Called to order: A board president in trouble

This is a fictionalized case based on real events. It is intended as a teaching tool to stimulate discussion about procedural issues in nonprofit governance; board roles and responsibilities; communications; and relationships between boards, chairs, and executives, particularly in the context of smaller organizations. It is meant to support sessions on nonprofit boards and governance in introductory courses on nonprofit management or for use in workshops with new or less experienced executives and board members. Set in an organization engaged in cultural exchange, the case can be used in introductions to nonprofit management, arts administration, or international nongovernmental management.     

A contingency approach to nonprofit governance

A number of contingency factors may be relevant for effective nonprofit organizations and their boards. Although all boards must fulfill certain critical roles and responsibilities, strategic choices can be made about adopting different governance configurations or patterns. These choices can be meaningfully informed by understanding organizational contingencies such as age, size, structure, and strategy—and, even more important, by external contingencies and environmental dimensions such as degree of stability and complexity. This article extends or layers contingency thinking beyond its traditional focus on an alignment between the external environment and the organization's structure to focus as well on the alignment of the organization's governance configuration with its structure and environment. Structural contingency theory in general, and specifically within nonprofits, is reviewed. Two cases are presented of organizations that used an approach based on contingency theory in an action research process to examine and change their governance configurations. The steps they followed may help other nonprofits adapt their governance structures and practices and fulfill their responsibilities for board assessment and reflection.     

The Adoption of the Corporate Governance Model by Nonprofit Organizations

This article examines the circumstances under which nonprofit organizations adopt corporate governance practices. In the study reported here, the authors found that adoption of corporate governance practices depends primarily on the presence of a supportive institutional (that is, value) context as well as available resources to support governance restructuring. These findings strongly suggest that the adoption of structures and practices from the for-profit sector is neither a feasible nor even a desirable solution to problems facing many nonprofit organizations.     

Revisiting Agency and Stewardship Theories

Using principal–agent theories, this study examined differences in the perceptions of nonprofit chief executive officers (CEOs) and board chairs on key governance aspects, including board performance, leadership, satisfaction with diversity, and board meetings. Using data from the CEOs and board chairs of 474 nonprofit organizations, we found statistically significant differences in the governance perceptions of these leaders of nonprofit organizations. The findings provide support for an agency theory explanation about the differing interests of principals (board chairs) and agents (CEOs). The findings suggest that these two sets of nonprofit actors frequently operate from different perspectives, potentially affecting the governance of their organizations.     

Contracting and Patterns of Nonprofit Governance

Executive staff and board members in nonprofit organizations that operate with government grants and contracts often work together to perform important governance functions. This shared responsibility can be predicted by strong executive leadership of the board, a board with highly regarded members, and affiliation with an influential statewide or regional association. The results of our research suggest that the distribution of governance responsibility in nonprofit organizations with government revenues should command the attention of researchers and activists.     

Behavioral Determinants of Nonprofit Board Performance

There is an increased awareness that the performance of boards (good governance) is not only determined by structural determinants but by behavioral determinants as well. These behavioral determinants might be particularly important for public and nonprofit governance, where the role of the board is more diffuse and heterogeneous than in corporate governance. Here we investigate how social dynamics within boards in secondary education influence their performance. We follow a concise model that includes cognitive conflict, the use of expertise, effort norms, and social cohesion as determinants of board task performance. A survey among all secondary schools in the Netherlands serves as the empirical underpinning for this process‐oriented model of good governance. We show that the behavioral determinants have different effects on the control task and advice task of boards. Also, we find that cognitive conflicts in supervisory boards do not lead to less but rather to more social cohesion within boards. Building on these findings, we suggest a revised model of the behavioral determinants of nonprofit board performance.     

Board development practices and competent board members: Implications for performance

This study explores underlying assumptions about board development practices in nonprofit governance. Specifically, a model was developed to determine if using recommended recruitment, board member orientation, and evaluation practices resulted in more competent board members and if the presence of these board members led to better board performance. The sample consisted of 1,051 survey responses from CEOs and board chairs representing 713 credit unions. As member‐benefit nonprofit organizations, credit unions rely almost exclusively on voluntary board members in an oversight capacity. Results support the contention that board development practices lead to more capable board members, and the presence of these board members tends to explain board performance. The study advances the understanding of nonprofit board development practices by further defining the concept and proposing an empirically tested assessment strategy. Furthermore, the findings support using specific recruitment practices that should strengthen nonprofit boards.     

How does a board of directors influence within‐ and cross‐sector nonprofit collaboration?

