The ambiguity of Europe and European identity in Finnish populist political discourse

Europe is a profoundly flexible concept and, in Ernesto Laclau’s terms, a ‘floating signifier’ which is given various meanings depending on the speaker’s political aims. The article focuses on current populist and nationalist political discourses in Finland and the articulation of Europe and European identity in the political rhetoric of The Finns Party. In the rhetoric, Europe is given contradictory meanings. On the one hand, it is perceived as a cultural and value-based community which shares a common (Christian) heritage and values. Identification with Europe and the promotion of European communality are particularly pronounced when a threat towards ‘us’ is experienced as coming from outside the imagined European borders. On the other hand, the European integration process and Europe as a political project can be articulated as threats not only to national independence, identity and cultural particularity but to European cultural identity as well.     

Articulations of populism: the Nordic case

Populism as a concept is elusive and has been connected to very different political movements. Generally, populism’s connotations are rather negative and the term is often used pejoratively in the academic field as well. However, Ernesto Laclau has approached populism by arguing that populist reason is a manifestation of political logic in which group identification – formed through various signifiers such as ‘the people’, which are articulated as part of an ‘equivalence chain’ – eventually establishes political agency as a totality. This paper uses Laclau’s articulation theory to analyse the public construction of contemporary populism in the Nordic countries of Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark. The analysis demonstrates that mainstream media frame populism rather negatively, although examples of the term’s positive identification with ‘the people’ are available, especially in the tabloid media. Thus, the positive identification behind the forming of populist movements clashes with the media discourse that prioritizes established journalistic views, practices and sources, making populism a ‘floating signifier’, that is, a concept that has several meanings which are contested in various public discourses. A general pattern in the construction of populism in Northern European multi-party democracies can be discerned, thus identifying the central role of nationalist and nativist identifications in contingent populist articulations. However, the differences between the Nordic countries emphasize a context-driven approach.     

Spill‐Up and Spill‐Over of Trust: An Extended Test of Cultural and Institutional Theories of Trust in South Korea1

In comparison to the heated debate over the origins of trust in political institutions, few studies have empirically examined the linkage between trust in political and nonpolitical institutions at the individual level. In this study, we utilize a two‐step methodology to investigate attitudes toward the government in the broader context of attitudes toward related nonpolitical institutions in South Korea. Results from latent class analysis reveal that political trust is an integrated part of a more general set of attitudes toward social and economic institutions. In addition, results from multinomial logistic regression analysis corroborate past studies that found a positive relationship between perceptions of institutional performance and trust in institutions while partially supporting theories advocating the importance of interpersonal trust for institutional trust. This study points to the possibility of interpersonal trust “spilling up” to trust in institutions and the likelihood that trust in one institution “spills over” to trust in other related institutions.     

Contradictory tendencies in the political culture of Croatian youth: unexpected anomalies or an expected answer to the social crisis?

A successful democratic consolidation of post-socialist societies depends, among other things, on their citizens’ political culture, younger generations included. Moreover, youth civic engagement today and in the future is a guarantee of the continuity and development of democracy, which means that scientists need to gain insight into young people’s political culture. In this paper we look at political values, institutional trust and participation as relevant components of the civic political culture. The analysis is based on quantitative data collected in the empirical studies of Croatian youth, carried out between 1999 and 2013. Based on longitudinal study results, a downward trend is identified regarding selected political culture indicators: acceptance of liberal-democratic values, trust in social and political institutions, interest in politics and party preference. However, there is a simultaneous increase in participation in various types of organizations, especially political parties. The interpretation of established tendencies is placed in a broader context of an inherited democratic deficit, economic recession and social crisis. Current trends are both indicators and consequences of young people’s inadequate political socialization as well as weaknesses of political institutions and various actors during the transition and consolidation period.     

Are universities left-wing bastions? The political orientation of professors,professionals, and managers in Europe

Universities are accused of being left-wing bastions, unwelcoming to conservative and right-wing professors. However, we know little about the political orientation of professors in comparison to other professionals, which would be the right comparison group if we want to know whether universities are potentially hostile environments to conservatives. Examining culturally and economically oriented political orientations in Europe, it is demonstrated that professors are more liberal and left-leaning than other professionals. However, there is no greater homogeneity of political orientations among the professoriate relative to other specific professions, suggesting that there is a diversity of opinions which is similar to what professionals would find in other occupations. One exception concerns attitudes towards immigration, on which professors have more liberal orientations and comparatively low residual variance around that more liberal mean. Importantly, the difference between professors and other professionals is not so clear within graduates from the social sciences, but emerges more clearly among graduates with a medical, STEM, economics or law degree. An important political cleavage exists between professionals and managers, a group of similar social standing.     

