《萨班斯法案》对在美上市的中国公司内部控制的影响

<正>1前言《萨班斯法案》是一部涉及会计职业监管、公司治理、证券市场监管等方面改革的重要法律。《萨班斯法案》的主要内容包括七个方面:成立独立的上市公司会计监管委员会,负责监管执行上市公司审计的会计师事务所及注册会计师:加强审计师的独立性;加大公司的财务报告责任;加强公司的财务披露义务;加重对公司管理层违法行为的处罚措施;增加经费拨款,强化SEC的监管职能;要求美国审计总署加强调查研究。而其中最难操作、最复杂、成本最高的则是该法案中对企业要求的完善内部控制,即404条款。     

浅析完善中国上市公司审计委员会制度——以美国上市公司经验为例

审计委员会（audit committee）是美国上市公司治理结构稳定的三个重要支柱（管理层、审计委员会、外部审计）之一。针对安然公司、世通公司财务欺诈事件，美国国会于2002年出台了《萨班斯法案》，首次以联邦立法形式规定审计委员会制度，明确审计委员会组成、责任。而我国审计委员会尚属于初创阶段，本文介绍如何借鉴美国经验，完善我国上市公司审计委员会制度。     

规范发展 内控为上——浅谈上市公司的“练好内功”

<正>一、再看萨班斯——国外内控制度典型2002年,美国联邦政府颁布了《萨班斯一奥克斯利法案》。这一法案暴露的是安然事件等一系列公司丑闻背后市场经济制度的弱点。法案为提高公司管理层的职责,加强证券交易委员会(SEC)的监管建立了一个框架。法案颁布近10年了,对我国产生了怎样的影响?我们今天来看一看。对于该法案的意义,原中国证监会首席会计师张为国曾表示,萨班斯法案在会计师行业监管、公司治理等方面提出了许多新的严格要求,不仅会对美国而且会对世界各国会计、公司治理以至整个证券市场产     

独立董事制度与监事会制度对比分析

对上市公司管理者的监督机制分为内部机制和外部机制.内部监督机制有:一元制治理结构引入独立董事,改变董事会中的内部人控制状况,提高董事会的独立性;或设立主要由独立董事组成的董事会下设的审计委员会、提名委员会和报酬委员会等各种机构;二元制治理结构中强化监事会的监督职能.外部监督机制有:培育资本市场的机构投资者,发挥它们在公司治理中的应有作用;发挥银行作为债权人的监督作用;发挥证券市场在公司治理中的作用,利用证券市场的控制权竞争机制、收购兼并机制和股东投票机制等,对公司董事和经理进行外部监督和约束.     

审计委员会设立的必要性及制约因素分析

上市公司设立审计委员会是为了保证审计的独立性,我国独立董事制度的建立为上市公司董事会设立审计委员会提供了可能,并将有效促进上市公司法人治理结构的完善和公司内、外部审计的健康发展.     

试论内部审计的未来与展望

目前,我国的内部审计,从内容上讲主要是围绕信息的可靠性与完整性,政策、计划、程序、法律和规章的遵循,保护资产的安全,资源的节约与有效使用,经营目标的完成等方面来展开的。但内部审计从机构设置、工作重点、审计内容的深度及广度、审计方法、规范管理等方面,还未发挥出应有的支持内部审计管理作用,更无法适应现代企业制度的要求。因此,为适应未来社会对内部审计的要求,未来内部审计将会现出下列趋势:一、隶属于董事会的审计委员会将成为内部审计机构设置的主流形式随着现代企业制度的不断建立和公司治理结构的不断完善,内部审计将会受到前所未有的重视,会有越来越多的组织的内部审计机构向董事会或董事下设的审计委员会负责,这一     

双重委托代理下独立董事治理效应研究

为深入理解独立董事在双重委托代理关系下的治理功用,并为构建具有中国特色的公司治理结构提供理论借鉴,运用双重委托代理理论对独立董事治理效应进行分析,结果表明:一方面为监督CEO而提高董事会中独立董事比例,CEO会越不愿意与董事会共享公司内部信息,使得独立董事难以直接降低第1类代理成本;另一方面,为监督大股东侵占而必须进行的独立董事"独立化"有可能在抑制第2类代理问题的同时,削弱大股东治理机制的有效性,诱发严重的股东与经理层之间的利益冲突,间接增加第1类代理成本。     

独立董事与公司治理

2005年10月,宝钢集团公司按照《公司法》和国务院国资委的精神进一步健全、规范公司治理结构,其核心是完善董事会治理。成功聘请了5位外部独立董事,标志着我国的公司治理结构在健全董事会方面又上了一个新台阶,也期待着独立董事能够在公司治理中发挥巨大的作用。要探讨独立董事对公司治理的作用,还要先从公司治理的内部动因说起。     

