“智猪博弈”在企业一般培训策略中的运用

人力资本是企业的核心竞争力。企业对员工进行培训就是人力资本投资,有巨大的收益但也存在培训后员工流失的风险。由于企业的规模和经营特点不同,其对人才进行培训后面临的流失风险也不同。大企业由于高薪、发展前景好的优势,人才流失的风险小,因此,现实中对员工进行培训的行为多发生在大企业当中。本文试从博弈论的角度来分析这一问题的成因。     

浅析企业人力资本投资

企业人力资本投资是人力资本投资的具体形式之一,它是人力资本投资主体(企业、员工个体或政府)通过一定量的投入,增加与企业工作有关的人力资本投资客体的各种技能水平的一种投资活动。本文首先阐述了企业人力资本投资的理论基础;接着对人力资本投资的收益和风险进行了分析;最后对人力资本投资的政策提出了建议。     

电子企业员工培训后流失的风险探讨

随着电子行业所面临的竞争不断加剧,培训成了企业和企业内部员工的共同需求。然而,由于人力资本的特殊性及企业内外环境的复杂性、不确定性,造就了企业培训投资具有很高的风险性。培训后员工的流失风险是企业培训风险中的最大风险。如何降低、减弱这种风险对企业的损伤程度,向来是各企业研究培训风险的重点。本人在对电子行业企业员工培训后流失现象及原因分析的基础上,从预防风险、减轻风险和回避风险等三个层面提出了应对员工培训后流失风险的尝试性举措,希望对电子行业企业在做好有关这方面的风险防范有所帮助。     

酒店人力资本投资取向

酒店作为劳动密集型企业,核心竞争力是以服务为核心的产品组合,而服务质量的高低取决于员工的服务意识和服务技能。要想获得最大的效益,必须重视人力资本投资。本文通过对投资对象与投资内容的阐述,为酒店降低投资风险,提高收益提供借鉴。     

博弈论在企业人力资本投资中的应用

一个企业能否在市场中取得经济优势,依赖于企业科技优势、产品的市场适应性等等,而这一切又源于人才优势。但是统计调查显示,我国企业对于员工的培训现状不尽如人意,本文通过对我国企业员工培训和员工个人的博弈分析,认为应该根据自身需要对员工进行培训,并且企业应采取措施挽留住接受了人力资本投资的员工。     

基于雇主品牌时代下人力资源管理战略初探

本文在分析国内雇主品牌发展现状的基础上提出了四大人力资源管理应对策略：①以快乐工作为本,让员工找到更深层次的快乐;②加大人力资本投资力度,确保培训系统协调运行;③完善企业内部职业生涯管理体系,确保人力资源竞争优势;④加快建立核心员工长期激励机制进程。这四大策略对置身于雇主品牌时代的中国企业而言有一定的启发作用。     

企业员工培训的问题与对策

当今企业的核心竞争力取决于员工的素质,而培训是提高员工素质的主要手段,其实质是一种人力资本投资,可以使人力资本的价值得到提升,从而提升企业的竞争力。一、企业员工培训存在的问题1.思想观念陈旧,对培训不重视。首先,企业领导对培训不重视。由于培训见效慢,不可能在短期内     

不同职业生涯阶段心理契约的实证研究

本研究采取调查问卷的方式对不同地区企事业单位的400名员工实行有效测量,通过统计数据的分析,结合职业生涯发展阶段理论,探讨不同员工生涯阶段的心理契约。研究结果表明,组织人际责任在员工职业生涯发展的各阶段都处于较高水平;组织发展责任和组织规范责任在职业生涯的维持阶段和衰退阶段显著高于发展阶段和探索阶段。管理者要依据心理契约的变化特征,科学有效地进行职业生涯管理,促进企业可持续发展。     

个体职业生涯管理对专用性人力资本的影响研究

本文基于人力资本理论,探讨中国情境下的员工职业生涯管理对专用性人力资本的作用机制。以202名知识型员工为研究对象,运用结构方程模型的方法进行实证分析。研究结果显示,员工职业生涯发展影响人力资本专用性水平,在个体职业生涯管理的三个维度中,职业探索、职业目标和职业策略对员工专用性人力资本有显著的正向影响。     