Ideological or religious? Contending visions on the future of Alevi identity

Establishing a coherent collective identity within the modern urban context among people who have different ideological, social and religious orientations, and social and economic backgrounds, is an ongoing struggle within the Alevi community in Turkey. This study tries to understand how alternative positions on Alevi identity dynamically construct the boundaries, moral contents and the new shape of Alevi identity in modern urban contexts through use of various discursive resources. At least two main contending ‘positions’ on Alevi identity try to institutionalise Alevi identity in modern urban contexts, which are ‘Ideological Position’ and ‘Religious Position’. Those discourse positions constitute different visions about the past and the future of the Alevi community as well as the cultural and the political boundaries of Alevi identity. More importantly, those positions resonate in ordinary citizens’ life stories as well as group narratives. This study utilises the analytical frame of ‘positioning theory’ to shed light on the complexities of identity negotiation.     

Alternative ideologies of la francophonie

This paper concerns current transformations in the relationship between political and linguistic ideologies of la francophonie based on a sociolinguistic ethnographic study in a French-language minority school in Canada. A dominant modernist orientation, focussing on unilingual social spaces and the authenticity and integrity of French, is being confronted by an emerging globalizing orientation which emphasizes the value of French as an economic resource, or commodity, and which values both pluralism and a common language. The result is a crisis of legitimacy for francophone institutions, struggles for voice among old and new elites, and the marginalization of the working class speakers of the ‘authentic’ vernacular.     

Populism and social media: how politicians spread a fragmented ideology

Populism is a relevant but contested concept in political communication research. It has been well-researched in political manifestos and the mass media. The present study focuses on another part of the hybrid media system and explores how politicians in four countries (AT, CH, IT, UK) use Facebook and Twitter for populist purposes. Five key elements of populism are derived from the literature: emphasizing the sovereignty of the people, advocating for the people, attacking the elite, ostracizing others, and invoking the ‘heartland’. A qualitative text analysis reveals that populism manifests itself in a fragmented form on social media. Populist statements can be found across countries, parties, and politicians’ status levels. While a broad range of politicians advocate for the people, attacks on the economic elite are preferred by left-wing populists. Attacks on the media elite and ostracism of others, however, are predominantly conducted by right-wing speakers. Overall, the paper provides an in-depth analysis of populism on social media. It shows that social media give the populist actors the freedom to articulate their ideology and spread their messages. The paper also contributes to a refined conceptualization and measurement of populism in future studies.     

The Family in the Light of a New Relational Theory of Primary,Secondary and Generalized Social Capital

The aim of this article is to pinpoint the relevance of family relationships in the studies on ‘social capital’. In order to clarify this perspective, Pierpaolo Donati outlines a new approach called ‘relational approach’. According to it, social capital is a property and a quality of social relationships, not an attribute of individuals or social structures as such. This theory has two major advantages: first, it leads to differentiate those components of social capital which are usually conflated; second, it permits to identify various forms of social capital (primary, secondary-communitarian and civic or generalized). Riccardo Prandini criticizes the sociological prejudices which consider the family mainly as an obstacle for the full deployment of ‘liquid’ and ‘modern’ social relations. The family's social capital is defined as the reciprocal orientations of the family's members which are able to generate trust and therefore cooperative actions. Empirical evidence shows that the family's social capital is strictly connected to the emergence of pro-social attitudes in individuals, particularly in terms of social trust and participation in civil associations.     

Visions of power: ideology and practice in the American garage sale

In this article, we examine ideological statements reflected in, and to a small extent created by, people's participation in garage sales.¹ Although the article touches upon the economics of garage sales, its focus is on ideology, about how people understand what they are doing when they buy and sell, and how this relates to their more general perception of the social world and their position in it. The way people discuss their participation in garage sales tells a great deal about how they understand their worlds: patterns of work and consumption, claims (especially by women and the aged) that their daily activities have more dignity than is normally afforded them within society, a felt need for moral and practical networks. The expression of ‘oppositional culture’in the statements garage sale participants make to describe their lives is certainly underdeveloped. It is not free of the dominant ideology, cannot be the basis of class-conscious political practice and in present form poses little danger to any social institution (except perhaps department stores). Still it does contain, in shadowy form, seminal statements in contradiction to what is generally regarded as the dominant ideology. We will call these emerging elements ‘prefigurative cultural formations’, as in vague form they connote emergent social values. Further, we will argue that these prefigurative cultural formations are grouped into discrete ideological claims that we call ‘Visions of Power, each of which speaks to the empowerment of subordinate groups. We will discuss four specific Visions of Power: reclaiming control of one's work, creating a sense of social justice, beating the system, and feeling oneself a part of a nurturing community. Before attempting to demonstrate the utility of these concepts in understanding forms of belief reflected in garage sales and other informal economic activities, we will briefly explore our approach to ideology, and will attempt to situate it within the contemporary debate on the nature of ideology.     