公司治理的机制与绩效——案例分析与制度反思

本文借助案例分析的方法或是“讲故事”的形式 ,通过解剖两个上市公司治理的真实故事来透视故事背后的公司治理“玄机”。两个行业相近、股权结构相似且都发生过股权转让的中外合资上市公司上演的却是两出反差极大的“悲喜剧” ,背后的原因和问题错综复杂而又值得深思。本文重点就股权结构与公司治理之间的关系、董事会 (特别是独立董事 )与监事会的制度安排、机构投资者对公司治理的作用等问题进行了探讨和研究。研究发现 ,从健全公司治理和完善资本市场的长远考虑 ,适度集中的股权结构与大股东相对控制型公司治理机制应该可以作为我国公司治理改革的优选方向;应该逐渐采取以独立董事和董事会的审计委员会为主的监督制衡模式 ,摒弃低效的监事会制度;机构投资者执行以公司治理为导向的投资策略已经具备一定的可行性。     

上市公司审计委员会治理有效性的实证研究——来自沪深两市的经验证据

本文基于2002～2004年我国沪深两市A股上市公司审计委员会设立及其正常运转的基本数据,并立足于《上市公司治理准则》所赋予审计委员会的基本治理职能,以审计意见和事务所变更为反应变量,对审计委员会治理有效性进行了实证研究。研究发现,设立审计委员会的公司更不易被出具非标准审计意见,这一结果证实审计委员有效履行了财务信息质量控制和沟通协调的职能,并从审计质量的层面反映了监管层推进上市公司治理制度改革的政策效应。研究没有发现是否设立审计委员会和会计师事务所变更之间存在相关性,因而本文没有获得审计委员会实现有效监督职能的证据。本文还认为,现行的年度报告对审计委员会等董事会下设专业委员会活动和履职情况的信息披露尚不规范,由此可能影响投资者对公司治理结构有效性的判断。     

Board age and corporate financial fraud: An interactionist view

Unlike past studies which have focused on either executives or boards of directors, this study takes an interactionist view to investigate the determinants of corporate financial fraud. We propose that CEOs evaluate the opportunities for financial fraud according to both situational stimuli and their own personal characteristics. As older directors are often more experienced and have more to lose if they fail in their monitoring duties, we expect them to be more capable and to have stronger motivation for monitoring CEOs closely. As such, we propose that a CEO is less likely to engage in corporate financial fraud when the average age of the board of directors increases (i.e., board age). However, when the CEO is older than the board, the CEO may attach less importance to board age when deciding whether to commit fraud. Therefore, we further propose that the CEO–board directional age difference can weaken the effect of board age. Our empirical analyses provide strong support for these hypotheses. Our study contributes to the literature on corporate governance by highlighting the often neglected roles of board age and CEO–board directional age difference in deterring corporate financial fraud.     

Board size and corporate performance: the missing role of board leadership structure

Different arguments have been introduced in the literature both for and against large and small board sizes. In this context, empirical evidence regarding the impact of board size on corporate performance is less conclusive, which means that further study is needed. Contrary to previous work, it is hypothesized in this study that the relationship between board size and corporate performance is more likely to be confounded by board leadership structure. Econometric analysis provided strong evidence for the applicability of this hypothesis and demonstrated that board size positively affects corporate performance in the presence of CEO non-duality (board leadership structure that is split between the roles of the CEO and the roles of the chairman). Furthermore, board size is shown to have a negative influence on corporate performance in the presence of CEO duality (board leadership structure that assigns the roles of both CEO and chairman to the same person). This conclusion is robust to the use of different measures of corporate performance, control variables and econometric models. Thus, these findings cast doubt on most of the existing evidence that posits that either large or small board size is always the best alternative to be followed in all organizations.     

Unternehmenserfolg, Wechsel im Vorstandsvorsitz und Disziplinierung von Finanzvorständen

The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is often referred to as a company’s No. 2 on contemporary management boards; yet corresponding empirical evidence is scarce. As a result, academic literature has not yet investigated whether CFOs—like CEOs—are dismissed more frequently if corporate performance is poor and to what extent forced Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover also influences disciplinary action towards CFOs. Therefore, in this paper we examine the antecedents of forced CFO departures in the largest German corporations between 1999 and 2006. Building on principal-agent theory, we expect respective relationships between the board of directors, the CEO, and the CFO. Moreover, we propose that principals also take team-specific and firm-specific human capital into consideration when disciplining agents. We find that poor corporate performance and forced CEO turnover both independently increase the likelihood of CFO dismissal. In addition, we find indications for a close team relationship between CFOs and CEOs. In summary, our results support the prominent role of CFOs alongside CEOs on contemporary management boards and suggest a more detailed consideration of CFOs in future research on performance consequences of managerial successions.     

