Narcissistic CEOs and executive compensation

Narcissism is characterized by traits such as dominance, self-confidence, a sense of entitlement, grandiosity, and low empathy. There is growing evidence that individuals with these characteristics often emerge as leaders, and that narcissistic CEOs may make more impulsive and risky decisions. We suggest that these tendencies may also affect how compensation is allocated among top management teams. Using employee ratings of personality for the CEOs of 32 prominent high-technology firms, we investigate whether more narcissistic CEOs have compensation packages that are systematically different from their less narcissistic peers, and specifically whether these differences increase the longer the CEO stays with the firm. As predicted, we find that more narcissistic CEOs who have been with their firm longer receive more total direct compensation (salary, bonus, and stock options), have more money in their total shareholdings, and have larger discrepancies between their own (higher) compensation and the other members of their team.     

“See You in Court”: How CEO narcissism increases firms' vulnerability to lawsuits

Although some researchers have suggested that narcissistic CEOs may have a positive influence on organizational performance (e.g., Maccoby, 2007; Patel & Cooper, 2014), a growing body of evidence suggests that organizations led by narcissistic CEOs experience considerable downsides, including evidence of increased risk taking, overpaying for acquisitions, manipulating accounting data, and even fraud. In the current study we show that narcissistic CEO's subject their organizations to undue legal risk because they are overconfident about their ability to win and less sensitive to the costs to their organizations of such litigation. Using a sample of 32 firms, we find that those led by narcissistic CEOs are more likely to be involved in litigation and that these lawsuits are more protracted. In two follow-up experimental studies, we examine the mechanism underlying the relationship between narcissism and lawsuits and find that narcissists are less sensitive to objective assessments of risk when making decisions about whether to settle a lawsuit and less willing to take advice from experts. We discuss the implications of our research for advancing theories of narcissism and CEO influence on organizational performance.     

Birds of a feather?: Firm sales growth and narcissism in the upper echelons at the CEO-TMT interface

Blending conceptual framing from the CEO-TMT interface literature with upper echelons decision-making theory, we develop a model of the role of CEO narcissism and narcissism in the upper echelons. We argue that narcissistic CEOs tend to have higher narcissism in their Top Management Teams (N-TMTs). In turn, TMTs characterized by narcissism can benefit from positive aspects of narcissism while avoiding its pitfalls; especially when strategic decision speed is slower and behavioral integration is higher. In a field study of 104 TMTs from publicly-listed South Korean firms, we find an association between narcissistic CEOs and N-TMT, and that N-TMT mediates in the indirect, conditional relationship between CEO narcissism and sales growth. We also invoke threshold theory in anticipation that outcomes associated with N-TMT may be nonlinear. In support of our threshold hypothesis, we find a curvilinear relationship between N-TMT and sales growth; and this curvilinear relationship is stronger for a small number of TMTs scoring high on N-TMT (> +2SD), where TMTs’ activities are defined by deliberative integration. The pattern of results we report provides evidence for the importance of accounting for narcissism in the upper echelons as a predictor of sales growth, and key contextual moderators of this relationship.     

CEO grandiose narcissism and firm performance: The role of organizational identification

This study reconciles the positive and negative sides of CEO grandiose narcissism by examining the role that CEO organizational identification plays in moderating the effect of CEO grandiose narcissism on top management team (TMT) behavioral integration. We first distinguish between grandiose and vulnerable narcissism and we then draw on upper echelons theory and executive personality research to hypothesize and test a model in which CEO grandiose narcissism is positively related to TMT behavioral integration when CEOs are high in organizational identification. The relationship is expected to be negative when CEOs do not identify strongly with their organizations. TMT behavioral integration, in turn, predicts subsequent firm performance. Findings based on multi-source data from a sample of 97 CEOs and their firms supported the hypotheses. These results highlight the complex nature of CEO grandiose narcissism – namely, that the construct has both positive and negative aspects as it relates to top management team dynamics and firm performance and that the relationship is affected by CEOs' identification with their organizations.     

CEO humility,narcissism and firm innovation: A paradox perspective on CEO traits

We examine how two seemingly contradictory yet potentially complementary CEO traits—humility and narcissism—interact to affect firm innovation. We adopt a paradox perspective and propose that individuals can have paradoxical traits and that, in particular, humility and narcissism can coexist harmoniously, especially among the Chinese, whose philosophical tradition embraces paradoxical thinking and behaving. CEOs that are both humble and narcissistic are hypothesized to be more likely to have socialized charisma, to cultivate an innovative culture, and to deliver innovative performance. Two studies using multisource data involving 63 CEOs, 328 top managers, and 645 middle managers in Study 1 and 143 CEOs and 190 top managers in Study 2 support the hypotheses and point to new directions for studying CEO traits and their effects on firm outcomes.     

