between middle managers’ perceptions of organizational form and strategic alignment within a large local authority. The results illustrate that the clustering of managers’ perceptions of organizational structure, process and environment reflect three organizational archetypes: machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy and professional adhocracy. Statistically significant differences in the degree of strategic alignment between each of these organizational forms are then examined to validate the established clustering. Finally, conclusions are drawn on the theoretical and practical implications of the findings.     

存在应收账款条件下中小企业不足额质押融资合同设计

债权融资合同和股权融资合同都存在经营者道德风险问题,与对称信息相比都尚存在效率改进的空间。针对此问题,在中小企业质押不足、存在应收账款的前提下,基于非对称信息博弈论给出了利用应收账款进行融资的"条件合同"。研究表明:与单纯的债权合同相比,"条件合同"能有效地减少中小企业谎报项目真实收益、将资金挪为它用投资更高风险项目的激励;与单纯的股权合同相比,"条件合同"能保证中小企业经营者付出更多的努力;进一步,"条件合同"是股权合同的严格帕累托改进,并且在一定条件下也是债权合同的严格帕累托改进。最后以一个算例说明了研究结论的有效性。     

There is more to contracts than incompleteness: a review and assessment of empirical research on inter-firm contract design

This paper aims at achieving a greater understanding of how contracts operate in practice through a review of recent empirical literature on inter-firm contract design. Our focus on the structure of contractual agreements differentiates this review from others that dedicated ample coverage also to the antecedents of the decision to contract and of the choice of contracting versus integration. Our framework develops Stinchcombe’s (Organization Theory and Project Management, 1985) hypothesis that contracts are an organizational phenomenon. This allows us to uncover considerable but unevenly distributed evidence on a number of organizational processes formalized in relational contracts, which partially overlap with the processes that are observed in integrated organizations. It also enables us to describe contracts in terms of a larger number of dimensions than is commonly appreciated. The paper summarizes the evidence by proposing a general and tentative framework to guide the design of relational contracts, discusses a number of lingering issues, and outlines directions for further research on contracts as an organizational phenomenon.

Agencification and Location: Does Agency Site Matter?

Two decades of New Public Management have placed agencifiction high on the agenda of administrative policy-makers. However, agencification (and de-agencification) has been one of the enduring themes of public administration. Agencies organized at arm’s length from ministerial departments have fairly often been located outside of the capital or political centre. Although practitioners tend to assign some weight to central versus peripheral location as regards political-administrative behavior, this relationship has been almost totally ignored by scholars in the field. In this paper, based on a large-N elite survey, we show that agency autonomy, agency influence and inter-institutional coordination seem to be relatively unaffected by agency site. This study also specifies some conditions under which this finding is valid.     

Does strategic corporate performance depend on corporate financial architecture? Empirical study of European,Russian and other emerging market’s firms

Performance of the firm depends on its structural dimensions: capital structure, ownership structure and corporate governance. Their interactions are known as corporate financial architecture according to S. Myers. In this paper we analyze financial architecture which is a mix of ownership structure, capital structure, control and board’s composition, and therefore, provides the given framework for improving corporate performance. We contribute to the literature by different attributes of our study. In contrast to most empirical papers on performance, we develop integrated rather than segmented approach combining the intrinsic components of corporate financial design in one research model. We introduce new variable to capture the structure of ownership for the purpose of performance analysis. Our third contribution is based on comparative analysis of the influence of financial architecture over corporate performance in rather different capital market environment: developed European and emerging (developing) capital market’s countries. We start with a classic empirical model of the impact of ownership structure, capital structure and other components of financial architecture on the corporate performance. Further we verify the validity of exogenous nature of key variables of the classic model when applying it to companies in developed and emerging market environment. Our results could have some important policy implications for the firms in normal economic environment as well as in the period of global economic crisis. We found that the higher proportion of related ownership which indicates investors with significant voting power and the board’s composition affect firm performance positively. The related shareholders and independent directors seem to add more value to firms while the impact of government ownership differs depending on the country. The emerging market’s sample versus the one from developed countries proves the stronger influence of corporate financial architecture over performance.     

