Implementation with Near‐Complete Information

Many refinements of Nash equilibrium yield solution correspondences that do not have closed graph in the space of payoffs or information. This has significance for implementation theory, especially under complete information. If a planner is concerned that all equilibria of his mechanism yield a desired outcome, and entertains the possibility that players may have even the slightest uncertainty about payoffs, then the planner should insist on a solution concept with closed graph. We show that this requirement entails substantial restrictions on the set of implementable social choice rules. In particular, when preferences are strict (or more generally, hedonic), while almost any social choice function can be implemented in undominated Nash equilibrium, only monotonic social choice functions can be implemented in the closure of the undominated Nash correspondence.     

Stationary Equilibria in Asset‐Pricing Models with Incomplete Markets and Collateral

We consider an infinite‐horizon exchange economy with incomplete markets and collateral constraints. As in the two‐period model of Geanakoplos and Zame (2002), households can default on their liabilities at any time, and financial securities are only traded if the promises associated with these securities are backed by collateral. We examine an economy with a single perishable consumption good, where the only collateral available consists of productive assets. In this model, competitive equilibria always exist and we show that, under the assumption that all exogenous variables follow a Markov chain, there also exist stationary equilibria. These equilibria can be characterized by a mapping from the exogenous shock and the current distribution of financial wealth to prices and portfolio choices. We develop an algorithm to approximate this mapping numerically and discuss ways to implement the algorithm in practice. A computational example demonstrates the performance of the algorithm and shows some quantitative features of equilibria in a model with collateral and default.     

Computing Supergame Equilibria

We present a general method for computing the set of supergame equilibria in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring and public randomization. We present a three‐stage algorithm that constructs a convex set containing the set of equilibrium values, constructs another convex set contained in the set of equilibrium values, and produces strategies that support them. We explore the properties of this algorithm by applying it to familiar games.     

第四方物流企业作业承接不完全信息双边讨价还价分析

第四方物流(4PL)企业承接物流作业后要依靠第三方物流(3PL)企业来完成物流作业,因而4PL企业承接物流作业的价格决策会受到它与3PL企业交易情况的影响.本文利用不完全信息双边讨价还价博弈得出了4PL企业承接物流作业的价格,分析了价格的影响因素和4PL企业与生产企业达成交易的条件.通过对比4PL企业已知其与3PL企业交易情况和未知其与3PL企业交易情况时的报价,得出了在与生产企业交易过程中,4PL企业在前一情况下的报价高于后一情况下的报价的结论,并分析了产生这一结论的原因.     

Blending Bayesian and Classical Tools to Define Optimal Sample-Size-Dependent Significance Levels

ABSTRACT

This article argues that researchers do not need to completely abandon the p-value, the best-known significance index, but should instead stop using significance levels that do not depend on sample sizes. A testing procedure is developed using a mixture of frequentist and Bayesian tools, with a significance level that is a function of sample size, obtained from a generalized form of the Neyman–Pearson Lemma that minimizes a linear combination of α, the probability of rejecting a true null hypothesis, and β, the probability of failing to reject a false null, instead of fixing α and minimizing β. The resulting hypothesis tests do not violate the Likelihood Principle and do not require any constraints on the dimensionalities of the sample space and parameter space. The procedure includes an ordering of the entire sample space and uses predictive probability (density) functions, allowing for testing of both simple and compound hypotheses. Accessible examples are presented to highlight specific characteristics of the new tests.     

考虑再谈判的网上服务采购多属性拍卖研究

针对在线服务外包，研究了供应商投标服务方案（体现服务质量）和价格的买方决定制多属性采购拍卖，分析了交易双方关于服务内容的再谈判对供应商投标均衡、买方初始服务内容决策和各方期望利润的影响。结果表明，无再谈判情形下，供应商的服务质量投标均衡和信息租金都随初始服务内容递增；而有再谈判情形下，尽管买方对服务质量的评标权重随初始服务内容递增，但供应商服务质量、信息租金及买方期望利润都不受初始服务内容影响。换言之，初始服务内容对采购项目的规制作用被再谈判完全替代。不仅如此，相较于无再谈判情形，再谈判的存在能够激励供应商提供更高的服务质量，并促成更多的服务内容成交，最终使买方、获胜供应商和交易平台都获得更高期望利润。     

A method for sample size calculation via E-value in the planning of observational studies

Confounding adjustment plays a key role in designing observational studies such as cross-sectional studies, case-control studies, and cohort studies. In this article, we propose a simple method for sample size calculation in observational research in the presence of confounding. The method is motivated by the notion of E-value, using some bounding factor to quantify the impact of confounders on the effect size. The method can be applied to calculate the needed sample size in observational research when the outcome variable is binary, continuous, or time-to-event. The method can be implemented straightforwardly using existing commercial software such as the PASS software. We demonstrate the performance of the proposed method through numerical examples, simulation studies, and a real application, which show that the proposed method is conservative in providing a slightly bigger sample size than what it needs to achieve a given power.     

考虑服务流的产品服务供应链网络均衡模型

产品服务供应链在向客户制造高质量产品的同时，也提供了产品全生命周期的专业服务，服务的嵌入增加了供应链协调的复杂性。考虑产品服务的双重需求，在分析各主体的运作行为的基础上，构建了包括多个制造商和多个销售商的多主体供应链网络；运用变分不等式刻画了制造商层、销售服务集成商层和需求市场的最优运作行为及其达成均衡的条件；最后，通过修正投影算法对数值算例进行了仿真。研究结果表明：产品服务供应链网络中的产品与服务均衡流相互影响，其中，服务水平直接影响到了产品需求；降低产品的售价将有利于服务价格和效益的提升。研究结论进一步印证了在产品服务供应链网络中承载于产品的服务将逐渐成为价值创造的主体。     

Hidden obstacles to trade: The case of the EU’s Ban on beef hormones

Non-tariff measures (NTMs) have become a prominent issue in trade negotiations, especially in agriculture. For trade negotiations between the EU and U.S., beef has emerged as an important topic. To export to the EU, U.S. producers face a complex series of compliance costs that occur on multiple points along the supply chain. However, the current approach to measuring NTMs does so in an abstract manner; this paper applies a more detailed, supply chain (SC) approach to measure those costs. Our analysis finds that the SC approach comprehensively accounts for the different components of NTM costs and leads to more meaningful implications for interpreting the welfare impacts of removing NTMs.     

Bridging the Gap between Social Acceptance and Ethical Acceptability

New technology brings great benefits, but it can also create new and significant risks. When evaluating those risks in policymaking, there is a tendency to focus on social acceptance. By solely focusing on social acceptance, we could, however, overlook important ethical aspects of technological risk, particularly when we evaluate technologies with transnational and intergenerational risks. I argue that good governance of risky technology requires analyzing both social acceptance and ethical acceptability. Conceptually, these two notions are mostly complementary. Social acceptance studies are not capable of sufficiently capturing all the morally relevant features of risky technologies; ethical analyses do not typically include stakeholders’ opinions, and they therefore lack the relevant empirical input for a thorough ethical evaluation. Only when carried out in conjunction are these two types of analysis relevant to national and international governance of risky technology. I discuss the Rawlsian wide reflective equilibrium as a method for marrying social acceptance and ethical acceptability. Although the rationale of my argument is broadly applicable, I will examine the case of multinational nuclear waste repositories in particular. This example will show how ethical issues may be overlooked if we focus only on social acceptance, and will provide a test case for demonstrating how the wide reflective equilibrium can help to bridge the proverbial acceptance‐acceptability gap.