Population growth overshooting and trade in developing countries

This paper examines a developing economy using a family-optimization model in which the number of children is a normal good. Trade liberalization generates two effects: the income effect that increases population growth and the gender wage effect that, in the short run, increases, but, in the long run, decreases population growth. With higher income, families invest more in capital if the status of the capital is significant. Because female labor is complementary to capital, higher investment increases the relative wages of women and attracts them from child rearing into production. Ultimately, the population growth falls below the original level.      

The prospective effects of work–family conflict and enrichment on job exhaustion and turnover intentions: comparing long-term temporary vs. permanent workers across three waves

This study investigated work–family conflict (WFC) and enrichment (WFE) in relation to job exhaustion and turnover intentions among long-term temporary (n = 384) and permanent (n = 430) workers. We used three-wave data collected among Finnish university employees in 3 consecutive years. The participants were either permanently or temporarily employed for the whole 3-year period. The results showed that permanent employees reported both higher WFC and WFE during the follow-ups than temporary employees. Temporary workers reported higher job exhaustion and turnover intentions compared to permanent workers. Job contract functioned as a moderator: high WFC showed a prospective effect on increased turnover intentions in permanent employees. In contrast, temporary employees benefited more from high WFE, which showed a prospective effect on reduced job exhaustion in temporary employees. The results suggest that measures taken to improve work–family balance could have different implications for long-term temporary and permanent workers.     

Attitudes to prioritization in selected health care activities

The aim of this study was to measure attitudes to health care prioritization in various Finnish population groups. Three study groups were established: 1) the general public (n=4260); 2) politicians (n=1427); and 3) medical and social work professionals (n=1055).
The following background data were obtained: sex, year of birth, marital status, number of children, education, profession, personal income, self-perceived health, and how subjects viewed their own future and whether they were satisfied with their lives. Information on activities involving prioritization of health service was elicited by presenting a list of 16 health care activities. Respondents evaluated these activities as 1) more important than average, 2) of average importance, or 3) less important than average (indicated as numbers 1-3).
The response rate was 59.3%, and 57.2% (n=3858) of the original sample was accepted for analysis. The politicians and profes-sionals showed almost identical attitudes. All groups prioritized treatment of life-threatening diseases among children. The general public prioritized high-tech surgery more highly than professionals or politicians. Alternative medicine and cosmetic surgery were the two least important activities. All groups agreed about prioritization of serious diseases among children, care of dying patients, prevention, surgery which helps people to perform their everyday tasks, and home care for the disabled elderly. Professionals and politicians prioritized mental health more highly than the population. The general public prioritized intensive care for premature babies with a low birth weight (less than 800 g). Professionals prioritized family planning more highly than politicians and the population. The results resemble those obtained in Britain, indicating that attitudes towards priorities in health are similar between Britain and Finland, and that the respondents' professions determine attitudes more strongly than does cultural background.     

Political instability, gender discrimination, and population growth in developing countries

This paper introduces gender discrimination and population growth into a model of political economy. The government keeps up the military for the sake of political instability in the country. It is shown that if the risk of internal conflicts is high, then the government needs a bigger military and a larger supply of young men for it. The government is then willing to boost population growth by keeping women outside the production (e.g. neglecting their education or restricting their movement). Some empirical evidence on the interdependence of political instability, population growth, and gender discrimination is provided.