In-house capability and supply chain decisions

This study considers an internal production option for a contractor and analyzes its effect on the supply chain decisions when the contractor has innovated and the subcontractor has an incentive for opportunistic behavior. In contrast to the single disclosure threshold in the benchmark scenario where the contractor lacks in-house capability, we find two thresholds in the referred scenario. When information misappropriation is possible and the contractor has in-house capability, the contractor will organize a coordinated supply chain only when innovations fall between the two thresholds. Compared to the benchmark scenario, in-house capability has a positive effect on the contractor's incentive to innovate and an ambiguous effect on the subcontractor's incentive to invest in the production process. When the contractor needs to incur an extra cost to build in-house capability, the contractor keeps the same levels of investment compared to the case of no additional in-house capability cost, whereas the subcontractor increases the levels of investment. Furthermore, we find that in the presence of potential misappropriation on the part of the subcontractor, the higher the level of in-house capability, the less likely the contractor will be to outsource innovative products that generate higher profitability. This study can explain why firms strategically outsource low-end products and produce high-end products themselves. This study provides new results on the effects of in-house capability on the strategic interactions of parties in supply chains and, hence, on supply chain efficiency.     

Cooperative Advertising with Bilateral Participation

We study cooperative (co‐op) advertising strategies in a two‐tier distribution channel and extend the popular unilateral participation strategy to bilateral participations. Our research shows that a properly designed bilateral participation has several advantages over unilateral participation. Bilateral participation is capable of coordinating the distribution channel under a very general demand function. In addition, when channel members determine participation parameters endogenously, the bilateral participation improves the channel efficiency and leads to a Pareto improvement over the corresponding unilateral participation.     

Distribution Channel Strategies for a Manufacturer with Complementary Products

In this article, we consider distribution channel strategies for an incumbent manufacturer who produces two complementary products and must determine whether or not to have another company to sell its products. We identify factors that affect the manufacturer's motivation to use dual‐channel distribution. Our results show that both complementarity between complements and product substitutability between firms influence the manufacturer's channel strategy. We find that if the potential entrant does not produce the complement of the primary product, a higher complementary effect for the complement will weaken the motivation of the incumbent to add an indirect channel. We also find that the incumbent has a stronger incentive to add the indirect channel when a product's substitutability is high. Furthermore, we show that when the two channels have the same pricing power, the incumbent has a stronger incentive to sell through the indirect channel in a higher pricing power environment.     

女性创业动机的演化博弈模型

女性创业动机始终是女性创业研究的一个重要视角。文章将演化博弈模型引入女性创业动机研究,对女性创业动机的演化博弈过程进行了分析。结果显示：女性是否将创业作为理想的就业选择（最优解）,取决于女性自身条件和环境状态的博弈,只有当女性自身条件和环境状态都有利于创业时,创业才是女性就业策略决策博弈的最优解。要激发女性的创业动机和扶持女性的创业行为,就必须致力于不断改善女性的创业条件和创业环境。     

农业巨灾保险供求双方行为博弈及对策

目前,国外农业保险已较为成熟,但国内农业保险发展迟缓甚至一度停滞萎缩。如何使我国农业保险走出困境,文章从经济学期望效用理论的角度,分析我国农业保险供求双方——农户和保险公司采取不同行为的期望利润,并以此建立两者的博弈模型,最后分析模型,提出结论和政策建议。     

制度设计与制度功能：政治学视域下的博弈分析

博弈论假定人是“理性人”。“哈丁悲剧”与“纳什均衡”的博弈结构与状态,要求政治制度的设计与安排在战略对策上应规避“集体行动的悲剧”,走共赢、稳定与创新之路。博弈论的理性假定与“囚徒困境”蕴含着制度功能,对良好结局具有决定性意义。     

我国钢铁市场价格的动态重复博弈模型研究

我国钢铁市场处于近似的寡头垄断状态,各厂商之间的价格博弈非常复杂,未必能够达到理论上的均衡点,其博弈结果与博弈过程密切相关。本文基于以价格作为决策变量的伯川德模型,建立了双寡头垄断钢铁市场动态重复博弈模型,对其动态博弈过程进行研究。本文还尝试把模型推广到n个寡头企业的价格博弈分析中,对于研究多寡头企业的动态重复博弈过程有一定的指导意义。     

一种估计连续策略博弈的两阶段方法

 最近实证博弈研究的迅速发展为分析市场中的策略互动、进行政策分析与反事实实验提供了有效的工具。本文提出一种估计不完全信息连续策略博弈的两阶段方法,它可以处理私有信息的影响。第一阶段通过非参数分位数回归估计局中人的策略与期望支付函数;第二阶段利用贝叶斯——纳什均衡不等式构造模拟最小距离估计量,最终获得结构参数的估计。数值模拟显示本方法有良好的小样本表现。与现有文献的嵌套固定点方法相比,本方法不需计算均衡,极大地降低了计算量,并减轻了多重均衡的干扰。本方法既可以用于估计离散状态博弈,也适用于连续状态博弈。     

竞争博弈中的角色转换

本文讨论了博弈论中价值网的概念,解释了价值网在竞争分析中的作用,解释了通过改变博弈中的参与者的地位而使博弈对自己有利.本文首次提出了价值网中博弈方角色转换的概念,提出了价值网的网络模型,讨论了由此种转换而产生相应结果,从而拓展了价值网分析的范围.     

统计信用与统计数据质量研究

 统计数据质量问题严重影响着政府决策和社会公信力。本文运用博弈论分析方法，分析了声誉资本大小、失信惩戒力度、报假收益及监督力度是影响统计数据失真的重要因素，证明了引入统计信用可以在有限的成本下防范数据失真，提出了完善统计信用惩戒制度是统计信用发挥作用的制度基础。