Board members play a significant, yet largely unexamined, role in nonprofit collaboration. Processes, such as finding prospective partners, creating common ground with a partner, and establishing appropriate collaborative governance implicate nonprofit board members. In contrast to the scholarship of the role of interlocking directorates as potential networks for nonprofit collaboration, this paper examines the role of board members' social and human capital on nonprofit collaboration with other nonprofits, businesses, and government agencies. Drawing on online survey data from 636 nonprofit organizations, this paper finds that board social capital—but not board human capital—is positively related to the presence and number of within‐sector and cross‐sector nonprofit collaboration. However, board human capital enhances nonprofit‐government collaboration, when board social capital is also high. The results provide a novel perspective in nonprofit collaboration and board management research.     

“Corporate” governance in nonprofit organizations

The economics‐based theoretical and related empirical literature on the governance of nonprofit organizations is brought together and integrated in a way easily accessible for noneconomists. This literature is scattered in academic journals covering economics, health economics, management, and accounting, and in the more nonprofit‐geared research publications. After defining corporate governance, I present in a nontechnical way the most appropriate economic framework for studying governance problems: the principal‐agent theory. Most of the economic literature deals with the role and influence of the board and its relation to the organization's management and performance. This is reflected in the article's structure. The board's functioning, composition, and committee structure are first discussed, followed by a review of the literature on incentive‐based remuneration schemes, disclosure of financial information, and the use of debt to mitigate agency problems between the board and management. The literature dealing with donors and subsidizing authorities in governance relations is then presented. The article concludes with a number of practical implications of the scholarly obtained results to date, as well as some suggestions for further theoretical and empirical research.     

Reframing Board‐Staff Relations: Exploring the Governance Function Using a Storytelling Metaphor

This article attempts to reframe board‐staff relations by presenting an alternative perspective on governance, management, and leadership functions within nonprofit organizations. It draws on an interpretative view of organizations and suggests that we can understand nonprofits as socially constructed entities by using the metaphor of storytelling. Seeing the role of board and staff through this theoretical lens allows us to reconceptualize them. This in turn enables us to enhance the creative potential of the governance function and allows governance to support the goal of creating resilient, adaptive, learning organizations.     

Lessons for successful nonprofit governance

Boards of nonprofit organizations malfunction as often as they function effectively. As the best-managed nonprofit organizations demonstrate, both the board and the executive are essential to the proper functioning of a nonprofit organization. These administrative organs must work as equal members of a team rather than one subordinate to the other. Moreover, the work of the executive and the board does not divide neatly into policy-making versus execution of policy. Boards and executives must be involved in both functions and must coordinate their work accordingly. In a well-functioning nonprofit organization, the executive will take responsibility for assuring that the governance function is properly organized and maintained.     

Organizational Change-Too Much,Too Soon?

ABSTRACT

Recent changes in government policies and practices, especially managed care, have led many nonprofit organizations to embrace collaboration as a competitive strategy. This article presents a case study of a large human service agency that has adopted a management service organization (MSO) model, a type of collaboration particularly suited to handling third-party contracts, at the urging of the founding CEO. A new governance model was also adopted. Using chronology as an analytical approach, the case examines key decisions made by professional and lay leaders during four distinct stages of organizational development. The actions taken by the board of directors to restore financial stability and protect the organization's reputation after learning from the CEO of the existence of a significant deficit demonstrate the need for strategic planning and better communication among all relevant parties involved in a collaboration.     

Nonprofit versus corporate governance: An economic approach

This article proposes a new theoretical concept of nonprofit governance using transaction cost economics and the economic theory of contracts. After a short review of economic approaches to corporate governance, I clarify the specific nature of the governance problem in nonprofit organizations. Based on this analysis, I derive criteria for selecting an organization's relevant stakeholders. If stakeholders provide valuable specific resources without the protection of a comprehensive contract that details exactly how the organization is to use these resources, then such stakeholders seek decision and control rights in order to direct the use of the resources they have provided. I argue that the core problem of governance is how to enhance valuable specific contributions of the relevant stakeholders while keeping the costs of bargaining between stakeholders and the costs of collective decision making low. The theory developed is then applied in a discussion of practically relevant governance mechanisms, and the concept of governance is used to contribute to the discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of the nonprofit character of organizations from a governance perspective.     

Agency Problems between Managers and Employees in Nonprofit Organizations: A Discrete Choice Experiment

Most principal–agent literature of nonprofit organizations has focused on the relationship between board members and managers. However, in addition to the role as an agent of the board, the manager also performs a role as principal with respect to the nonprofit employees. By using a discrete choice experiment, we identify the objectives of managers and employees in nonprofit organizations and assess the presence of agency problems in this relationship. Our sample consists of 76 headmasters, 161 teachers, and 39 administrative employees in 74 secondary nonprofit schools in Belgium. We find that the six objectives set out in the experiment play an important role for both headmasters and subordinate staff. However, the results also indicate that some of these objectives are significantly more important for the headmasters. In sum, our results suggest that agency theory and stewardship theory are not necessarily in conflict with each other but can be combined into a more general governance framework for nonprofit organizations. Consequently, we argue that incentive structures that incorporate different types of objectives can facilitate the recruitment and retention of employees in nonprofit organizations.     