Re‐examining the Glass Cliff Hypothesis using Survival Analysis: The Case of Female CEO Tenure

We use the glass cliff to study the appointment and employment duration of 193 female CEOs between 1992 and 2014 in a sample of large, small and mid‐size North American firms. Consistent with the glass cliff, we find that women are appointed as CEOs in precarious situations. However, we find female CEOs are 40% less likely to face turnover at any point after appointment than male CEOs. This conflicts with an implication of the glass cliff and differs significantly from existing research which shows that female CEOs have only a slightly lower risk of turnover than male CEOs. Our larger, more recent sample captures changes in the labour market that explain the departure from the results of earlier studies. We find evidence that the lower turnover rate of female CEOs is related to firms’ desire to avoid the negative publicity that would accompany their termination, and we also show that greater education has a positive impact on CEO job security.     

Narcissistic leadership

Narcissism—a personality trait encompassing grandiosity, arrogance, self-absorption, entitlement, fragile self-esteem, and hostility—is an attribute of many powerful leaders. Narcissistic leaders have grandiose belief systems and leadership styles, and are generally motivated by their needs for power and admiration rather than empathetic concern for the constituents and institutions they lead. However, narcissists also possess the charisma and grand vision that are vital to effective leadership. We review and critically assess the theoretical and research literature on narcissistic leaders in order to understand the potential positive and negative consequences of their leadership, the trajectories of their leadership, and the relationship of narcissism to established models of leadership. We conclude that the study of narcissistic leaders is inherently limited in scope, and propose a new definition of narcissistic leadership in order to reframe the discussion and better incorporate the topic of narcissism into the field of leadership studies.     

The impact of family CEO’s ownership and the moderating effect of the second largest owner in private family firms

This study explores two ownership issues in private family firms. First, we investigate the relationship between the ownership of family CEOs and firm performance, and postulate that this relationship in private family firms is more complex than the inverted “U” relationship found in public family firms. Second, we predict a potential moderating effect of the second largest owner, who may exert a monitoring role on family CEOs. We focus on private family firms as recent studies show that private family firms have distinct features compared to public family firms, and that findings documented in public family firms may not apply to the ubiquitous, but much less studied, private family firms. We have applied agency theory to develop the two hypotheses, used secondary data on a large sample of private family firms, utilized an adjusted conventional quadratic technique to test the hypotheses, and validated the findings using a second method of piecewise linear specification. The results show that the non-linear relationship between the ownership of family CEOs and firm performance is more complicated than the often-documented inverted “U” shape from public firms. Meanwhile, the second largest owner with a high enough ownership stake can impose a positive moderating effect by mitigating potential agency problems caused by family CEOs.     

Does owner CEO narcissism promote exporting SMEs' market spreading strategy? Joint effects of asset-specific investments and firm exporting experience

This study explores the influence of owner chief executive officer (CEO) narcissism on the market spreading strategy of exporting small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs). Combining insights from the literature on CEO narcissism and trait activation theory, it is argued that SMEs with narcissistic owner CEOs are more likely to prefer a market spreading strategy, depending on firm-level asset-specific investments and exporting experience. The empirical analysis of a sample of 248 exporting SMEs in China supports the theoretical prediction that owner CEO narcissism has a positive impact on the preference toward a market spreading strategy. In addition, the results show that asset-specific investments weaken the positive influence of owner CEO narcissism on the preference of a market spreading strategy, but this negative moderating effect becomes less significant as SMEs gain more exporting experience. This paper contributes to the emerging research on the role of owner CEO narcissism in firm internationalization decisions, offering a more complete understanding of the extent to which owner CEO narcissism can influence exporting SMEs' tendency toward market spreading, and delineating how such influence may be dependent on organizational-level situational factors.     

Charisma,Macht und Narzissmus

Charisma, power and narcissism. On the diagnostics of an ambivalent leading qualityManagers are often obviously narcissistic personalities with “charismatic qualities”. The author discusses the background of these qualities and their ambivalence, because behind the brilliance of a successful manager may be a hidden narcissistic problem as the actual motive power. Nevertheless a constructive narcissism is to be distinguished from a destructive one. Charismatic constellations as well as narcissistic dynamics are to be understood not only as an individual problem but as an interactional phenomenon, involving both sides of a relationship. In order to explain these dynamics, the author presents the concepts of “narcissistic collusion” and “expanded self”. It is of great importance to the coach, to be able to analyse and to deal with these relational patterns — and also to preserve oneself from being involved in such narcissistic dynamics.     

