Equilibrium Financing in a Distribution Channel with Capital Constraint

There exist capital constraints in many distribution channels. We examine a channel consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the retailer is capital constrained. The retailer may fund its business by borrowing credit either from a competitive bank market or from the manufacturer, provided the latter is willing to lend. When only one credit type (either bank or trade credit) is viable, we show that trade credit financing generally charges a higher wholesale price and thus becomes less attractive than bank credit financing for the retailer. When both bank and trade credits are viable, the unique equilibrium is trade credit financing if production cost is relatively low but is bank credit financing otherwise. We also study the case where both the retailer and the manufacturer are capital constrained and demonstrate that, to improve the overall supply chain efficiency, the bank should finance the manufacturer if production cost is low but finance the retailer otherwise. Our analysis further suggests that the equilibrium region of trade credit financing shrinks as demand variability or the retailer's internal capital level increases.     

Contract Pricing in Consumer Credit Markets

We analyze subprime consumer lending and the role played by down payment requirements in screening high‐risk borrowers and limiting defaults. To do this, we develop an empirical model of the demand for financed purchases that incorporates both adverse selection and repayment incentives. We estimate the model using detailed transaction‐level data on subprime auto loans. We show how different elements of loan contracts affect the quality of the borrower pool and subsequent loan performance. We also evaluate the returns to credit scoring that allows sellers to customize financing terms to individual applicants. Our approach shows how standard econometric tools for analyzing demand and supply under imperfect competition extend to settings in which firms care about the identity of their customers and their postpurchase behavior.     

Economic order quantity model with trade credit financing for non-decreasing demand

Researchers in the past have established their inventory lot-size models under trade credit financing by assuming that the demand rate is constant. However, from a product life cycle perspective, it is only in the maturity stage that demand is near constant. During the growth stage of a product life cycle (especially for high-tech products), the demand function increases with time. To obtain robust and generalized results, we extend the constant demand to a linear non-decreasing demand function of time. As a result, the fundamental theoretical results obtained here are suitable for both the growth and maturity stages of a product life cycle. In addition, we characterize the optimal solutions and obtain conclusions on important and relevant managerial phenomena. Lastly, we provide several numerical examples to illustrate the proposed model and its optimal solution.     

论交易成本与社会信用

本文通过对社会信用的理论溯源,揭示了其本质其实就是社会诚信。在考察了社会信用与制度、交易成本的关系后,本文指出了反思当代伦理价值的重要性。     

全球化视野下国际诚信秩序的解构与重建

全球化从内涵上体现为一种全球秩序,表现为世界不同国家与地区秉承自由、平等原则而开展的政治、经济、文化交往。全球化的内在要求与国际诚信旧秩序并行不悖,客观上呼唤一种融公共性、包容性、多元性、积极信任等特征为一体的新秩序。国际诚信新秩序的重建,需要从秩序理念、秩序网络、秩序内容、秩序维护平台等多方面予以努力。     

农户正规信贷需求和信贷约束——基于江西省的调查

发展中国家的农民往往因为信贷资金的缺乏依然生活在贫困之中,缓解农户的信贷约束能够极大的促进农村经济增长、提高农民生活水平。以江西省872个农户为样本,用直接衡量方法不仅考察农户的显性正规信贷需求,也考察农户的隐性正规信贷需求,进而甄别农户正规信贷约束的类型和程度。统计分析结果表明:农户的正规信贷需求较高,农户贷款金额以中短期小额信贷为主,资金需求以消费性用途为主,生产性用途比例较小;农户供给型信贷约束程度较轻,需求型正规信贷约束严重。因此,相比信贷供给,农户信贷需求的发掘是解决农村信贷市场不均衡的关键。     

农本局合作金库与近代农村金融建设

为推动现代金融组织发展和改善农村金融状况,国民政府成立了农本局,以辅导设立合作金库网络,管理农贷业务。抗战时期,农本局通过机构改革、人员培训等一系列措施,在实践中取得了积极的效果,推动了农村金融、农业技术和合作组织三位一体的协同发展,是近代中国农村金融建设中一次有益的尝试,对我们当前建立现代农村金融体系和推进新农村建设也具有一定的参考价值。     

《共产党》月刊与马克思主义在中国的早期传播

《共产党》月刊是中国共产党的第一份党刊,是中国早期宣传马克思主义、批驳非马克思主义的重要载体。虽然期刊存在的时间只有半年多,但为马克思主义在中国的传播做出了重要贡献。     

竞争性农村金融服务体系构建路径

现阶段农村金融存在农村信用合作社“一社独大”的局面,农信社在推动农村经济发展的同时,也影响了农村金融的有效竞争,降低了农村金融资源的配置效率。通过山东莘县农村金融问卷调查,分析了农村金融改革的成就和问题,提出农村金融改革建议,即打破农村信用社在农村金融中的垄断地位,建立与农村多种融资需求相匹配,政策性、商业性、社区性、普惠制、合作制和民间金融等多种金融组织并存的竞争性农村金融服务体系。     

专利制度的“阿喀琉斯之踵”及其克服

技术创新是经济增长的引擎。专利制度以发明的市场利润为手段激励技术创新。然而,当市场提供给创新者的预期回报较低或不能补偿创新投资时,市场利润的激励手段并不能实现激励创新的目标,它构成了专利制度的“阿喀琉斯之踵”。为克服专利制度的局限性,国家为激励创新所采取的政策工具和法律手段具有多元性,它包括研发资助和税收优惠等。不同激励机制具有不同型态的成本、收益,在社会或创新者之间的成本、收益也并不一致,不同的激励机制具有发挥各自作用的场域。因此,既要坚持专利制度在激励创新中的基础地位,也要重视发挥其他激励机制的作用。这不仅是专利制度改革应秉持的基本原则,也是完善其他激励机制的出发点。