Buying a pig in a poke: An experimental study of unconditional veto power

We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by responders. We also elicit responders’ willingness to pay for (un)conditional veto power. The bids reveal a large endowment effect.     

Climate events and the role of adaptive capacity for (im-)mobility

Population and Environment - The study examines the relationship between sudden- and gradual-onset climate events and migration, hypothesizing that this relationship is mediated by the adaptive...     

The effect of outside directors’ and auditors’ incentives on managers’ ability to manage cash bonuses

This paper investigates the impact of outside directors’ and auditors’ monetary incentives on the association between discretionary accounting and managers’ cash bonuses in a two-tier system. For a sample of German stock corporations from 2005 to 2007 we expect and find that outside directors who receive compensation based on accounting income and auditors who receive high non-audit fees have the incentive to tolerate managers’ bonus-increasing accounting choices. More specifically, we show that positive discretionary accruals are more strongly associated with managers’ cash bonuses than negative discretionary accruals if outside directors receive accounting-based compensation and/or if auditors receive high non-audit fees. Our results suggest that executives’ ability to manage their cash bonuses depends on the monitoring institutions’ monetary incentives.     

Kommunikationsprobleme in Teams mit hoher aufgabenbezogener Diversität: Ursachen und Möglichkeiten zur Intervention

This paper starts with an analysis, based on the communication theories of Schulz von Thun (2000) and Clark (1996), of the reasons why teams with a high task-related diversity are particularly susceptible to communication problems. To reduce communication problems, a modularly composed training- and team-development concept, which applies on “individual” and “team” levels, is subsequently presented. Communication problems are defined as failure in understanding as well as low level of task-related openness and as absence of esteem and acceptance between communicating participants.     

Do Temporary Workers Receive Risk Premiums? Assessing the Wage Effects of Fixed–term Contracts in West Germany by a Matching Estimator Compared with Parametric Approaches

The wage effects of fixed–term contracts (FTCs) are analysed with the German Socio–Economic Panel (GSOEP) for West Germany. Taking selection on observables into account results in an estimated wage effect of −6 percent up to −10 percent. Controlling additionally for selection on unobservables leads to wage effects of −23 percent, which may be explained by self–selection of workers. The results also highlight the importance of asymmetric information as an explanation for the incentive for employers as well as workers to enter FTCs.     

The geometry of Gaussian double Markovian distributions

Gaussian double Markovian models consist of covariance matrices constrained by a pair of graphs specifying zeros simultaneously in the matrix and its inverse. We study the semi-algebraic geometry of these models, in particular their dimension, smoothness, and connectedness as well as algebraic and combinatorial properties.     

Improving the use of self-generated identification codes

In panel studies on sensitive topics, respondent-generated identification codes are often used to link records across surveys. However, usually a substantial number of cases are lost due to the codes. These losses may cause biased estimates. Using more components and linking the codes by the Levenshtein string distance function will reduce the losses. In a simulation study and two field experiments, the proposed procedure outperforms the methods previously applied.