Reinventing a Large Nonprofit: Lessons from Four Voluntary Health Associations

This article describes attempts by four voluntary health associations to obtain their member organizations' consent to an emphasis on national rather than local goals and to new structures that centralized the members' management and governance functions while keeping service delivery decentralized. It argues that at three of the four associations, the member organizations agreed to a restructuring because the national organizations won their trust through a broadly inclusive decision‐making process and because the members were persuaded that the restructuring would increase resources available for local programs and services. Although the shift in focus to national goals risks diminishing local support, the reorganizations are evidence of a broadly felt need in nonprofit associations for a new decision‐making model and for new roles for volunteers that take better advantage of their community relationships.     

Role ambiguity and volunteer board member performance in nonprofit sport organizations

We explore the relationship between multidimensional role ambiguity and individual board member performance within nonprofit voluntary sport organizations. Role ambiguity accounted for 29 percent of the variance in perceived board member performance, and ambiguity about one's responsibilities was the strongest predictor. These findings extend our understanding of the drivers of individual board member performance within voluntary sport organizations and the multidimensional nature of role ambiguity. The study supports previous arguments that knowing what to do is fundamental to one's performance, and more critical than knowing how to do it, and what difference it makes.     

The governance self‐assessment checklist: An instrument for assessing board effectiveness

This article describes the development and validation of the Governance Self‐Assessment Checklist (GSAC). The GSAC was designed to assist boards of directors of nonprofit and public sector organizations to identify strengths and weaknesses in the governance of their organizations, educate board members about the essentials of good governance, and improve their governance practices. The instrument comprises 144 items organized into twelve subscales. The results of the study indicated that the subscales have excellent internal consistency reliability, exhibit good criterion‐related validity, and are able to discriminate between stronger and weaker aspects of board functioning. The relative strengths and weaknesses in board effectiveness were identified, and the implications of the findings for the assessment of board effectiveness and field applications of the GSAC were discussed.     

Devolution of Services to Children and Families: The Experience of NPOs in Nanaimo,British Columbia,Canada

This study focuses on the current experience of Nanaimos nonprofit family and child service organizations (N = 29) providing services on behalf of government and their adaptation to this devolution. The effects and consequences of contracting on organizational practices, accountability, and services were explored through interviews and focus groups with executive directors, board members, line staff, government representatives, and the United Way. Results show that a significant proportion of funding comes from provincial government contracts. The funding climate is uncertain, and there is considerable confusion, stress, and time involved with the contracting process. Accountability requirements are demanding and nonprofit organizations (NPOs) express concern about a shift to a business management model. Recommendations include a need for increased collaboration between NPOs, a body that speaks for the voluntary sector, and improved relationships between NPOs and government funders.     

Female leaders and board performance in member‐serving nonprofit organizations

Despite an active stream of “good governance” research, there is not yet much nonprofit scholarship examining how the gender composition of a board or its leadership relates to board performance. This article helps to fill this gap, focusing on the governance practices of US‐based nonprofits serving a domestic or international membership. A structural equation model finds that the presence of female leaders relates to the performance of nonprofit boards both directly and indirectly through these leaders' presumed influence on board characteristics and operation. This research advances the field by empirically testing a longstanding theory that board performance is both multidimensional and contingent on the market and labor environment, organizational capacity and other characteristics—in this case, gender dynamics. We find there are some positive relationships between female board leadership and clearly defined measures of board performance. These findings also suggest that a strategy to balance a board's gender may serve many nonprofits, but gender representation works in tandem with other board characteristics.     

The Pyramid of Nonprofit Responsibility: The Institutionalization of Organizational Responsibility Across Sectors

Observers have noted that organizations in all sectors, whether business, nonprofit, or government, have been moving toward rationalized structures that presuppose and express empowered organizational actorhood. We draw upon neo-institutional theory in this paper to extend the argument: The arrival of organizational actorhood has precipitated a concomitant, cross-sectoral movement toward organizational social responsibility. Whereas existing research has tended to theorize the social responsibilities of businesses, we develop a pyramid conceptual schema to array the social responsibilities of nonprofits. We then document the coevolution of organizational actorhood and responsibility across both sectors with a metastudy of nearly 200 extant surveys. We chart the institutionalization of a slate of formal structures that express organizational actorhood (i.e., mission statements, vision statements, and strategic plans) and that profess and define organizational social responsibilities (i.e., core values, ethics codes, and responsibility communications). We close with implications and future directions for organizational studies and research on corporate social responsibility.