中国地方NGO生成机制的制度分析

地方NGO作为一种具体制度安排，其生成机制主要是在外在制度环境的作用下，以潜在利益为基本诱因，外在制度需求与内在制度供给相互契合推进，从而激励地方公民合作创设NGO制度安排的复杂过程。这是中国地方NGO生成的简要逻辑。从制度需求与制度供给的视角分析，在中国地方NGO的生成机制中，国家与市场对NGO制度安排的供给、市民集体行动的理性选择、地方制度转型的适应性安排、地方政府之间的制度竞争、地方知识精英的主导性介入与网络等科学技术进步的推动是六个关键性因素。特别是国家与市场的博弈过程与中国地方NGO的发展壮大过程相伴相生。分析中国地方NGO的生成机制，可以窥见中国公民社会的生长与发展轨迹。     

基于供应链集成的网络式新产品开发研究

基于供应链集成的网络式新产品开发，不是从一个企业或企业集团层面看，而是从整个产业的层面看，那就是新产品开发是由产业内价值链相关各企业及企业外部研发资源，利用企业间的互动机制，相互创意激发及技术交流而产生新产品的一种模式，这种模式的最大优势是全体参与者的共同参与，发挥全体参与者团体作用的优势，强调产品开发流程，以产出为衡量基准，强调“产出成本效率”的业绩评估体系以及通过对外部资源的充分利用，强调“资源优化和无缝对接”和有效配套管理。     

Competition and Coordination in a Two‐Channel Supply Chain

We study competition and coordination in a supply chain in which a single supplier both operates a direct channel and sells its product through multiple differentiated retailers. We study analytically the supply chain with symmetric retailers and find that the supplier prefers to have as many retailers as possible in the market, even if the retailers' equilibrium retail price is lower than that of the supplier, and even if the number of retailers and their cost or market advantage prevent sales through the direct channel. We find that the two‐channel supply chain may be subject to inefficiencies not present in the single‐channel supply chain. We show that several contracts known to coordinate a single‐channel supply chain do not coordinate the two‐channel supply chain; thus we propose a linear quantity discount contract and demonstrate its ability to perfectly coordinate the two‐channel supply chain with symmetric retailers. We provide some analytical results for the supply chain with asymmetric retailers and propose an efficient solution approach for finding the equilibrium. We find numerically that the supplier still benefits from having more retailers in the market and that linear quantity discount contracts can mitigate supply chain inefficiency, though they no longer achieve perfect coordination.     

Supply Chain Consequences of Subsidies for Corporate Social Responsibility

The use of government incentives tied to market prices as means of boosting corporate social responsibility (CSR) has expanded notably in recent decades. Enhanced business tax deductions for charitable donations and credits for conservation easements are notable cases. While providing incentives for socially desirable behavior to achieve legislative goals has intuitive appeal, the broader economic consequences are not always fully understood. In this study, we examine such wider consequences for supply chains when subsidies for CSR are offered. One effect we identify is that since incentives are typically tied to market value, firms have not only an added incentive to achieve societal objectives (say by donating inventory) but also an incentive to raise output (retail) market prices. A second consequence is that since firms forgo potential revenues by engaging in socially desired behavior, they become increasingly sensitive to supplier pricing; in an uncoordinated supply chain this leads to input (wholesale) price concessions. Among other things, the results underscore that incentives put in place to meet broader societal objectives also have notable ramifications for suppliers, retailers, and consumers in primary markets.     

Repurposing Materials and Waste through Online Exchanges: Overcoming the Last Hurdle

Online material and waste exchanges (OMWEs) provide online channels to repurpose by‐products, unused materials and waste from industrial and commercial facilities. Unfortunately, OMWE's also have challenges. First, sellers may have access to other disposal options and, as a result, may not fully commit to the exchange. Second, buyers can face high uncertainty about the product exchanged and the transaction being undertaken. Overcoming these challenges is the “last hurdle” to making OMWEs successful. This study investigates the factors that reduce the buyers' uncertainty and increase the sellers' commitment to the OMWE. We analyze novel transaction‐level data from an online exchange (MNExchange.org) combined with other archival public records on county‐level repurposing and disposal statistics. First, we find that regional repurposing policies and alternatives have a complementary effect on sellers' commitment toward OMWEs, resulting in increased OMWE exchanges. However, regional disposal policies and alternatives have a substitution effect on sellers' commitment, resulting in reduced exchange success. Further, greater product and transaction information reduce the buyer's uncertainty and increase exchange success. Finally, the analysis shows that users' (buyers and sellers) heavily rely on their prior experience with OMWEs. Specifically, higher familiarity between the buyer–seller pair and familiarity with the OMWE system leads to higher likelihood of exchange success. This study lays the foundation for understanding OMWEs and has important implications for developing policies and operations to increase online transactions of by‐products, materials and wastes.     

