Redistribution under proportional representation

The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between proportional representation voting system and the size of government via its effects on political equilibrium. The multiparty spatial competition on tax-transfer policy and the post-electoral coalition formation are examined. The implemented policy does not necessarily reflect the median voters preference, ranging from laissez-faire to a redistributive economy according to income distribution. It can even reflect the preference of the lower income class in spite of equal income distribution, leading to the large-scale redistribution. Our results can explain the heterogeneous sizes of government observed among European proportional representation democracies.The author is grateful for helpful comments to Masahiro Ashiya, Nobuaki Hori, Moriki Hosoe, Toshihiro Ihori, Tatsuro Kuroda, Yasuhiro Sato, and seminar participants at the University of Tokyo, Kyushu University, and Nagoya University.     

Freedom of choice and diversity of options: Some difficulties

This paper explores the possibility for a (non-preference-based) freedom ranking of opportunity sets that is sensitive to the diversity of the options. It turns out that how distances between sets and alternatives are measured is crucial to the derivation of such a ranking. Several proposals are examined, each of which is shown to lead to impossibility results. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at conferences in Kortrijk, Osnabrück, Oisterwijk, Caen and Pavia. I thank the participants at these conferences for their comments. I would also like to thank Steven Hartkamp, Theo Kuipers, Clemens Puppe and especially Kotaro Suzumura for their helpful comments. Furthermore, I am very grateful to Somdeb Lahiri for pointing out a mistake in a previous version of this paper.     

A note on “Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize” by G. J. Woeginger

Given a tournament T, a Banks winner of T is the first vertex of any maximal (with respect to inclusion) transitive subtournament of T. While Woeginger shows that recognizing whether a given vertex of T is a Banks winner is NP-complete, the computation of a Banks winner of T is polynomial, and more precisely linear with respect to the size of T.The article of G.J. Woeginger appeared in Soc Choice Welfare 20: 523–528 (2003)     

Lattices of choice functions and consensus problems

In this paper we consider the three classes of choice functions satisfying the three significant axioms called heredity (H), concordance (C) and outcast (O). We show that the set of choice functions satisfying any one of these axioms is a lattice, and we study the properties of these lattices. The lattice of choice functions satisfying (H) is distributive, whereas the lattice of choice functions verifying (C) is atomistic and lower bounded, and so has many properties. On the contrary, the lattice of choice functions satisfying (O) is not even ranked. Then using results of the axiomatic and metric latticial theories of consensus as well as the properties of our three lattices of choice functions, we get results to aggregate profiles of such choice functions into one (or several) collective choice function(s).The authors thank two anonymous referee for several useful remarks or corrections on the first version of the paper.     

A limit theorem on the dual core of a distributive social system

I consider abstract social systems where the distribution of wealth is an object of common concern. I study, in particular, the systems where liberal distributive social contracts consist of the Pareto-efficient distributions that are unanimously preferred to the initial distribution. I define a Dual Distributive Core from a process of decentralized auction on the budget shares of Lindahl associated with net transfers, operated by coalitions aiming at increasing the value of the public good for their members while maintaining their utility levels. I establish that the dual distributive core converges, as the number of distributive agents becomes large relative to the number of agent types, to a typically finite number of distributive liberal social contracts, which correspond to the Lindahl equilibria that are unanimously preferred to the initial distribution. This process of decentralized auction provides a theoretical foundation for contractual policies of redistribution. The comparison with the usual notion of core with public goods (Foley 1970) yields the following results in this context: the Foley-core is a subset, generally proper, of the set of liberal distributive social contracts; it does not contain, in general, distributive Lindahl equilibria.     

Room assignment-rent division: A market approach

A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.We would like to thank seminar participants at Barcelona, Boston College, Duke, Koç, Málaga, MIT, Michigan, NYU, conference participants at the First Brazilian Workshop of Game Theory Society (Sao Paulo 2002), SED 2002-Conference on Economic Design (New York City 2002), The Sixth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (Pasadena 2002), an anonymous referee for their comments and Ahmet Alkan, Selçuk Karabati, Bari Tan, nsan Tunali for insightful discussions. Sönmez gratefully acknowledges the research support of KoçBank via the KoçBank scholar program and Turkish Academy of Sciences in the framework of the Young Scientist Award Program via grant TS/TÜBA-GEBP/2002-1-19. Any errors are our own responsibility.     

