Benchmark Analysis for Quantifying Urban Vulnerability to Terrorist Incidents

We describe a quantitative methodology to characterize the vulnerability of U.S. urban centers to terrorist attack, using a place-based vulnerability index and a database of terrorist incidents and related human casualties. Via generalized linear statistical models, we study the relationships between vulnerability and terrorist events, and find that our place-based vulnerability metric significantly describes both terrorist incidence and occurrence of human casualties from terrorist events in these urban centers. We also introduce benchmark analytic technologies from applications in toxicological risk assessment to this social risk/vulnerability paradigm, and use these to distinguish levels of high and low urban vulnerability to terrorism. It is seen that the benchmark approach translates quite flexibly from its biological roots to this social scientific archetype.     

A Decision Framework for Managing Risk to Airports from Terrorist Attack

This article presents an asset‐level security risk management framework to assist stakeholders of critical assets with allocating limited budgets for enhancing their safety and security against terrorist attack. The proposed framework models the security system of an asset, considers various threat scenarios, and models the sequential decision framework of attackers during the attack. Its novel contributions are the introduction of the notion of partial neutralization of attackers by defenders, estimation of total loss from successful, partially successful, and unsuccessful actions of attackers at various stages of an attack, and inclusion of the effects of these losses on the choices made by terrorists at various stages of the attack. The application of the proposed method is demonstrated in an example dealing with security risk management of a U.S. commercial airport, in which a set of plausible threat scenarios and risk mitigation options are considered. It is found that a combination of providing blast‐resistant cargo containers and a video surveillance system on the airport perimeter fence is the best option based on minimum expected life‐cycle cost considering a 10‐year service period.     

Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Terrorism Risk

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), considerable efforts have been made to estimate the risks of terrorism and the cost effectiveness of security policies to reduce these risks. DHS, industry, and the academic risk analysis communities have all invested heavily in the development of tools and approaches that can assist decisionmakers in effectively allocating limited resources across the vast array of potential investments that could mitigate risks from terrorism and other threats to the homeland. Decisionmakers demand models, analyses, and decision support that are useful for this task and based on the state of the art. Since terrorism risk analysis is new, no single method is likely to meet this challenge. In this article we explore a number of existing and potential approaches for terrorism risk analysis, focusing particularly on recent discussions regarding the applicability of probabilistic and decision analytic approaches to bioterrorism risks and the Bioterrorism Risk Assessment methodology used by the DHS and criticized by the National Academies and others.     

Relative Risk Perception for Terrorism: Implications for Preparedness and Risk Communication

Terrorism presents a significant risk that is often approached at public policy, infrastructure, or emergency management level. Public perceptions of the likelihood of terrorist events, and how this may relate to individual preparedness, are not always extensively examined. The tendency to think that negative events are less likely to happen to oneself than to the average person is known as optimism bias. Optimism bias is relevant to perceptions of terrorism, because it is thought to be related to a reduction in precaution use. Using an online survey of 164 participants, this study aimed to determine whether Sydney residents thought they had a lower likelihood of experiencing terrorist events than other Australians. Significant optimism bias was observed for witnessing terrorist events, but not for personally experiencing terrorist events. In addition, Sydney residents tended to think that terrorist attacks were more likely to occur in Sydney than another major Australian city in the next five years. At the same time, household and workplace preparedness for terrorism was quite low, as was awareness of emergency strategies in the central business district. Perceptions of high likelihood of terrorism happening in one's own city, yet low preparedness present a challenge for risk communication and emergency management strategies. The diversity of possible terrorist targets, and the simple plans that can moderate the effects of a disaster may need to be emphasized in future anti‐terrorism initiatives.     

Recollection Bias and Its Underpinnings: Lessons from Terrorism Risk Assessments

Recollection bias is the phenomenon whereby people who observe a highly unexpected event hold current risk beliefs about a similar event that are no higher than their recollection of their prior beliefs. This article replicates and extends the authors’ previous study of recollection bias in relation to individuals’ perceptions of the risks of terrorism attacks. Over 60% of respondents in a national U.S. sample of over 900 adults believe that the current risk of a future terrorist attack by either an airplane or in a public setting is no higher than they recall having believed, respectively, before the 9/11 attack and before the Boston Marathon bombing. By contrast, a rational Bayesian model would update to a higher currently assessed risk of these previously uncontemplated events. Recollection bias is a persistent trait: individuals who exhibited this bias for the 9/11 attack exhibited it for the Boston Marathon bombing. Only one‐fifth of respondents are free of any type of recollection bias. Recollection bias is negatively correlated with absolute levels of risk belief. Recollection bias in relation to highly unexpected terrorist events—the belief that perceived risks did not increase after the surprise occurrence—dampens support for a variety of anti‐terrorism measures, controlling for the level of risk beliefs and demographic factors. Persistent recollection bias for both 9/11 and the Boston Marathon bombing is especially influential in diminishing support for protective policy measures, such as surveillance cameras in public places. Given that public attitudes influence policy, educating the public about risk is critical.     