企业薪酬安排方式的相机选择分析——基于所有者与经理人人力资本在企业发展中相对重要性的变化

企业不同形式的薪酬安排是人力资本的有效收益选择的过程,是一个与人力资本拥有量、个人风险偏好、企业收益相关的博弈过程。本文在回顾企业薪酬理论和现有人力资本理论研究成果的基础上,从企业所有人(主要提供非人力资本)与经理人的人力资本在企业发展中的相对重要性变化的角度,对人力资本分享企业剩余索取权的方式,即对企业薪酬安排的基本形式进行了多维度的分析与总结。本文指出,若剩余索取权完全归企业所有人,则适合实施固定薪酬制;若剩余索取权归所有人和上市企业管理人员共同分享,则适合实施分成薪酬制;若剩余索取权完全归上市企业管理人员掌握,则适合实施额薪酬制。薪酬计划与企业在不同发展阶段的经营战略相一致,能够保证企业剩余分享收益方式成为一种有效的人力资本激励方式,从而提高企业绩效,使企业长远发展获得制度上的保证。     

Why Do Women's Wages Increase So Slowly Throughout Their Career? A Dynamic Model of Statistical Discrimination

Abstract. The aim of this paper is to explain the growing wage differentials between men and women during their working careers. We provide a dynamic model of statistical discrimination, which integrates specific human capital decisions: on‐the‐job training investment and wages are endogenously determined. We reveal a small wage differential at the beginning of women's career, but women's wages increase more slowly; this is partly due to a lower level of human capital investment by women and partly because firms smooth training costs between different periods.     

Estimating return on leadership development investment

When making capital investment decisions organizational leaders are trained to consider the financial return on investment. Yet, the same expectation typically does not exist for investments in leadership training. We suggest that decisions regarding leadership training and development ought to use a similar approach as the process leads to organizations incurring cost for an anticipated benefit, like any other investment. In the current paper, we describe how to estimate the return on leadership development investment (RODI) and the implications for measuring organizational effectiveness from such analyses. Using different guiding assumptions, scenarios, length of the intervention, and level of management participating in the leader development program, the expected return on investment from leadership development interventions ranged from a low negative RODI to over 200%.     

Inefficient Job Destructions and Training with Hold‐up

This paper develops an equilibrium search model with endogenous job destructions and where firms decide at the time of job entry how much to invest in match‐specific human capital. We first show that job destruction and training investment decisions are strongly complementary. It is possible that there are no firings at equilibrium. Further, training investments are confronted to a hold‐up problem making the decentralized equilibrium always inefficient. We show therefore that both training subsidies and firing taxes must be implemented to bring back efficiency.     

互动公平、委员会决策程序公平与员工决策承诺:基于公平启发理论与不确定管理理论的实证研究

借助层级团队形式制定决策,决策者能激发员工的决策承诺,确保决策的有效执行。以委员会作为决策者的层级团队为例,本文探讨了以下问题:当存在个体对自身胜任力的自信、专用性人力资本投资这两个因素的影响时,互动公平与委员会决策程序公平效应及它们之间的交互效应会发生什么变化?引入公平启发理论与不确定管理理论,本文假设并检验了上述四个因素如何交互作用于员工决策承诺。以两家大型商业银行信贷业务人员为研究对象,实证研究表明:(1)自信和专用性人力资本投资对委员会决策程序公平效应有着显著调节作用,但它们对互动公平效应的调节作用不显著;(2)当存在自信和专用性人力资本投资的影响时,较强的互动公平与委员会决策程序公平之间的交互效应更稳定一些,而较低的互动公平感知与程序公平之间的交互效应在方向上发生变化。本文有助于管理者理解"公平何时能引致员工合作"这一问题,帮助其更好地把握决策过程以获得员工对其决策的支持。本研究的假设完全基于公平启发理论(FHT)和不确定管理理论(UMT)的理论逻辑做出,实证结果与FHT和UMT的理论预测以及已有实证研究结果相一致,这意味着本研究具有较高可信性和可靠性,能为进一步理论探索提供了比较坚实的基础。     

Investigating investment decisions in equity crowdfunding: The role of projects' intellectual capital

