Children’s Deliberate Control of Facial Action Units Involved in Sad and Happy Expressions

Few attempts have been made since the pioneer work of Ekman et al. (1980) to examine the development of the deliberate control of facial action units in children. We are reporting here two studies concerned with this issue. In Study 1, we investigated children’s ability to activate facial action units involved in sadness and happiness expressions as well as combinations of these action units. In Study 2, we examined children’s ability to pose happiness and sadness with their face, without telling them which action unit to activate. The children who took part in this study were simply asked to portray happiness and sadness as convincingly as possible. The results of Study 1 indicate a strong developmental progression in children’s ability to produce elementary facial components of both emotions as well as in their ability to produce a combination of the elements in the case of happiness. In agreement with prior research in motor development, several non-target action units were also activated when children performed the task. Their occurrence persisted throughout childhood, indicating limitations in the finer motor control achieved by children across age. The results obtained in Study 2 paralleled those obtained in Study 1 in many respects, providing evidence that the children used the technique of deliberate action to pose the two target emotions.     

Bayesian prediction for two-stage sequential analysis in clinical trials

This article deals with a Bayesian predictive approach for two-stage sequential analyses in clinical trials, applied to both frequentist and Bayesian tests. We propose to make a predictive inference based on the notion of satisfaction index and the data accrued so far together with future data. The computations and the simulation results concern an inferential problem, related to the binomial model.     

Optimal life-cycle fertility in a Barro-Becker economy

Parenthood postponement is a key demographic trend of the last three decades. In order to rationalize that stylized fact, we extend the canonical model by Barro and Becker (Econometrica 57:481–501, 1989) to include two—instead of one—reproduction periods. We examine how the cost structure of early and late children in terms of time and goods affects the optimal fertility timing. Then, we identify conditions that guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium with a stationary cohort size. Finally, we examine how the model can rationalize the observed postponement of births, and we highlight two plausible causes: (1) a general rise in the cost of children in terms of goods and (2) a decline in the degree of family altruism.     

Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Persistent Shocks

This paper studies the optimal level of discretion in policymaking. We consider a fiscal policy model where the government has time‐inconsistent preferences with a present bias toward public spending. The government chooses a fiscal rule to trade off its desire to commit to not overspend against its desire to have flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. We analyze the optimal fiscal rule when the shocks are persistent. Unlike under independent and identically distributed shocks, we show that the ex ante optimal rule is not sequentially optimal, as it provides dynamic incentives. The ex ante optimal rule exhibits history dependence, with high shocks leading to an erosion of future fiscal discipline compared to low shocks, which lead to the reinstatement of discipline. The implied policy distortions oscillate over time given a sequence of high shocks, and can force the government to accumulate maximal debt and become immiserated in the long run.     

Social cognitive neuroscience and leadership

We provide an overview of how the emerging field of social cognitive neuroscience can be linked to leadership theory and practice. A number of challenges are addressed, including theory development, as well as technical, measurement and methodological issues. In addition, we review recent leadership research that involves neuroscience applications, as well as areas that are closely related to leadership, such as emotional regulation and ethical reasoning and decision-making. Consideration is also given to how neuroscience might inform leadership development processes. We conclude with a discussion of the institutional challenges in conducting leadership research that incorporates neuroscience, and we consider potential limitations of such applications.     

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF INTEREST RATE BEHAVIOR: ARE CENTRAL BANKS DIFFERENT?

Political influences on short-term interest rates in seventeen OECD countries from 1960–1990 are measured. After controlling for unexpected changes in inflation and unemployment, as well as changes in the world interest rate, short-term interest rates in most countries do not respond to political events, neither the timing of elections nor changes in the governing party. Thus, on this criterion, the central banks in this sample do not reveal large differences in their degree of independence from political influence. The small differences are not closely related to rankings of central bank independence based on quantification of central bank laws.     

An extension of Bowen’s dynamic voting rule to many dimensions

 We ask in this paper about the effect on social decisions of limiting the size of changes that voters may propose each time in an otherwise standard dynamic social choice model. The voting rule we study can be seen as an extension of Bowen’s dynamic “majority voting” rule, and is closely related to the dynamic procedures for public good allocation in the literature (Drèze and de la Vallée Poussin 1971; Malinvaud 1971; Laffont and Maskin 1983; Chander 1993). Under general assumptions we prove existence and Pareto efficiency of equilibrium, and show that our rule motivates voters not to misrepresent preferences (more precisely, the rule is Strongly Locally Individually Incentive Compatible). Under Euclidean preferences we find that electoral cycles do not arise (i.e., the rule is convergent), that there is a unique equilibrium, and that the equilibrium coincides with the solution to an old problem of geometry, first addressed by Fermat, Torricelli, and Cavallieri. Received: 20 September 1994/Accepted: 6 August 1996