Terrorism Risks and Cost‐Benefit Analysis of Aviation Security

We evaluate, for the U.S. case, the costs and benefits of three security measures designed to reduce the likelihood of a direct replication of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. To do so, we assess risk reduction, losses, and security costs in the context of the full set of security layers. The three measures evaluated are installed physical secondary barriers (IPSB) to restrict access to the hardened cockpit door during door transitions, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), and the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) Program. In the process, we examine an alternate policy measure: doubling the budget of the FFDO program to $44 million per year, installing IPSBs in all U.S. aircraft at a cost of $13.5 million per year, and reducing funding for FAMS by 75% to $300 million per year. A break‐even cost‐benefit analysis then finds the minimum probability of an otherwise successful attack required for the benefit of each security measures to equal its cost. We find that the IPSB is costeffective if the annual attack probability of an otherwise successful attack exceeds 0.5% or one attack every 200 years. The FFDO program is costeffective if the annual attack probability exceeds 2%. On the other hand, more than two otherwise successful attacks per year are required for FAMS to be costeffective. A policy that includes IPSBs, an increased budget for FFDOs, and a reduced budget for FAMS may be a viable policy alternative, potentially saving hundreds of millions of dollars per year with consequences for security that are, at most, negligible.     

A Game‐Theoretical Model to Improve Process Plant Protection from Terrorist Attacks

The New York City 9/11 terrorist attacks urged people from academia as well as from industry to pay more attention to operational security research. The required focus in this type of research is human intention. Unlike safety‐related accidents, security‐related accidents have a deliberate nature, and one has to face intelligent adversaries with characteristics that traditional probabilistic risk assessment techniques are not capable of dealing with. In recent years, the mathematical tool of game theory, being capable to handle intelligent players, has been used in a variety of ways in terrorism risk assessment. In this article, we analyze the general intrusion detection system in process plants, and propose a game‐theoretical model for security management in such plants. Players in our model are assumed to be rational and they play the game with complete information. Both the pure strategy and the mixed strategy solutions are explored and explained. We illustrate our model by an illustrative case, and find that in our case, no pure strategy but, instead, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists.     

Asteroid Risk Assessment: A Probabilistic Approach

Following the 2013 Chelyabinsk event, the risks posed by asteroids attracted renewed interest, from both the scientific and policy‐making communities. It reminded the world that impacts from near‐Earth objects (NEOs), while rare, have the potential to cause great damage to cities and populations. Point estimates of the risk (such as mean numbers of casualties) have been proposed, but because of the low‐probability, high‐consequence nature of asteroid impacts, these averages provide limited actionable information. While more work is needed to further refine its input distributions (e.g., NEO diameters), the probabilistic model presented in this article allows a more complete evaluation of the risk of NEO impacts because the results are distributions that cover the range of potential casualties. This model is based on a modularized simulation that uses probabilistic inputs to estimate probabilistic risk metrics, including those of rare asteroid impacts. Illustrative results of this analysis are presented for a period of 100 years. As part of this demonstration, we assess the effectiveness of civil defense measures in mitigating the risk of human casualties. We find that they are likely to be beneficial but not a panacea. We also compute the probability—but not the consequences—of an impact with global effects (“cataclysm”). We conclude that there is a continued need for NEO observation, and for analyses of the feasibility and risk‐reduction effectiveness of space missions designed to deflect or destroy asteroids that threaten the Earth.     