Managing Logistics in Regional Banknote Supply Chain Under Security Concerns

We study the logistics problem faced by Regional Branches (RBs) of a central bank in managing the currency supply under security concerns. While making banknote supply decisions to Sub‐Branches (SBs), the management of RB must achieve two goals simultaneously: (i) guarantee that each SB has sufficient inventories of all denominations of banknotes to satisfy the demands from all commercial banks within its service area, and (ii) control the annual spending on this banknote supply operation. Due to security concerns, the following methods are implemented in the process of transporting banknotes: (i) the capacity of a cash truck is limited by the total face value (instead of the physical space) of banknotes, and (ii) empty decoy trucks are deployed along with the trucks filled with banknotes. After deriving a polynomial‐time strategy to guarantee an optimal solution for the special Bin‐Packing Problem faced in this study, we provide an exact formulation for the RB's supply planning problem. We also propose several polynomial‐time algorithms for deriving either optimal or near‐optimal solutions for the problem under different settings. Using the weekly demand data obtained from the central bank, we verify the performance of our algorithms, and analyze the impacts of changes in these features and in the fleet capacity on the total cost incurred by an RB under various scenarios.     

不同权力结构下制造商双渠道供应链的博弈分析

在单个拥有线下传统批发及线上直销双渠道的制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链中,基于供应链成员博弈权力的差异,构建制造商占优或零售商占优的两类Stackelberg博弈及双方同等权力的Nash博弈模型,分析了三种博弈权力结构对供应链成员价格,需求和利润的影响。研究发现：当制造商线下传统批发渠道所占市场份额较小时,（1）渠道交叉价格弹性系数为0时和不为0时,三种博弈权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链均衡解的影响具有一定的鲁棒性;（2）三种博弈权力结构下,制造商线上直销渠道价格相同;两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构下,线下传统批发渠道价格相同且大于Nash博弈下的传统渠道价格;制造商批发价格随其博弈主导地位下降逐渐降低;（3）当渠道交叉价格弹性系数为0时,三种博弈权力结构对线上直销渠道需求的影响是无差异的;当渠道间交叉价格弹性系数不为0时,两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构下的线下传统批发渠道需求相同且小于Nash博弈下的传统渠道需求,线上直销渠道需求相同且大于Nash博弈下的线上直销渠道需求;（4）三种博弈策略下,制造商收益及零售商收益随其博弈主导地位下降逐渐降低;Nash博弈下,供应链总利润最大。     

供需不确定条件下基于CVaR的零售商库存鲁棒优化模型

在经典报童模型下考虑供应和需求不确定性,研究了具有风险厌恶的零售商库存优化问题。采用条件风险值（CVaR）对库存绩效进行度量,构建了基于CVaR的零售商库存运作模型;在此基础上,考虑上游供应商供货能力和下游市场需求不确定性,并采用一系列未知概率的离散情景进行描述,给出了供需不确定条件下基于CVaR的零售商库存鲁棒优化模型。进一步,采用区间不确定集对未知情景概率进行建模,给出了基于最大最小准则的鲁棒对应模型。针对同时考虑供需不确定性导致的模型非凸性,采用标准对偶理论将其转化为易于求解的数学规划问题。最后,通过数值计算分析了不同风险厌恶程度和不确定性程度对零售商库存决策以及库存绩效的影响。结果表明,供需不确定性的存在虽然会导致零售商库存绩效损失,但损失值较小。特别地,依据文中模型得到的鲁棒库存策略在多数情况下能够保证零售商获得更优的库存绩效。此外,不确定性和风险厌恶程度的增加虽然会影响零售商库存决策和运作绩效,但在同等风险厌恶态度下,随着不确定性程度的增加,基于文中方法得到的鲁棒库存策略仍能确保零售商获得理想的库存绩效,表明文中所建模型在应对供需不确定性方面具有良好的鲁棒性。     

制度环境、风险感知对供应链网络治理模式选择的影响研究

本文以新制度理论与交易成本理论进行对话,从合法性视角构建中国情境下制度环境、风险感知与供应链网络治理模式选择之间影响机理的理论模型。通过问卷调查的方式收集117份有效问卷,并采用结构方程模型方法实证检验制度环境、风险感知对供应链网络治理模式的"形塑"作用。研究结果表明,制度环境是影响供应链网络治理模式选择的重要因素,强制制度对供应链网络治理模式选择具有显著影响,规范制度的影响作用不显著。在供应链网络治理模式选择过程中关系风险感知具有完全中介作用,而绩效风险感知具有部分中介作用。     

基于RFID技术的双供应链投资决策研究

本文考虑零售商主导的分别由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两条竞争型供应链中,当两个供应商都未投资RFID技术、只有一个供应商投资RFID技术以及两个供应商同时投资RFID技术时,考虑供应商成本结构的差异,对比分析供应链的投资决策。由于模型解析解过于复杂,本文通过算例分析,着重考虑产品的替代率、RFID标签价格以及库存可获得率三个因素对供应链成员利润的影响。结果表明两条供应链对RFID技术的投资决策会因成本结构和产品替代率的不同而发生变化,其中在两个供应商生产成本差异较大且产品竞争强度较低时,生产成本较高的供应商更愿意投资RFID技术,而生产成本较低的供应商不愿意投资RFID技术,两个零售商则希望使用RFID技术,所以此时仅会有一条供应链上的成员达成一致,决定投资使用RFID技术。