会计信息透明度与公司经营绩效的实证分析

信息透明度是公司治理的重要层面之一,自亚洲金融风暴及一连串的公司弊案之后,上市公司信息透明度及披露质量受高度关注,根据世界银行及亚洲华尔街报导,东亚国家上市公司普遍有信息透明度不高的问题。本文以深圳证券交易所对上市公司的信息披露评分作为信息披露透明度的代理变量,以2005至2006年深市上市公司为样本,探讨信息透明度与公司经营绩效的关连性。实证结果发现当信息透明度较高的公司,经营绩效的表现均优于信息透明度较低的公司。     

公司治理与机构投资人持股之研究

在一连串的管理阶层舞弊案发生后,信息透明度(Information Transparency)成为实务界和学界关心的焦点,而信息透明度为其探讨公司治理制度的重点之一。本研究探讨董监事会的组成、股权结构、薪酬制度和信息透明度等公司治理机制与机构投资人投资间之关系,了解包含信息透明度在内的多项公司治理评量变量是否为机构投资人投资的重要参考指标。研究结果亦显示,董监事持股比例、样本公司所有权透明度与投资者关系透明度与机构投资人持股呈现显著正相关。显示公司治理成效愈佳及信息透明度越高的企业,将较易吸引机构投资人的青睐。     

公司信息透明度与大股东资金占用研究

本文以2002-2006年非金融类的中国A股上市公司为研究对象,分析了公司信息透明度与大股东资金占用之间的关系.研究发现,在控制其它影响因素条件下,公司信息透明度越差,大股东资金占用问题越严重.该研究结论表明,提高公司信息透明度将有助于改善大股东与中小股东之间的信息不对称,缓解二者之间的代理冲突,减少大股东资金占用的可能性.     

公司治理与上市公司信息披露违规的实证研究

本文以2002-2007年的公司数据为研究样本,用二分类logistic回归检验公司治理机制对上市公司信息披露违规的影响,发现:提高公司高管人员的持股比例、增加第一大股东持股比例、适当的董事会会议强度可以减少信息披露违规行为;上市公司所在地区的市场化程度越高、政府干预程度越低、法治及中介组织发育水平越高,上市公司信息披露越合规;审计意见为标准无保留的公司有更高的信息披露质量;两职兼任、独立董事比例、委员会数量对公司透明度均为无显著影响;会计绩效越好、资产负债率越低,公司的信息披露行为越规范。     

提高上市公司透明度:以自愿性信息披露为手段

上市公司透明度对规范证券市场运转和提高上市公司价值有重要作用,而当前我国上市公司透明度不高,已严重扰乱了资本市场的秩序。文章以自愿性信息披露为公司透明度的替代变量,分析了影响自愿性信息披露的因素,提出了建立自愿性信息披露机制的建议,以提高上市公司透明度。     

公司治理结构与会计信息透明度相关性研究——以深市制造业企业为例

采用多元线性回归分析,运用2012年深市制造业上市公司数据考察公司治理结构与会计信息透明度的相关性。研究表明:第一大股东的持股比例、两职合一、资产负债率与会计信息透明度负相关,其他股东对第一大股东的制衡、无限售条件股份、监事会规模、高管持股比例与会计信息透明度正相关,董事会规模与独立董事比例与会计信息透明度无显著关系。提出改善公司会计信息透明度的建议。     

上市公司财务信息透明度对公司绩效的影响——基于不同股权集中度的对比

本文以2008～2011年深市A股408家上市公司为样本,用实证方法检验了财务信息透明度对企业绩效的影响。研究得出：财务信息透明度的提高可以在一定范围内提升企业绩效;较高的股权集中程度会削弱财务信息透明度对企业绩效的提升作用。     

信息透明度与经理薪酬契约有效性:来自中国证券市场的经验证据

本文以2003-2006年深圳证券交易所A股上市公司为研究对象,实证考察信息透明度对经理薪酬契约有效性的影响,试图从经理薪酬契约角度重新诠释信息透明度的经济后果.研究发现,信息透明度能够显著提高经理薪酬契约的有效性.具体而言,信息透明度越高的公司,经理薪酬业绩敏感性越高,经理薪酬与盈利业绩和亏损业绩之间的非对称性越小.研究还发现,与非国有企业相比,国有上市公司信息透明度对经理薪酬契约有效性的影响更加显著.本研究论证了信息透明度在减少股东与经理之间的信息不对称和降低公司代理成本中的重要作用.     

