韦伯经济伦理与中国传统道德的理性化重构

韦伯的经济伦理思想的核心内容是理性精神 ,其实质是一种理性的功利主义。正是新教的理性经济伦理塑造了理性的资本主义精神 ,并促进了资本主义的产生和发展。中国传统道德存在诸多方面的理性缺失 ,更缺少系统的理性经济伦理思想 ,因而阻碍了中国社会的理性化和经济的现代化进程。在市场经济条件下 ,应大力弘扬理性精神 ,建立理性的经济伦理原则     

政府产业管制的理性和非理性

政府的产业管制行为存在着被经济学家潜在察觉到、但没有专门予以研究的理性和非理性的融合。从有限理性约束来理解政府的产业管制行为,可以从理性和非理性融合的角度展开分析。这种分析视角认为:经验和理论在强化政府理性行为的同时会导致政府管制行为的非理性,它反映政府选择行为的理性和非理性的融合。政府产业管制会引致的多种交易费用,这是一个未被经济理论分析引起高度关注的问题。以抽象的数学模型刻画出的由产业管制行为所引起的交易费用,是对政府理性和非理性行为之效应的一种现实分析。     

Status quo bias in decision making

Most real decisions, unlike those of economics texts, have a status quo alternative—that is, doing nothing or maintaining one's current or previous decision. A series of decision-making experiments shows that individuals disproportionately stick with the status quo. Data on the selections of health plans and retirement programs by faculty members reveal that the status quo bias is substantial in important real decisions. Economics, psychology, and decision theory provide possible explanations for this bias. Applications are discussed ranging from marketing techniques, to industrial organization, to the advance of science.     

Models for estimating discount rates for long-term health risks using labor market data

This article utilizes evidence from job choices involving fatality risks to estimate individual discount rates for adverse health outcomes. The study compares the results from five distinct models for estimating discount rates from labor market data. The estimated discount rates range from 1% to 14% with confidence intervals that usually include financial market rates for the same period. This result, and consistent findings of significant compensating differentials for fatality risk, provide strong support for life-cycle models of individual rationality in the choice of job risks. Discounted value-of-life estimates are also developed and compared to the crosssection estimates that are more prevalent in the literature.     

文化侵略与文化守卫--论19世纪后半期儒家反洋教的意义及其教训

近代中国,基督教强制性输入与儒家士绅的顽强抵制,衍生出中西两大文化"法"与"理"的冲突与张力,且由这种冲突与张力引发了一个个教案并最终导致义和团运动的发生.诚然,儒家反洋教具有反抗列强文化侵略和捍卫儒教中国的双重文化意义,但由于盲目排外的"文化义和团"心态,同时也扭曲了中外文化正常交流的管道.总结这一历史教训,对于面临全球化与本土化困惑的我们,警惕强势文明文化、宗教与价值观的强制性输入和避免"文化义和团心态"具有重要意义.     

The individual rationality of maintaining a sense of justice

Let us say that an individual possesses aprincipled preference if she prefers satisfying her preferences without violating the principles of justice governing her community to satisfying her preferences by violating these principles. Although living among possessors of principled preferences benefits individuals, maintaining such a preference is individually costly. Further, individuals can benefit from others possessing principled preferences without themselves possessing one. In this paper, I argue that occupying a choice situation which mirrors key aspects of our own situation, maximizing rationality requires individuals to develop and maintain principled preferences.To establish that maintaining a principled preference is individually rational for the occupants of such a choice situation, I define a range of individual strategies for them, model their choice of individual strategies as a game, and argue that this game involves an equilibrium in which all of its participants would choose to develop and maintain a principled preference.     

Bayesian boundedly rational agents play the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

In this paper a model of boundedly rational decision making in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is proposed in which: (1) each player is Bayesianrational; (2) this is common knowledge; (3) players are constrained by limited state spaces (their Bayesian minds) in processing (1) and (2). Under these circumstances, we show that cooperative behavior may arise as an individually optimal response, except for the latter part of the game. Indeed, such behaviorwill necessarily obtain in long enough games if belief systems satisfy a natural condition: essentially, that all events consistent with the players' analysis of the game be attributed by them positive (although arbitrarily small) subjective probability.     

Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information

Aumann's (1987) theorem shows that correlated equilibrium is an expression of Bayesian rationality. We extend this result to games with incomplete information.First, we rely on Harsanyi's (1967) model and represent the underlying multiperson decision problem as a fixed game with imperfect information. We survey four definitions of correlated equilibrium which have appeared in the literature. We show that these definitions are not equivalent to each other. We prove that one of them fits Aumann's framework; the agents normal form correlated equilibrium is an expression of Bayesian rationality in games with incomplete information.We also follow a universal Bayesian approach based on Mertens and Zamir's (1985) construction of the universal beliefs space. Hierarchies of beliefs over independent variables (states of nature) and dependent variables (actions) are then constructed simultaneously. We establish that the universal set of Bayesian solutions satisfies another extension of Aumann's theorem.We get the following corollary: once the types of the players are not fixed by the model, the various definitions of correlated equilibrium previously considered are equivalent.     

道德权利的价值原则初探

在道德权利的本质规定中,蕴涵着普遍性原则、合理性原则、社会性原则。普遍性原则强调道德权利中权利主体的普遍性,合理性原则强调道德权利中利益的价值合理性,社会性原则强调道德权利的社会本性。只有合乎三方面价值原则的权利要求,才能上升为道德权利。     

产权公共领域与农地确权颁证

由于地区差距、产业差别以及社区差异,使得公共领域的结构差异较大,且存在差序格局.而公共领域的存在正是公共利益构建的基础,也是个人理性与村社理性之间的桥梁.确权颁证的重点并不是对于产权公共领域的分解,而是在公共领域之上构建合作视角的产权合约.从近郊与远郊两个不同的确权颁证区域,可以得出农户对于产权的诉求的偏重存在较大差异,而产权公共领域的治理也存在较大的不同.但是,确权颁证的关键依然在于对产权公共领域的合理利用.