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31.
在西方国家首先出现的生态政治运动促使了西方国家的政治转型,即逐渐走向生态政治模式.始于20世纪80年代的中国改革,致力于维持现存政治形态下的经济突破,虽带来经济的超常规增长,亦不知不觉陷入总想避免又无力回头的"先污染、后治理"状况.频发的生态危机与低效治理模式的"错配"引发的"合法性"危机促使了生态政治化的产生和发展.作为政治形态的系统转型,多元主体间的利益博弈又往往使这一进程面临诸多变数.要准确把握中国生态政治化的演化进程,就必须结合具体的生态危机案例,动态演绎其中的互动利益博弈;即选取博弈主体,定位其角色,描述其博弈策略和技术.最后,在相关结论基础上,对中国生态政治化进程进行总体性描述.  相似文献   
32.
It is shown that an exponentially small departure from the common knowledge assumption on the number T of repetitions of the prisoners' dilemma already enables cooperation. More generally, with such a departure, any feasible individually rational outcome of any one-shot game can be approximated by a subgame perfect equilibrium of a finitely repeated version of that game. The sense in which the departure from common knowledge is small is as follows: (I) With probability one, the players know T with precision ±K. (ii) With probability 1 −ε, the players know T precisely; moreover, this knowledge is mutual of order εT. (iii) The deviation of T from its finite expectation is exponentially small.  相似文献   
33.
When offering a product that has a complementary product in a different market, a firm must consider the interdependence between the complementary products as well as the competition within markets. If the firm participates in both markets, the balancing act becomes even more challenging. This article provides insights about strategies in this latter setting: when should the firm seek to keep its products closed to competing complementary products, and when would the firm be better off by accepting a common standard? To address these questions, we employ standard game theoretic analysis to a simple spatial model that captures aspects of both intermarket externalities and intramarket competition. We find that if a firm participates in both markets and chooses a closed standard, it achieves lower profits compared to an open standard, but gains greater market share. Surprisingly, we find that customers are better off when standards are kept closed.  相似文献   
34.
由于具有相似的区位条件和产业结构,并处在大体相同的发展阶段,皖江城市带各市在承接产业转移上势必会产生激烈的竞争。鉴于此,文章通过构建比较优势和政府政策的两城市承接产业转移博弈模型,得出具有比较优势的城市将获得更高的收益、城市之间的合作比不合作将带来更高的收益等结论,在此基础上,提出应发挥自身优势承接产业转移,建立合理的分工协作机制,避免恶性竞争,引导产业向皖江城市带聚集等措施。  相似文献   
35.
从发起者和参与者博弈的角度解释:参与者会基于发起者的资金回报承诺、发起者本人的信誉和相应的法律约束对民间金融组织进行投资;随着组织规模扩大,发起人违约成本减少、违约收益增加使得发起者放弃声誉而导致民间金融组织风险爆发;在极端情形下民间金融组织继续运营的最低限度依赖于市场在未来对违约者的惩罚,而这一惩罚不能低于发起者违约而获得本应属于参与者参与组织的利息收益。  相似文献   
36.
We consider a supply chain consisting of one supplier and two value-adding heterogeneous retailers. Each retailer has full knowledge about his own value-added cost structure that is unknown to the supplier and the other retailer. Assuming there is no horizontal information sharing between two retailers, we model the supply chain with a three-stage game-theoretic framework. In the first stage each retailer decides if he is willing to vertically disclose his private cost information to the supplier. In the second stage, given the information he has about the retailers, the supplier announces the wholesale price to the retailers. In response to the wholesale price, in the third stage, the retailers optimize their own retail prices and the values added to the product, respectively. Under certain conditions, we prove the existence of equilibrium prices and added values. Furthermore, we obtain the condition under which both retailers are unwilling to vertically share their private information with the supplier, as well as the conditions under which both retailers have incentives to reveal their cost information to the supplier, thus leading to a win–win situation for the whole supply chain.  相似文献   
37.
六方会谈:决策树模型视角下的“猎鹿困境”   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
朱芹 《太平洋学报》2011,19(4):54-63
朝核问题是国际核不扩散体系中最令人关切的核心问题之一。朝核问题的症结在于怎样解读和执行朝鲜半岛无核化,在于美国的军事存在及敌视政策与朝鲜安全诉求的负相关性,在于现存国际法致使捍卫国家安全的正当性和维护国际安全的法理性二者相悖,而消弭这一悖论的纳什均衡点难以寻求。作者以决策树模型和猎鹿博弈理论,论证了解决朝核问题的机制——六方会谈的实质是购买朝鲜弃核。本文认为,该机制本身孕育了致使其难以成功的困境,并进而得出朝鲜难以在现存国际体系下和平弃核,以朝鲜半岛中立化机制内化掉朝核问题未尝不是最佳出路。  相似文献   
38.
从混合策略博弈模型的视角出发,分析小额贷款公司在中小企业融资中的作用,对小贷公司放贷和中小企业需贷的动态互动行为模式进行了描述。研究发现小额贷款公司自身的经营能力、项目收益以及预期坏账率具有至关重要的作用,为小额信贷公司支持中小企业融资提出相应的政策建议。  相似文献   
39.
An original equipment manufacturer (OEM) produces new products and often faces a dilemma when determining the level of interchangeability in its product design. The interchangeability is considered as a degree to which the product can be disassembled without force, and thus an increasing degree of interchangeability would decrease the OEM's production cost, but it would also lower a remanufacturer's cost in cannibalizing used items. Decreasing the level of interchangeability to deter the remanufacturer, on the other hand, would simultaneously increase the production costs of the OEM. We thus formulate a two-period supply chain model consisting of two chain members, an OEM and a remanufacturer, to investigate the product design decision of the OEM and both chain members' competitive pricing strategies. We then characterize the equilibrium decisions and profits with regard to costs and consumers' preference for the remanufactured product. We also evaluate a strategic game in which the OEM chooses the degree of interchangeability, and the remanufacturer determines its collection strategy. We find that the product-design strategy is effective for the OEM in competing with the remanufacturer, but it is not necessarily harmful to the remanufacturer.  相似文献   
40.
The Crying Game's central, tragic theme of warrior/lovers caught between their love for one another and loyalty to their respective factions has significant roots in early Celtic mythology. The elegaic theme of potential lovers forced into ill-fated combat that frames the film's events also, significantly, bears the weight of the film's most unambiguous political commentary, when Fergus speaks directly to the picture of Jody in Dil's apartment, telling him: ‘You should have stayed at home.’ This sad remonstration, which clearly lays responsibility for the chain of causality that has led to so much suffering not with Jody, but with the British state, is similar in quality to Cu Chulainn's lament as he contemplates his meeting with Ferdia. When we listen carefully for ways in which Celtic mythical themes underlie and nuance the film's events, different rhythms emerge, accenting different beats.  相似文献   
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