Analysis of short-term systematic measurement error variance for the difference of paired data without repetition of measurement

The variance of short-term systematic measurement errors for the difference of paired data is estimated. The difference of paired data is determined by subtracting the measurement results of two methods, which measure the same item only once without measurement repetition. The unbiased estimators for short-term systematic measurement error variances based on the one-way random effects model are not fit for practical purpose because they can be negative. The estimators, which are derived for balanced data as well as for unbalanced data, are always positive but biased. The basis of these positive estimators is the one-way random effects model. The biases, variances, and the mean squared errors of the positive estimators are derived as well as their estimators. The positive estimators are fit for practical purpose.     

Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which together imply individual rationality) exists. For two agents with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for some profiles of separable preferences, no rule is efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. If there are more than two agents, for some profiles of separable preferences, no rule is efficient, individually rational, and transfer-proof.     

Demographic dynamics and long-run development: insights for the secular stagnation debate

This paper takes a global, long-run perspective on the recent debate about secular stagnation, which has so far mainly focused on the short term. The analysis is motivated by observing the interplay between the economic and demographic transition that has occurred in the developed world over the past 150 years. To the extent that high growth rates in the past have partly been the consequence of singular changes during the economic and demographic transition, growth is likely to become more moderate once the transition is completed. At the same time, a similar transition is on its way in most developing countries, with profound consequences for the development prospects in these countries, but also for global comparative development. The evidence presented here suggests that long-run demographic dynamics have potentially important implications for the prospects of human and physical capital accumulation, the evolution of productivity, and the question of secular stagnation.     

On (n-l)-wise and joint independence and normality of n Random variables: an example

An example is given of a vector of n random variables such that any (n-1)-dimensional subvector consists of n-1 independent standard normal variables. The whole vector however is neither independent nor normal.     

Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents may desire to consume more than one object and monetary transfers are not possible. Each agent receives a set of objects and free disposal is allowed. We are interested in allocation rules that satisfy appealing properties from an economic and social point of view. Our main result shows that sequential dictatorships are the only efficient and coalitional strategy-proof solutions to the multiple assignment problem. Adding resource-monotonicity narrows this class down to serial dictatorships.We thank Francois Maniquet, two anonymous referees, and the participants of the GREBE-FRANCQUI Summer School on Axiomatic Resource Allocation Theory, held in Namur, Belgium, for their comments.     

Consistent judgement aggregation: the truth-functional case

Generalizing the celebrated “discursive dilemma”, we analyze judgement aggregation problems in which a group of agents independently votes on a set of complex propositions (the “conclusions”) and on a set of “premises” by which the conclusions are truth-functionally determined. We show that for conclusion- and premise-based aggregation rules to be mutually consistent, the aggregation must always be “oligarchic”, that is: unanimous within a subset of agents, and typically even be dictatorial. We characterize exactly when consistent non-dictatorial (or anonymous) aggregation rules exist, allowing for arbitrary conclusions and arbitrary interdependencies among premises.