Some indications of limits to framing the policy preferences of the civically engaged: Interplay of social capital,race attitudes,and social justice frames

Our experiment, which tested support for a hypothetical social welfare program, found that the civically engaged as a whole were resistant to social justice framing employing universalistic versus particularistic standards. We suggest the lack of a framing effect was due to the use of a preexisting, shared “symbolic racism” frame. Social justice framing did succeed for those whose attitudes toward symbolic racism were ambivalent or neutral. Other factors including sex, income level, political participation, and ideology significantly influenced choice. These results provide some indications of limits to experimental framing of policy preferences of the civically engaged in their institutional settings.     

The U.S. Health System and Immigration: An Institutional Interpretation1

We examine the institutions that comprise the U.S. health system and their relationship to a surging immigrant population. The clash between the system and this human flow originates in the large number of immigrants who are unauthorized, poor, and uninsured and, hence, unable to access a system largely based on ability to pay. Basic concepts from sociological theory are brought to bear on the analysis of this clash and its consequences. Data from a recently completed study of health institutions in three areas of the United States are used as an empirical basis to illustrate various aspects of this complex relation. Implications of our results for theory and future health policy are discussed.     

Systematic analysis of multiple voting rules

For a class of voting rules, which includes Approval and Cumulative Voting, it is shown how to find and analyze all possible outcomes that arise with a specified profile, and, conversely, how to start with a potential region and determine whether there exist supporting profiles. The geometry of these regions is determined by the “Reversal symmetry” portion of a profile; i.e., components of the A\succ B\succ C, C\succ B\succ A{A\succ B\succ C, C\succ B\succ A} type.     

A simplified proof of a theorem on the difference of the moore–penrose inverses of two positive semi–difinte matrices

Simplified proofs are given of a standard result that establishes positive semi–definiteness of the difference of the inverses of two non–singular matrices, and of the extension of this result by Milliken and Akdeniz (1977) to the difference of the Moore–Penrose inverse of two singular matrices.     

Estimating consumer acceptance limits

A methodology is developed for estimating consumer acceptance limits on a sensory attribute of a manufactured product. In concept these limits are analogous to engineering tolerances. The method is based on a generalization of Stevens' Power Law. This generalized law is expressed as a nonlinear statistical model. Instead of restricting the analysis to this particular case, a strategy is discussed for evaluating nonlinear models in general since scientific models are frequently of nonlinear form. The strategy focuses on understanding the geometrical contrasts between linear and nonlinear model estimation and assessing the bias in estimation and the departures from a Gaussian sampling distribution. Computer simulation is employed to examine the behavior of nonlinear least squares estimation. In addition to the usual Gaussian assumption, a bootstrap sample reuse procedure and a general triangular distribution are introduced for evaluating the effects of a non-Gaussian or asymmetrical error structure. Recommendations are given for further model analysis based on the simulation results. In the case of a model for which estimation bias is not a serious issue, estimating functions of the model are considered. Application of these functions to the generalization of Stevens’ Power Law leads to a means for defining and estimating consumer acceptance limits, The statistical form of the law and the model evaluation strategy are applied to consumer research data. Estimation of consumer acceptance limits is illustrated and discussed.     

Simmel at a Distance: On the History and Systematics of the Sociology of the Stranger

Abstract

Concepts made famous in “classic” works are often cited in ways that deviate from their original meaning. This often leads to cumulative confusion rather than the advancement of insight. Scrutiny of such confusions may provide fruitful points of departure for systematic codification.

In the literature which refers to Simmel's excursus on “The Stranger,” four areas of confusion can be identified

1. Simmel's conception of the stranger has periodically been equated with the concept of the “marginal man,” a very different social type;

2. Simmel's conception of the stranger has often been equated with the newly arrived outsider, another distinct type;

3. the distinction (only latent in Simmel) between strangers as individuals and stranger communities has not been articulated in later studies; and

4. the significance of the variety of ways in which Simmel used the metaphor of simultaneous closenss and remoteness has been obscured.

Clarification of the issues related to these four areas of confusion lays the basis fora typology of stranger statuses (Guest, Sojourner, Newcomer, Intruder, Inner Enemy, Marginal Man) and a related paradigm presented to assist in organizing the sociology of the stranger in a more systematic fashion.     

On the almost inconceivable misunderstandings concerning the subject of value‐free social science

A value judgment says what is good or bad, and value‐free social science simply means social science free of value judgments. Yet many sociologists regard value‐free social science as undesirable or impossible and readily make value judgments in the name of sociology. Often they display confusion about such matters as the meaning of value‐free social science, value judgments internal and external to social science, value judgments as a subject of social science, the relevance of objectivity for value‐free social science, and the difference between the human significance of social science and value‐free social science. But why so many sociologists are so value‐involved – and generally so unscientific – is sociologically understandable: The closest and most distant subjects attract the least scientific ideas. And during the past century sociologists have become increasingly close to their human subject. The debate about value‐free social science is also part of an epistemological counterrevolution of humanists (including many sociologists) against the more scientific social scientists who invaded and threatened to expropriate the human subject during the past century.