A Methodology for Modeling Regional Terrorism Risk

Over the past decade, terrorism risk has become a prominent consideration in protecting the well‐being of individuals and organizations. More recently, there has been interest in not only quantifying terrorism risk, but also placing it in the context of an all‐hazards environment in which consideration is given to accidents and natural hazards, as well as intentional acts. This article discusses the development of a regional terrorism risk assessment model designed for this purpose. The approach taken is to model terrorism risk as a dependent variable, expressed in expected annual monetary terms, as a function of attributes of population concentration and critical infrastructure. This allows for an assessment of regional terrorism risk in and of itself, as well as in relation to man‐made accident and natural hazard risks, so that mitigation resources can be allocated in an effective manner. The adopted methodology incorporates elements of two terrorism risk modeling approaches (event‐based models and risk indicators), producing results that can be utilized at various jurisdictional levels. The validity, strengths, and limitations of the model are discussed in the context of a case study application within the United States.     

Communicating with the Public About Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attacks: Results from a Survey Experiment on Factors Influencing Intention to “Run,Hide, Tell” in the United Kingdom and Denmark

Effective risk communication is an integral part of responding to terrorism, but until recently, there has been very little pre‐event communication in a European context to provide advice to the public on how to protect themselves during an attack. Following terrorist attacks involving mass shootings in Paris, France, in November 2015, the U.K. National Police Chiefs’ Council released a Stay Safe film and leaflet that advises the public to “run,” “hide,” and “tell” in the event of a firearms or weapons attack. However, other countries, including Denmark, do not provide preparedness information of this kind, in large part because of concern about scaring the public. In this survey experiment, 3,003 U.K. and Danish participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: no information, a leaflet intervention, and a film intervention to examine the impact of “Run, Hide, Tell” advice on perceptions about terrorism, the security services, and intended responses to a hypothetical terrorist firearms attack. Results demonstrate important benefits of pre‐event communication in relation to enhancing trust, encouraging protective health behaviors, and discouraging potentially dangerous actions. However, these findings also suggest that future communications should address perceived response costs and target specific problem behaviors. Cross‐national similarities in response suggest this advice is suitable for adaptation in other countries.     

Behavioral Channels in the Cross‐Market Diffusion of Major Terrorism Shocks

The diffusion mechanism of terrorist shocks to third countries’ stock market responses is explored by employing a Heckit model. Stock market response is broken down to (i) the direction of reaction and (ii) conditional on negative reaction, its magnitude. The analysis puts forward two behavioral factors (memory‐based utility/availability heuristic, social amplification of risk), proxied by past terrorism record and terrorism risk concern as the shocks’ diffusion channels. The findings are that the likelihood and the size of negative stock market reaction increase with terrorism record and risk concern. Additionally, weak evidence is uncovered for a mitigation of risk concern's impact by favorable macroeconomic stance. Furthermore, the impact of behavioral factors, especially over the magnitude of reaction, is robust when controlling for economic linkages. The latter are also significant predictors of the direction of stock market reaction, but not of its magnitude.     

Catastrophe Risk Models for Evaluating Disaster Risk Reduction Investments in Developing Countries

Major natural disasters in recent years have had high human and economic costs, and triggered record high postdisaster relief from governments and international donors. Given the current economic situation worldwide, selecting the most effective disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures is critical. This is especially the case for low‐ and middle‐income countries, which have suffered disproportionally more economic and human losses from disasters. This article discusses a methodology that makes use of advanced probabilistic catastrophe models to estimate benefits of DRR measures. We apply such newly developed models to generate estimates for hurricane risk on residential structures on the island of St. Lucia, and earthquake risk on residential structures in Istanbul, Turkey, as two illustrative case studies. The costs and economic benefits for selected risk reduction measures are estimated taking account of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability. We conclude by emphasizing the advantages and challenges of catastrophe model‐based cost‐benefit analyses for DRR in developing countries.     

A Risk Assessment Framework for the Socioeconomic Impacts of Electricity Transmission Infrastructure Failure Due to Space Weather: An Application to the United Kingdom