我国家族上市公司信息透明度研究

信息披露及其透明度是证券市场信息公开制度的核心内容,也是公司治理重要的外部监督机制之一,信息透明度的高低直接关系到公司治理的成败。当前,我国家族上市公司信息披露违规情况较为严重,信息透明度较低,从而降低了公司治理效率,影响了公司绩效。因此,完善我国家族上市公司的信息披露制度是提高公司治理效率的重要保障。     

稳健性对公司信息披露行为的影响研究——基于会计信息透明度的视角

本文以我国上市公司会计信息透明度为切入点,探讨稳健性对公司信息披露行为的影响.初步检验表明,稳健性和会计信息透明度之间呈倒U型关系,即在适度范围内,稳健性的增强有助于提升会计信息透明度,而由极端向下盈余管理引起的“过度稳健”则导致会计信息透明度下降.进一步检验发现,在剔除了盈余管理的影响后,稳健性的增强有助于提高会计信息透明度.这些结果表明,在不受盈余管理动机干扰情况下,稳健性的增强有助于缓解信息不对称水平.但是,如果企业假借稳健之名而实施极端向下的盈余管理反而会加重信息不对称程度.因此,应在大力倡导公司实施适度稳健会计的同时,需谨防公司假借稳健会计之名实行极端向下的盈余管理,会计稳健性的运用应保持一个合理的度.     

多元化、公司业绩与总经理变更

总经理变更是公司内部治理的重要手段,其业绩敏感性受到多种因素的影响,以2002年～2007年沪深两市702家A股上市公司的数据为样本,探讨多元化经营对总经理变更绩效敏感性及其业绩改进效应的影响,为公司经营模式对公司治理效率的影响提供经验证据,利用传统的Logistic回归、边际效应分析以及面板数据随机效应回归对多元化和总经理变更的关系进行研究。实证结果表明,多元化降低了总经理变更的业绩敏感性,多元化公司总经理变更的概率与资产收益率代表的多元化公司业绩变化没有显著的关系,即使在公司业绩下降的条件下,股东替换总经理的动机也弱于集中化公司;多元化公司总经理变更后的资产重组行为规模显著弱于集中化公司,带来的业绩改进也小于集中化公司。     

融资融券对上市公司治理影响的研究

以融资融券机制推出为背景, 运用我国内地A股市场上市公司为样本, 研究了融资融券对上市公司治理水平的影响.回归结果显示, 成为融资融券标的后, 上市公司高管离职与高管薪酬对于公司绩效的黏性均有提高, 表明融资融券可以作为外部公司治理机制.机制检验显示融资融券是通过促进公司信息释放而提升公司治理水平的.进一步分析显示, 当公司面临行业竞争压力较小或面临财务约束时, 融资融券对于公司治理的促进作用更加明显.最后, 将融资和融券分开分析, 发现融资机制和融券机制均对公司治理有提升作用.证明了融资融券机制可以提高资本市场对企业的监督, 促进企业信息释放, 从而提高上市公司治理水平.     

Do CEOs exercise managerial discretion to save their jobs?

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) wield considerable power and authority. In many industries and contexts, CEO turnover is studied in terms of antecedents, the event itself, and the related consequences. However, the extent to which CEOs exert their power and attempt to prevent their dismissal has not been thoroughly examined. In this study, we examine the role of CEOs exercising managerial discretion in their effort to prevent their own corporate demise. We hypothesize that CEOs cut discretionary expenses such as research and development, advertising, and rent in order to boost earnings and enhance financial performance. A sample of CEO turnover from Standard and Poor’s ExecComp database for the period 1992–1998 in US firms yielded 474 turnover firms and 2,066 control firm-years. We tested the effects of CEO turnover and managerial discretion on firm performance measured by cumulative abnormal stock returns. We also compared the turnover and non-turnover firms in terms of pattern of discretionary spending prior to CEO turnover. The results are consistent with our prediction that CEOs facing termination attempt to post higher earnings by reducing discretionary spending after controlling for firm performance, firm diversification, book to market ratio, and CEO ownership, industry-, and year dummies.     