Winners and losers in the post‐communist transformation: The czech republic in comparative perspective

The gradual dismantling of redistributive practices as part of the transition to a market economy, together with an increase in wage, income, and wealth inequalities make those who actually profited (in relative terms) from the socialist redistribution feel like ‘losers’ of the transformation. Conversely, those who were relatively disfavoured by the communist redistributive policies and who feel strong today in the competition for better life‐chances may consider themselves ‘winners’ of the transition process. This article considers who are the winners and losers informer communist countries and what impact this factor has on the crystallization of political attitudes. The principle assumption is that the two segments of the population uphold quite different views on the consequences of the transition to a market economy and democracy for their life‐chances and maintain different positions on the political spectrum. The analysis starts from a subjective definition of winners and losers based on the perception of ones’ change in social status (social status of the family) and economic situation (families’ wealth) during the years of transformation. Then, objective characteristics of the two groups are examined. Finally, the effects of being a loser or winner on left or right political orientations are analyzed.     

Techno-sovereignism: the political rationality of contemporary Italian populism

This article provides an original exploration of the self-identified populist coalition leading the Italian government between 2018 and 2019. The analysis, informed by a governmentality approach, starts by scrutinising the economic, social, and cultural issues framed as political “problems” by the coalition, also highlighting the tensions underlying such constructions. The second step charts how this political subject sought to address those problems by deploying an array of political technologies. From examining these two dimensions, the article then can discern the composite rationality—techno-sovereignism—that drove precariously the coalition’s art of government. Finally, the article sketches out some forms of contestation against the techno-sovereignist operations, whose significance may stretch beyond the Italian borders. Overall, although the Italian populist coalition turned out to be ephemeral, the dynamics that characterized its emergence and functioning could still be used heuristically to understand the interactions and reciprocal adjustments possibly used by right-wing and technocratic populist groups to exert political power conjointly.

     

基于智能网络的党外青年知识分子政治引领策略

从政治认同感、政治信任感、政治效能感、社会主义核心价值观、宗教信仰等方面对党外青年知识分子的政治思想和网络政治引领状况进行的调查发现,党外青年知识分子思想观念和价值倾向呈现鲜明的实用性,引领对象组织复杂致其政治思想意识呈现较大的不平衡性,教育背景不同致其政治理念呈现多元化和差异化,网络政治公共服务和产品供给不足,协同教化机制缺乏。新时代应明晰党委领导责任机制,构建新媒体、融媒体等多维媒体矩阵平台,发挥技术优势,建章立制,发挥其政治引领功能。     

Understanding cultural omnivores: social and political attitudes

In this paper, I use data from the British Household Panel Survey and Understanding Society to investigate the social and political attitudes of cultural omnivores. I report a threefold typology of cultural consumption in the domains of music and visual arts that is consistent with previous research. Then by linking data across the two panel surveys, I show that cultural omnivores have quite a distinctive profile of social attitudes. Specifically, omnivores are more trusting and risk‐taking. They hold more favourable views about the European Union, and they tend to eschew subnational identities. Omnivores are politically more engaged. But they are not more ‘class conscious’, nor are they particularly left‐wing or right‐wing on distributional issues. When asked what is important to the sense of who they are, the two most important status‐conferring attributes, that is, profession and education, are not more salient to omnivores than to others. But omnivores are more extravert and open to new experiences. Taken together, these results suggest that omnivorousness is an expression of cosmopolitan postmaterialism rather than a new form of distinction.     

The arrival of critical citizens: decline of political trust and shifting public priorities in China

Political trust has been in decline in China. In this article, we capture this decline as reflecting the modernization of Chinese political culture. While the government managed to deliver a sustained period of rapid economic growth, the public's trust in it is diminishing through two mechanisms. On the one hand, Chinese citizens are acquiring stronger liberal democratic values, which make citizens more critical toward government institutions. On the other hand, changing political culture is also shown in the citizens’ shifting of their priorities toward the expansion of freedom and empowerment of citizens. Decades of socioeconomic modernization, therefore, meant that the era of critical citizens has arrived in China.     