CEO Reciprocal Interlocks in French Corporations

In France the chairperson of the board is mostoften the firm's CEO. This position strengthensthe insiders' hold on the board of directors.Moreover, a large fraction of outside directorsis composed of CEOs of other firms. Thereciprocal interlocking of CEOs creates the possibility of mutual interdependence of CEOs.We investigate factors explaining reciprocalinterlocking directorates of CEOs in Frenchcorporations. Our results indicate that CEOs oflarger firms hold more reciprocal CEOinterlocks and when CEOs have more outsidedirectorships, CEOs hold more reciprocalrelationships. We also find a positiverelationship between the number of CEOsreciprocal interlocks and their firms'performance measured by ROA. We find evidencethat CEOs hold more reciprocal interlocks whena blockholder is present on the CEO's board.     

Gaining the ultimate power edge: Women in the dual role of CEO and Chair

Using archival data, the authors explored whether female CEOs possess as much structural power as male CEOs and what demographic characteristics are essential for female CEOs to have in order to increase their structural power in their firms. The authors use status characteristics and human capital theories to develop hypotheses. Findings show that female CEOs do not possess as much structural power as male CEOs as proxied by attaining a dual CEO/Chair role in the firm. Instead of dual CEO and Chair roles, female CEOs are more likely to be given the less powerful role of CEO and President. Moreover, female CEOs are more likely to gain structural power if they are entrepreneurs, work in large companies, or possess an elite education.     

Do CEOs exercise managerial discretion to save their jobs?

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) wield considerable power and authority. In many industries and contexts, CEO turnover is studied in terms of antecedents, the event itself, and the related consequences. However, the extent to which CEOs exert their power and attempt to prevent their dismissal has not been thoroughly examined. In this study, we examine the role of CEOs exercising managerial discretion in their effort to prevent their own corporate demise. We hypothesize that CEOs cut discretionary expenses such as research and development, advertising, and rent in order to boost earnings and enhance financial performance. A sample of CEO turnover from Standard and Poor’s ExecComp database for the period 1992–1998 in US firms yielded 474 turnover firms and 2,066 control firm-years. We tested the effects of CEO turnover and managerial discretion on firm performance measured by cumulative abnormal stock returns. We also compared the turnover and non-turnover firms in terms of pattern of discretionary spending prior to CEO turnover. The results are consistent with our prediction that CEOs facing termination attempt to post higher earnings by reducing discretionary spending after controlling for firm performance, firm diversification, book to market ratio, and CEO ownership, industry-, and year dummies.     

Human capital and agency effects on CEO compensation of IPO biopharmaceutical firms and the market’s response

This paper examines the determinants of base pay and total incentive compensation packages of CEOs of biopharmaceutical firms that have recently gone public, and whether human capital and agency factors affect the market’s response to the initial public offering. We find that in terms of net proceeds, the IPO market appears to reward the firms that have founder-CEOs and CEOs with higher incentive compensation. CEOs with prior venture capital experience are associated with receiving higher incentive compensation, while CEOs with a greater ownership interest in the firm receive lower incentive compensation but higher salaries. CEOs of firms with a greater percentage of insiders are associated with lower salaries. The results should add to our understanding related to human capital and agency theories, as well as help firms and investors better understand and structure CEO compensation.     

Investor response to appointment of female CEOs and CFOs

We study the impact of appointing women to top executive positions from an investor perspective. We analyze whether shareholders value announcement of appointment of women to top positions differently than they do appointment of men. This study uses an international sample of 100 announcements of top executive appointments of women who replace men and investigates how shareholders respond to such appointments. This research combines an event study with a matched pair analysis to compare the response from investors regarding appointment of female versus male CEOs and CFOs. We establish that investors do not seem to value appointment of women significantly differently from that of men. This finding suggests that, from the investor perspective, there appears to be no business case for a particular gender when it comes to appointing a CEO or CFO.     