Space weather phenomena have been studied in detail in the peer‐reviewed scientific literature. However, there has arguably been scant analysis of the potential socioeconomic impacts of space weather, despite a growing gray literature from different national studies, of varying degrees of methodological rigor. In this analysis, we therefore provide a general framework for assessing the potential socioeconomic impacts of critical infrastructure failure resulting from geomagnetic disturbances, applying it to the British high‐voltage electricity transmission network. Socioeconomic analysis of this threat has hitherto failed to address the general geophysical risk, asset vulnerability, and the network structure of critical infrastructure systems. We overcome this by using a three‐part method that includes (i) estimating the probability of intense magnetospheric substorms, (ii) exploring the vulnerability of electricity transmission assets to geomagnetically induced currents, and (iii) testing the socioeconomic impacts under different levels of space weather forecasting. This has required a multidisciplinary approach, providing a step toward the standardization of space weather risk assessment. We find that for a Carrington‐sized 1‐in‐100‐year event with no space weather forecasting capability, the gross domestic product loss to the United Kingdom could be as high as £15.9 billion, with this figure dropping to £2.9 billion based on current forecasting capability. However, with existing satellites nearing the end of their life, current forecasting capability will decrease in coming years. Therefore, if no further investment takes place, critical infrastructure will become more vulnerable to space weather. Additional investment could provide enhanced forecasting, reducing the economic loss for a Carrington‐sized 1‐in‐100‐year event to £0.9 billion.     

Cost of Equity in Homeland Security Resource Allocation in the Face of a Strategic Attacker

Hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent in homeland security since September 11, 2001. Many mathematical models have been developed to study strategic interactions between governments (defenders) and terrorists (attackers). However, few studies have considered the tradeoff between equity and efficiency in homeland security resource allocation. In this article, we fill this gap by developing a novel model in which a government allocates defensive resources among multiple potential targets, while reserving a portion of defensive resources (represented by the equity coefficient) for equal distribution (according to geographical areas, population, density, etc.). Such a way to model equity is one of many alternatives, but was directly inspired by homeland security resource allocation practice. The government is faced with a strategic terrorist (adaptive adversary) whose attack probabilities are endogenously determined in the model. We study the effect of the equity coefficient on the optimal defensive resource allocations and the corresponding expected loss. We find that the cost of equity (in terms of increased expected loss) increases convexly in the equity coefficient. Furthermore, such cost is lower when: (a) government uses per‐valuation equity; (b) the cost‐effectiveness coefficient of defense increases; and (c) the total defense budget increases. Our model, results, and insights could be used to assist policy making.     

Strategic Alternative Responses to Risks of Terrorism

The terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 were a wake‐up call for changing our traditional response to risks of terrorism. Given that government and worldwide think‐tank organizations maintain that risks of terrorism will continue for the indefinite future, the following questions deserve strategic answers. How long can we respond to terrorism with tactical measures only, sustain current curtailments of some of our freedoms, travel, and quality of life, and absorb losses in human life and properties? Should not underlying strategic motivation lead to the tactical measures? Why do so many groups and individuals in some developing countries hate us? Is it because they fear that the ideas we export through television, movies, literature, and music have a corrupting influence on their cultures? Is it because of past operations that we conducted in such countries as Iran, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Granada? Can the genesis of the risks of terrorism to the homeland be traced to the unfavorable socioeconomic conditions in less‐privileged and developing countries, where civil and religious freedoms are close to nonexistent, and sanitary conditions, health and education, and critical infrastructures of essential utilities are almost at the same level that existed in the United States almost a century ago? If we could make progress at improving the quality of life of the billions of people in the developing countries and become more sensitive to their needs, cultures, and heritage, would their hatred subside? What other measures can we take to reduce their hatred, without compromising our basic cultural and democratic principles or their cultural and social heritage?     

Modeling the Cost Effectiveness of Fire Protection Resource Allocation in the United States: Models and a 1980–2014 Case Study

The estimated cost of fire in the United States is about $329 billion a year, yet there are gaps in the literature to measure the effectiveness of investment and to allocate resources optimally in fire protection. This article fills these gaps by creating data‐driven empirical and theoretical models to study the effectiveness of nationwide fire protection investment in reducing economic and human losses. The regression between investment and loss vulnerability shows high R² values (≈0.93). This article also contributes to the literature by modeling strategic (national‐level or state‐level) resource allocation (RA) for fire protection with equity‐efficiency trade‐off considerations, while existing literature focuses on operational‐level RA. This model and its numerical analyses provide techniques and insights to aid the strategic decision‐making process. The results from this model are used to calculate fire risk scores for various geographic regions, which can be used as an indicator of fire risk. A case study of federal fire grant allocation is used to validate and show the utility of the optimal RA model. The results also identify potential underinvestment and overinvestment in fire protection in certain regions. This article presents scenarios in which the model presented outperforms the existing RA scheme, when compared in terms of the correlation of resources allocated with actual number of fire incidents. This article provides some novel insights to policymakers and analysts in fire protection and safety that would help in mitigating economic costs and saving lives.     