Fake News Is Real: The Significance and Sources of Disbelief in Mainstream Media in Trump’s America

Are appeals to discredit mainstream media reporting of political news in the guise of “fake news” merely a diversion from more fundamental threats to democratic politics and policymaking? Or is the emerging belief in “fake news” itself a looming threat? Using data from the Voter Study Group’s panel survey, we examine the relationship between disbelief in mainstream media and a wide range of social attitudes and policy preferences. We find that in December 2016, just after Trump’s election, belief in fake news wields an outsized influence, independent of partisanship, ideology, media consumption, and other established foundations of public opinion. The effects of fake news beliefs are especially pronounced on key elements of Trump’s rhetoric as candidate and as president—hostility toward immigrants, racial and religious minorities, gender equality, perceptions of America’s “greatness,” and even support for democratic norms and institutions itself. We also find some evidence that by January 2019, the belief in fake news has become even more focally associated with Trump. These findings portend the possibility of an emerging exclusionary, populist variant of American conservatism, of which disbelief in media institutions is a key component.     

Capital,conflict and convergence: a political understanding of neoliberalism and its relationship to capitalist transformation

ABSTRACT

In this article we argue against influential analyses of neoliberalism that prioritize variegation and the role of ideas as key theoretical foci relevant to understanding neoliberalism’s diffusion into myriad national and political settings. Rather, we contend that crucial to understanding neoliberalism is the role of politically-produced convergence around market rationality that reflects two core processes: the reorganization of production and the ascendency of financialization. We present a theorization and analysis of neoliberalism’s political production and diffusion over time, explaining its contested evolution and impact across diverse settings (both ‘North’ and ‘South’) and emphasizing its ever-intensifying symbiotic relationship with the consolidating world market in which the former has increasingly come to serve as the latter’s operating system (OS). Further, we posit that neoliberalism’s form, function and impact demand analytically prioritizing the leverage of constellations of ideological and material interests within the contradictory context of consolidating relations of production and financialization. Our analysis thus challenges many previous expositions of neoliberalism for their failure to locate neoliberalism’s manifestation as arising out of social conflict within particular junctures that privilege certain social forces and ideas over others. We also distinguish our position by highlighting how manifestations of neoliberalism in various settings have combined to yield a greater world market in which variegation has gradually given way to ever-intensifying disciplinary pressures towards market-policy conformity (mono-policy). While current populist movements may well turn out to be important counter movements to neoliberal hegemony, especially if they can internationalize, the disciplining effect of the world market renders many nationally-oriented policy alternatives costly and politically fraught.     

From philosophy of history to political philosophy: an ideological investigation of globalization

Many have argued that one of the reasons for the irresistible trend of liberal democracy is the irreversible process of globalization. The logic assumes that globalization is not only an inseparable prerequisite for promoting economic development but also the dynamic to transform political structures into liberalism in less democratic countries, because economic development within countries creates new middle classes around the world, with their natural demands for more participation in decision and political pluralism. In other words, all societies will evolve to a point where they will adopt liberal democratic institutions. In turn, the resulting new world order will be characterized by international cooperation through market economies and liberal democracy. This paper investigates the ideological origin of globalization by inspecting Fukuyama's theory of the ‘end of history’. It argues that this belief is a continuance of modernization theory and reminiscent of functionalist concepts by Western scholars concerning the development of less developed countries. The difference is that globalizers cleverly cover their ethnocentrism with Hegel's philosophy, as it implies that the Western system is some perfect theory that all people will eventually accept as their cultures and societies evolve into a Western superior state.     

Implicit Nativist Attitudes,Social Desirability,and Immigration Policy Preferences

While previous research on immigration attitudes among the American public has focused on factors such as economic threat, social context, and racial prejudice, fewer studies have examined the psychological determinants of immigration policy preferences. This study analyzes the results of an implicit association test (IAT) procedure that measures automatic nativist preferences for a traditional American culture versus a Latino‐American culture (i.e., implicit nativist attitudes). In brief, this study demonstrates that implicit nativist attitudes are fairly common, that they are an independent predictor of immigration policy attitudes, and that they affect those who are not explicitly nativist but who still hold restrictionist policy views.     

The power and limits of ethnonationalism: Palestinians and Eastern Jews in Israel, 1974-1991

The relative standings of four ethnic groups - Muslim Palestinians, Christian Palestinians, Asian-African Jews, European Jews -were compared, using mobility data from 1974 and 1991. The findings show that despite the lack of government support and the prevalence of inexorable discrimination against Israeli Palestinians, they have narrowed the gap with Asian-African Jews in both education and occupational prestige. This finding demonstrates that ideological and political hegemony is not always effective in improving the socio-economic standing of preferred minorities (Asian-African Jews), and that social and economic structures may counterbalance the anti-Palestinian nationalist ideology. The analysis suggests that residential and educational segregation of Palestinians protects them from direct competition with European Jews, whereas Asian-African Jews have to compete with this dominant group in schools, as well as in the labour market.