Emotionally intelligent top management and high family firm performance: Evidence from Germany

Executives in family firms are often confronted with emotionally loaded issues, in part due to the need to include the interests of the owning family. Given this context, we hypothesize how high family-firm performance is affected by the emotional intelligence (EI) of a family-based CEO and top-management team (TMT), in addition to the CEO's transformational leadership (TFL) and TMT's behavioral integration. Survey measures were taken from a random sample of 72 CEOs of German family firms and 245 members of their TMTs. We found that TMT behavioral integration mediates between CEO TFL and objective firm performance while CEO EI is significantly related to both CEO TFL and TMT EI. Implications are discussed for future research thereby suggesting an extension to upper-echelon theory.     

The causes of gender diversity in Malaysian large firms

The issue of women’s representation at the decision-making level in Malaysia has received special attention from the Government since 2004, the year in which it adopted a policy requiring that 30 % of the posts at the decision-making level in the public sector be filled by women. In 2011, the policy was extended to the private sector where 30 % of listed firms’ board seats are to be allocated to women with 2016 being the deadline for compliance. To this end, this paper aims at examining the factors that determine the appointment of women to the boards of Malaysian large firms. Large firms were chosen in this study because they have the resources and the capacity to adopt the policy more readily than smaller firms. The results reveal that gender diversity is positively associated with board size and the presence of family on the board. That is, the larger the board, the more likely it is that women sit on it. The fact that the presence of women on the board is associated with the presence of one or more family members on the board means that the appointment of women to the board is very much influenced by family ties rather than commercial reasons. The results also reveal a positive association between board independence and the proportion of women directors. Further, it is found that board independence is associated positively with the presence of independent women directors. Finally, the results show that firm performance is negatively associated with gender diversity. That is, firms with low financial performance are more likely to have women on their boards. Hence, taken altogether, the evidence suggests that the appointment of women to the board is very much driven by tokenism and family connection rather than by the business case.     

Hedging and accounting-based RPE contracts for powerful CEOs

Several firms prohibit their CEOs from trading in the stock of peer firms. This is puzzling since hedging by the CEO through private trading in the capital market can reduce the CEO’s exposure to systematic compensation risk. When the CEO’s incentive contract comprises relative performance evaluation, we find that the firm might want to disallow private hedging even though there are no technological interdependencies or strategic interactions to peer firms. In the analysis, we highlight two frequently observed characteristics of incentive contracts. First, the use of accounting benchmarks is widespread in compensation contracts for CEOs. Second, empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that powerful CEOs have influence on the process of designing their own compensation. We find that in the presence of a powerful CEO, the firm can benefit from disallowing private hedging. In particular, the firm’s decision to allow or to disallow private hedging depends on the characteristics of the accounting benchmarks and the characteristics of the peer firms.     

The double-edged sword of CEO/chairperson duality in corporatized state-owned firms: evidence from top management turnover in China

This study examines how board leadership structure (CEO duality) affects the corporate governance of corporatized state-owned firms where the state shareholders use these firms to serve both profit and non-profit objectives. We propose that CEO duality will generate a positive (negative) significant impact on the firms’ corporate governance when state owners tend to monitor their CEOs on the basis of profit (non-profit) considerations. We test our hypotheses by examining the relations between CEO duality and CEO turnover in Chinese listed companies that are ultimately controlled by central or local governments. We find that CEO duality is negatively related to turnover in marginal profit-making firms where turnover would be value-enhancing. This suggests that CEO duality is detrimental to these firms’ corporate governance because it entrenches relatively poorly performing CEOs. Duality is also negatively related to turnover in high-profitability firms where turnover would be non-value-enhancing. This suggests that CEO duality might positively contribute to the corporate governance of these firms by reducing the occurrence of non-value enhancing turnover. Overall, our study suggests that CEO duality is a double-edged sword in corporatized state-owned firms.     

PERFORMANCE AND BEHAVIOR OF FAMILY FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM THE FRENCH STOCK MARKET

This paper empirically documents the performance and behavior of family firms listed on the French stock exchange between 1994 and 2000. On the French stock market, approximately one third of the firms are widely held, whereas the remaining two thirds are family firms. We find that, in the cross‐section, family firms largely outperform widely held corporations. This result holds for founder‐controlled firms, professionally managed family firms, but more surprisingly also for firms run by descendants of the founder. We offer explanations for the good performance of family firms. First, we present evidence of a more efficient use of labor in heir‐managed firms. These firms pay lower wages, even allowing for skill and age structure. We also find that descendants smooth out industry shocks and manage to honor implicit labor contracts. Second, we present evidence consistent with outside CEOs in family firms making a more parsimonious use of capital. They employ more unskilled, cheap labor, use less capital, pay lower interest rates on debt and initiate more profitable acquisitions. (JEL: G32, L25, J31)