Assessment of the Regional Economic Impacts of Catastrophic Events: CGE Analysis of Resource Loss and Behavioral Effects of an RDD Attack Scenario

We investigate the regional economic consequences of a hypothetical catastrophic event—attack via radiological dispersal device (RDD)—centered on the downtown Los Angeles area. We distinguish two routes via which such an event might affect regional economic activity: (i) reduction in effective resource supply (the resource loss effect) and (ii) shifts in the perceptions of economic agents (the behavioral effect). The resource loss effect relates to the physical destructiveness of the event, while the behavioral effect relates to changes in fear and risk perception. Both affect the size of the regional economy. RDD detonation causes little capital damage and few casualties, but generates substantial short‐run resource loss via business interruption. Changes in fear and risk perception increase the supply cost of resources to the affected region, while simultaneously reducing demand for goods produced in the region. We use results from a nationwide survey, tailored to our RDD scenario, to inform our model values for behavioral effects. Survey results, supplemented by findings from previous research on stigmatized asset values, suggest that in the region affected by the RDD, households may require higher wages, investors may require higher returns, and customers may require price discounts. We show that because behavioral effects may have lingering long‐term deleterious impacts on both the supply‐cost of resources to a region and willingness to pay for regional output, they can generate changes in regional gross domestic product (GDP) much greater than those generated by resource loss effects. Implications for policies that have the potential to mitigate these effects are discussed.     

Use of Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning in Maritime Security Assessment

Over the last few years, there has been a growing international recognition that the security performance of the maritime industry needs to be reviewed on an urgent basis. A large number of optional maritime security control measures have been proposed through various regulations and publications in the post-9/11 era. There is a strong need for a sound and generic methodology, which is capable of taking into account multiple selection criteria such as the cost effectiveness of the measures based on reasonable security assessment. The use of traditional risk assessment and decision-making approaches to deal with potential terrorism threats in a maritime security area reveals two major challenges. They are lack of capability of analyzing security in situations of high-level uncertainty and lack of capability of processing diverse data in a utility form suitable as input to a risk inference mechanism. To deal with such difficulties, this article proposes a subjective security-based assessment and management framework using fuzzy evidential reasoning (ER) approaches. Consequently, the framework can be used to assemble and process subjective risk assessment information on different aspects of a maritime transport system from multiple experts in a systematic way. Outputs of this model can also provide decisionmakers with a transparent tool to evaluate maritime security policy options for a specific scenario in a cost-effective manner.     

Optimal Security Investments and Extreme Risk

In the aftermath of 9/11, concern over security increased dramatically in both the public and the private sector. Yet, no clear algorithm exists to inform firms on the amount and the timing of security investments to mitigate the impact of catastrophic risks. The goal of this article is to devise an optimum investment strategy for firms to mitigate exposure to catastrophic risks, focusing on how much to invest and when to invest. The latter question addresses the issue of whether postponing a risk mitigating decision is an optimal strategy or not. Accordingly, we develop and estimate both a one‐period model and a multiperiod model within the framework of extreme value theory (EVT). We calibrate these models using probability measures for catastrophic terrorism risks associated with attacks on the food sector. We then compare our findings with the purchase of catastrophic risk insurance.     

Guiding Resource Allocations Based on Terrorism Risk

Establishing tolerable levels of risk is one of the most contentious and important risk management decisions. With every regulatory or funding decision for a risk management program, society decides whether or not risk is tolerable. The Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) is a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant program designed to enhance security and overall preparedness to prevent, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism by providing financial assistance for planning, equipment, training, and exercise needs of large urban areas. After briefly reviewing definitions of terrorism risk and rationales for risk-based resource allocation, this article compares estimates of terrorism risk in urban areas that received UASI funding in 2004 to other federal risk management decisions. This comparison suggests that UASI allocations are generally consistent with other federal risk management decisions. However, terrorism risk in several cities that received funding is below levels that are often tolerated in other risk management contexts. There are several reasons why the conclusions about terrorism risk being de minimis in specific cities should be challenged. Some of these surround the means used to estimate terrorism risk for this study. Others involve the comparison that is made to other risk management decisions. However, many of the observations reported are valid even if reported terrorism risk estimates are several orders of magnitude too low. Discussion of resource allocation should be extended to address risk tolerance and include explicit comparisons, like those presented here, to other risk management decisions.