Factors Contributing to Parents’ Preparation For Special-Needs Adoption

Three hundred and sixty-eight parents shared their perceptions of special-needs adoption preparation. Utilizing both quantitative and qualitative data to determine and understand what factors contribute to preparation, this study found that 12 child, family, and agency variables were correlated with perceived preparation, and that parents perceived level of preparation was predicted by the childs ability to attach, by the parents relationship with the agency, by the duration of the adoption, and by the parents ages at the time of adoption. Implications of these findings are discussed, as they relate to supporting parents, children, and families in special-needs adoptive placements.     

LEGISLATING LOVE: The Effect of Child Support and Welfare Policies on Father–child Contact

Reducing non-marital childbearing and making nonresidential fathers take greater responsibility for their children were identified as goals of numerous policy changes since the 1980s. Child-support award rates for children born to unmarried parents have been quite low historically, leading lawmakers to focus on increasing both award and payment rates for this group. Nonmarital fathers are also much less likely to have contact with their children. Although evidence suggests that policy efforts increase child support awards and receipt, the link between child support policies, child support outcomes, and father-child contact has received less attention. This paper uses data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation on children born between 1985–1997 to investigate the relationship between child-support award and receipt and the amount of contact that fathers have with their non-residential children. Since it is likely that both of these behaviors are, in part, determined by unobservable characteristics of the father, we estimate an instrumental variables Tobit model. The model is identified by our assumption that child support policy variables can impact child support awards and payments, but father-child contact cannot be directly legislated. Our results suggest that there are unintended, but desirable effects of child support establishment and collection. Policies to collect child support not only increase financial resources to families, but through their impact on payments increase visitation and contact between these children and their fathers. The estimated impact of receiving child support on contact is more than 27 days per year.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Economic Association, Washington DC, January 2003 and the Annual Meetings of the Association of Public Policy and Management, November 2003. Support from NICHD Grant # HD30944 is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank Suzann Eshleman for excellent computer programming and James Scully for providing us with data on genetic testing laws.     

Out-of-Home Placement of Children and Economic Factors: An Empirical Analysis

In this paper, we use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to estimate the effects of income, maternal employment, family structure, and public policies on several measures of childrens living arrangements. We use both linear probability models and discrete-time event history models to explore the effects of these factors on: (1) the probability that a child is living out-of-home in a given year; (2) the probability that a child is removed from home in a given year, conditional on the child living at home in the previous year; (3) the probability that a child is removed from home for the first time; (4) the probability that a child is reunified with his/her biological parent(s) given that the child was living out-of-home in the previous year. We also analyze whether these estimates differ by types of out-of-home placements. Our results suggest that children from lower-income, single-mother, and mother–partner families are considerably more likely both to be living out-of-home and to be removed from home. A change in family structure also tends to place a child at higher risk of an out-of-home living arrangement, unless this transition functions to bring a childs father back into the household. Maternal work appears to increase the probability that a child lives at home. Additionally, once a removal has taken place, we do not find a relationship between income and the probability of a family reunification, but we do find that single-mother and mother–partner families are less likely to reunify. Finally, our analyses provide some evidence that welfare benefit levels are negatively related to out-of-home placements.Funding for this project was provided the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development through grant number 5 F32 HD044 302-02. We are grateful to Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, Jennifer Hill, Sanders Korenman, Leonard Lopoo, Katherine Magnuson, and Christina Paxson for their excellent comments and advice.JEL Classification: D10, I30, J13     

How Much Is Leisure Worth? Direct Measurement with Contingent Valuation

This paper uses a contingent value survey in a Rocky Mountain city to measure the national income accounting value of leisure activities. Such direct measurement avoids shortcomings of the previously used labor value approach and individually values various types of leisure, e.g., napping and socializing. The results of the study indicate promise for this measurement approach but also raise some issues that require further research. Included are suggestions for overcoming problems discovered with this method and for future research.The authors wish to thank two anonymous referees of this journal who provided insightful comments and suggestions which improved the paper significantly.