The study aims to investigate the signalling role played by the intellectual capital of entrepreneurial projects towards crowdfunders. The study argues that information on; the intellectual capital of entrepreneurial projects posted on equity crowdfunding platforms can be perceived by external small investors or crowdfunders as signals of the venture's quality and can induce them to invest. By leveraging on the role of signalling theory in the mitigation of information asymmetries, the study argues that the intellectual capital of projects looking for equity crowdfunding is a powerful signal that positively affects the investment decisions of crowdfunders. Three components of entrepreneurial projects' intellectual capital – human, structural, and relational capital – are considered as factors affecting the success of equity crowdfunding campaigns, measured in terms of funding collected and the number of investors. The findings reveal that relational capital positively affects the investment decisions of equity crowdfunders and thus explains the success of equity crowdfunding campaigns. Factors related to human capital and structural capital have a positive impact on investment decisions, but only to a limited extent. This study provides valid implications for entrepreneurs, platform managers, and policy-makers/authorities.     

组织知识、制度环境与风险投资机构的联合投资

风险投资行业在中国发展迅猛,对促进国家经济转型和鼓励本土创新创业具有重要战略意义。本文从知识基础观出发,探究中国风险投资机构的组织知识积累与其联合投资行为之间的关系,并讨论了外部制度环境因素对这一关系的影响。基于对中国风险投资机构首轮投资纵向历史数据的实证分析,本文发现:风险投资机构基于特定行业和地域的组织知识积累和该机构与其他风险投资机构进行联合投资的可能性负相关,而投资活动所在地的市场化程度作为调节变量,削弱了风险投资机构的组织知识和联合投资之间的负向关系。     

THE LIMITS OF CAREER CONCERNS IN FEDERALISM: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

Performance‐based promotion schemes in administrative hierarchies have limitations. Chinese provincial leaders, despite facing strong career concerns, make different policy decisions depending on their career backgrounds. Provincial party secretaries who have risen from low to high positions within the province they govern (“locals”) spend a higher share of budgetary resources on education and health care and invest less in construction infrastructure than party secretaries who have made their most significant career advancements in other provinces (“outsiders”). Identification comes from variation in central leadership and term limits. As the promotion mechanism rewards infrastructure investments, locals are less likely to be promoted at the end of the term. We explore various mechanisms and provide evidence that the difference between locals and outsiders is not driven by knowledge or experience. Several pieces of evidence suggest that locals cater to low‐level provincial elites, who helped them rise to power. Thus, local career trajectories limit the power of career concerns by fostering competing allegiances.     

基于模糊层次分析法的风险投资后续管理风险评估研究

针对风险投资及风险企业的特点,在模糊层次分析法的基础上建立了风险投资后续管理中的风险评估模型,为风险投资后续管理提供了决策方法。该模型的特点在于:①提出了调整模糊判断矩阵的行为假设,通过修正重要参数的取值范围,完善了相关定理体系;②修改了多目标决策的规范化方法,建立了适用于单一项目评价的3种定量指标的计算公式,并进一步建立了融合定性与定量指标的模糊综合评价模型,使评估结果更加准确。最后,通过案例分析验证上述模型的可行性。     

专用性人力资本投资激励研究

研究委托人如何激励代理人对专用性人力资本进行投资 .代理人对人力资本投资的激励来自对未来报酬或职业发展的考虑 .但当投资是代理人的隐藏行动 ,而产出是委托人的私有信息时 ,由于出现双边败德行为 ,基于产出的报酬契约不能诱导代理人对专用性人力资本的投资 .职位提升机制能在一定程度上激励代理人的投资 ,但当委托人不提升从效率角度而言该被提升的代理人时 ,仍未能走出双边败德之困境 .当产出低时解聘代理人的解聘机制能消除委托方的机会主义行为 ,当人力资本的专用性较大 ,或投资的边际成本较小时 ,能诱导 Pareto有效的投资     

Factors impacting the knowing-doing gap in sexual harassment training

We examined the gaps between research-based sexual harassment training practices human resource (HR) managers believe their organization should use and the practices their organizations actually use (knowing-doing gaps). We studied individual (attitudes about academics) and organizational predictors (senior management support, managerial rewards, and organizational resources) of gaps at the pre-training, training design and delivery, and post-training stages. Organizational factors generally reduced gaps at the pre-training and post-training stages, while the individual factor marginally increased the gap at the pre-training stage. The knowing-doing gap for training design and delivery practices was not predicted by any of the individual or organizational variables.