董事会特征与总经理变更

本文以在上海证券交易所1999年前上市的公司为样本,研究董事会特征等治理变量对总经理变更的影响。研究结果表明,对相对业绩下降公司的总经理变更能起到显著解释作用的变量只有董事会会议的次数和公司的领导结构。而其它治理变量,诸如董事会规模、管理董事比例、独立董事比例、股权集中度、董事会成员持股比例等,未能对总经理变更起到显著的解释作用。     

The double-edged sword of CEO/chairperson duality in corporatized state-owned firms: evidence from top management turnover in China

This study examines how board leadership structure (CEO duality) affects the corporate governance of corporatized state-owned firms where the state shareholders use these firms to serve both profit and non-profit objectives. We propose that CEO duality will generate a positive (negative) significant impact on the firms’ corporate governance when state owners tend to monitor their CEOs on the basis of profit (non-profit) considerations. We test our hypotheses by examining the relations between CEO duality and CEO turnover in Chinese listed companies that are ultimately controlled by central or local governments. We find that CEO duality is negatively related to turnover in marginal profit-making firms where turnover would be value-enhancing. This suggests that CEO duality is detrimental to these firms’ corporate governance because it entrenches relatively poorly performing CEOs. Duality is also negatively related to turnover in high-profitability firms where turnover would be non-value-enhancing. This suggests that CEO duality might positively contribute to the corporate governance of these firms by reducing the occurrence of non-value enhancing turnover. Overall, our study suggests that CEO duality is a double-edged sword in corporatized state-owned firms.     

When do leaders matter? Ownership,governance and the influence of CEOs on firm performance

Leadership and strategic management research suggests that the extent to which CEOs influence performance largely depends on the presence or absence of certain factors. These factors may include the characteristics of the task at hand, subordinates, the organization itself or the external environment. Among these factors, a fundamental contingency that has received little empirical attention is an organization's ownership and governance structure—that is, who owns and monitors the organization. In this paper, we outline how different ownership and governance structures can present the opportunity for, or limit, leader influence and empirically examine the extent to which CEO effects on financial performance depend on these structures. Examining organizations in the same industry but with different ownership and governance structures, our results suggest that these structures are closely aligned with the degree to which CEOs influence firm performance. Our findings support the notion that leaders matter most when ownership and governance structures correspond with a weak or ambiguous institutional logic. This study contributes new insight into the “opportunity structure” of CEO influence, that is, the organizational factors that shape leader discretion and, hence, condition the CEO's level of influence over firm performance.     

Does Board Ethnic Diversity Impact Board Monitoring Outcomes?

This study investigates whether board ethnic diversity is associated with stronger board monitoring outcomes. We explore a range of outcomes – CEO compensation, accounting misstatements, CEO turnover–performance sensitivity and acquisition performance – but find no evidence to support this. We also find no evidence that board ethnic diversity improves overall firm performance, even for those firms with higher agency problems. Our results are robust across different methodologies and have important practical implications, by informing the current public policy debate on board ethnic diversity.     

The personality factor: how top management teams make decisions. A literature review

Past research has increasingly suggested that CEO/TMT personality can play a relevant role in influencing various external (e.g. firm performance) and internal (e.g. firm organizational structure) management outcomes. These promising results need appropriate systematization and discussion, which we aim at providing through a literature review based on rigorous inclusion/exclusion criteria. Our analysis shows great heterogeneity in regard to both the personality traits and the personality based management outcomes explored by the investigated population of studies. Thus, we specifically use the framework provided by the Five-Factor Model (FFM) of personality to codify the publications and this framework allows us to identify some possible theoretical trajectories. These trajectories mainly regard the empirical testing of the highlighted associations between CEO emotional stability, extraversion and conscientiousness with bureaucratization, strategic pro-activity and firm performance. Our article is primarily intended for those scholars and practitioners who want to improve their knowledge about psychology-based decision making and behavioural corporate governance through the understanding of how CEO/TMT personality can affect their strategic decisions.     

Relational Ownership and CEO Continuity: A Property Rights Perspective

Inspired by agency theory, research on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) succession often focuses on turnovers as a mechanism to discipline CEOs in the event of poor firm performance. Recent research extends this view by showing that CEO turnovers can also lead to substantial disruption in a firm's management. Less is known, however, about the antecedents of disruption and continuity in the context of CEO turnovers. Drawing on modern property rights theory, we investigate how CEO continuity varies across different types of firms. Using a sample of Swiss publicly traded firms, we find that relational ownership enhances the likelihood of CEOs staying in office or moving to the position of board chair. Firms with little relational ownership, in contrast, display a high degree of CEO continuity only when capital intensity is high. Provided that a CEO turnover occurs, relational ownership and capital intensity reduce the likelihood of interim CEO successions. These findings highlight the importance of a nuanced view of CEO continuity, taking into account owner types as well as contextual factors.