Resist or Comply: The Power Dynamics of Organizational Routines during Mergers

The role of power and agency in the development of organizational routines is under‐theorized. In this paper, we draw on an in‐depth qualitative case study of a merger between two academic institutions, a college of art and a university, and examine the diverging responses of two organizational routines (admissions and budgeting) during the course of the merger to understand how power dynamics contribute to resistance/compliance of routines. Our findings suggest that the differences in routines’ responses to a merger initiative can be explained by applying Bourdieu's theory of practice and by employing the concepts of field and symbolic capital to unpack power relations in the context of organizational routines, and to disclose why some routine participants can exercise their agency while others cannot. We find that (a) the field within which a routine operates and (b) the actors’ symbolic capital and position‐taking during change implementation shape routines’ responses to organizational change initiatives.     

合同线性化与线性化合同

本文讨论了不对称信息下委托代理关系中合同的线性化与线性化的合同。我们的出发点是代理人之间的能力差异,由此诱发了同时存在的逆向选择和道德风险问题,为处理这一问题我们得到一个产出呈凹性的支付合同,并对其线性化,考虑到这一参数线性合同系的不稳定性,我们最终以无参数的线性合同来替代,从而更为接近现实中使用的合同。     

Trust and adaptive learning in implicit contracts

Trust is a phenomenon that still is quite rarely investigated in agency theory. According to a common intuitive reasoning, trust should develop over time and it should evolve even in finite implicit-contract relationships. However, if the contracting parties are fully rational, theory cannot explain this. We therefore extend the standard model and develop a model of a finite relationship where the principal promises to pay a voluntary period-by-period bonus if the agent has worked according to the implicit agreement. The agent is boundedly rational and unable to foresee the principal’s future bonus decisions. The principal is, with some probability, honest and pays a promised bonus even in situations where ex-post cheating would be optimal. Based on the agent’s adaptive learning process, we show how trust evolves depending on the principal’s bonus-payment strategy. Depending on different levels of the agent’s bounded rationality, we derive the principal’s optimal pure strategy as part of a unique equilibrium. In an extension we show that the results are robust if the agent has bounded recall. The optimal strategy pattern mirrors a subset of trigger strategies which is exogenous in the standard model. Our findings imply that subjective incentives are more effective with increasing tenure of employees, or, that the optimal level of trust depends on how fast work environments change.     

Moral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit Markets

This paper studies the impact of credit markets on optimal contracting, when the agent's “interim preference” over upcoming contracts is private information because personal financial decisions affect it via the wealth effect. The main result is a severe loss of incentive provision: equilibrium contracts invariably cause the agent to shirk (i.e., exert minimal effort) if the agent's private financial decision precedes moral hazard contracting. The basic intuition is that committing on another private variable, other than the effort level, exposes the parties to further exploitation of efficient risk‐sharing by relaxing the incentive constraint that was binding ex ante, unless the risk‐sharing was fully efficient to begin with.     

JEEA‐FBBVA Lecture 2012: USE AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: A BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951, Econometrica, 19, 293–302), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to the realization of the state of the world, but he may also abuse this flexibility to exploit the agent. We capture this tradeoff in an experimental design and show that principals exhibit a strong preference for the employment contract. However, selfish principals exploit agents in one‐shot interactions, inducing the latter to resist entering into employment contracts. This resistance to employment contracts vanishes if fairness preferences in combination with reputation opportunities keep principals from abusing their power, leading to the widespread, endogenous formation of efficient long‐run employment relations. Our results inform the theory of the firm by showing how behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration—the abuse of authority—and by providing an empirical basis for assessing differences between the Marxian and the Coasian view of the firm, as well as Alchian and Demsetz's (1972, American Economic Review, 62, 777–795) critique of the Coasian approach.