When Does the Board Blame the CEO for Poor Firm Performance? Extreme Resource Reallocation and the Board's Industry and CEO Experience

This study sheds light on our understanding of when boards dismiss the CEO by considering the inherent conflict created by the board's advisory role when the firm underperforms. Using a sample of US firms listed in Standard & Poor's ExecuComp for the period 2000–2012 we find that, when a firm underperforms, extreme resource reallocation increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal. This relationship is positively moderated by the board's industry and CEO experience. The study contributes to the literature on corporate governance by identifying the conditions that trigger dismissal of the CEO in light of boards’ motive to protect their reputation.     

Can you catch two birds with one stone? The impacts of nominating committee composition on board monitoring and resource provision

While it has long been recognized that boards of directors perform two primary functions – monitoring and resource provision – little research has systematically examined the relationship between these two functions in public corporations. Given the growing external emphasis on the monitoring function by investors and advocates of corporate governance reforms, it is important to understand how such an emphasis impacts the resource provision function. In addition to identifying the composition of the nominating committee as a key to understanding the relationship, we propose two mechanisms through which the formation of an independent nominating committee in response to the external emphasis on monitoring leads to a decline in board resource provision. One mechanism is through a decline in information sharing between top managers and the nominating committee in new director selection, which results in a divergence between board capital and the firm's specific resource needs. The other is through decreased trust between the CEO and the board, which results in a less collaborative CEO-board relationship. To alleviate this negative impact that an external emphasis on monitoring has on resource provision, we propose that boards can bring non-CEO executives back onto nominating committees as inside directors. Our theoretical analysis contributes to the understanding of how the composition of the nominating committee influences board monitoring and resource provision, and has important implications for corporate governance research and practices.     

The double-edged sword of CEO/chairperson duality in corporatized state-owned firms: evidence from top management turnover in China

This study examines how board leadership structure (CEO duality) affects the corporate governance of corporatized state-owned firms where the state shareholders use these firms to serve both profit and non-profit objectives. We propose that CEO duality will generate a positive (negative) significant impact on the firms’ corporate governance when state owners tend to monitor their CEOs on the basis of profit (non-profit) considerations. We test our hypotheses by examining the relations between CEO duality and CEO turnover in Chinese listed companies that are ultimately controlled by central or local governments. We find that CEO duality is negatively related to turnover in marginal profit-making firms where turnover would be value-enhancing. This suggests that CEO duality is detrimental to these firms’ corporate governance because it entrenches relatively poorly performing CEOs. Duality is also negatively related to turnover in high-profitability firms where turnover would be non-value-enhancing. This suggests that CEO duality might positively contribute to the corporate governance of these firms by reducing the occurrence of non-value enhancing turnover. Overall, our study suggests that CEO duality is a double-edged sword in corporatized state-owned firms.     

Power and trust in board–CEO relationships

In this paper we develop and test a theoretical model that reduces relational risks to solve the puzzle of conflicting task requirements imposed on boards of directors in listed companies. Doing so unites two seemingly conflicting tasks—board control and service tasks—through examining relational risks between the board and the CEO. We also present two mechanisms that could reduce relational risks. One is board power over the CEO, and the other board trust in the CEO. Practitioners could apply these two mechanisms to achieve better performance of board control and service tasks simultaneously. We test hypotheses using 441 survey responses collected in 2005. The result shows a good fit between the model and survey data, indicating examining relational risks is a rewarding approach to understanding conflicting board task performance, and board control over the CEO and board trust in the CEO are two effective mechanisms to reduce relational risks.     

Do ‘soft law’ board gender quotas work? Evidence from a natural experiment

In a new era of “open governance”, in which societal and corporate change is taking place, 15 predominantly European countries, including Spain, enacted board gender quotas to increase the share of women on boards. In this paper, we explore the effectiveness of the European Union’s first “soft” quota – the 2007 Spanish Gender Equality Act recommending all large public and private Spanish firms to appoint a target of 40 percent of each gender to serve as board directors by 2015. The Act provides an incentive in that quota compliant firms may receive a preference for the tendering of public contracts. We draw on institutional and resource dependency theories to motivate the first empirical test of a “soft” quota which is distinct from Norway’s “hard law” board gender quota, and more similar to the proposed EU-wide quota. Using a large novel panel of 767 Spanish firms and 2786 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2014, we exploit the Spanish Act as a natural experiment and employ a difference-in-differences model. We find that less than nine percent of targeted firms fully comply with the quota. Firms that depend on public contracts are significantly more likely to increase female representation, although quota compliant firms do not actually benefit from the Act’s potential incentive. The results highlight the Spanish government’s lack of commitment to the quota, and that the quota’s normative obligations did not trigger the adoption of gender-balanced boards.