经理人激励与公司债务水平的选择

以或有要求权模型研究经理人激励对公司债务水平的影响,研究表明,经理人以股东的激励程度选择公司债务水平与工作努力程度以最大化自己的收益。在一定条件下,当股东所提供的激励较弱时,充分高的债务水平是经理人向外部投资者作出的他将努力工作的可信承诺,是项目得到融资的充分条件;当该激励较强时,经理人所选择的债务水平低于能够最大化公司价值的数值。     

管理层股权激励与企业未来盈余定价——来自中国资本市场的证据

本文探讨管理层股权激励对企业未来盈余定价的影响,并进一步将企业未来盈余分解为行业成分和公司特质成分,考察股权激励对不同成分未来盈余定价的影响,以及不同模式股权激励对上述关系影响的差异。利用实施股权激励的中国A股上市公司2006-2016年间的数据,本文发现：（1）股权激励提高了当期股票收益率与企业未来盈余的相关性。说明管理层股权激励有助于投资者对企业未来盈余定价;（2）管理层股权激励并不影响投资者对行业成分未来盈余定价,但会加速投资者对公司特质未来盈余定价;（3）管理层的股票型激励有助于投资者对企业未来盈余定价,同时也能加速投资者对公司特质未来盈余定价,但股票期权激励并无上述作用。研究结果意味着,整体而言股权激励能够缓解管理层与股东之间信息披露的代理问题,激励管理层向外部投资者披露更多高质量的公司基本面信息,从而降低投资者对公司特质未来盈余信息的搜寻成本,最终通过加速公司特质未来盈余信息融入股价来促进投资者对企业未来盈余定价。本文揭示了管理层股权激励促进投资者对企业未来盈余定价的微观机制,同时,研究结论对提高中国证券市场的信息效率提供了重要的理论参考。     

和谐社会视域下志愿服务精神的研究

志愿服务精神是我国优良的传统美德。志愿服务精神的培育与发展是社会发展的风向标，是构建和谐社会的要求。在阐述志愿服务精神内涵的基础上，分析当前志愿服务活动中存在的问题．并从价值观引导、长效激励机制的建立等方面对如何培育志愿服务精神进行了探讨。     

Behavioral implications of providing real incentives in stated choice experiments

This paper explores the potential impacts of introducing real economic incentives in choice experiments (CE). While many others have investigated such impacts before, the majority of the literature has focused solely on mitigation of hypothetical bias. We contribute to this literature by widening the scope of research to other behavioral aspects where consumers in CE are often found to deviate from homo economicus. We develop a theoretical model where not only Willingness to pay (WTP) measures but also decision processing can be affected by the introduction of an economic incentive. Specifically, our model allows for differential impacts on attribute processing, depending on the character of the attribute as well as self-image effects. In an empirical CE survey, we find some, though not unequivocal, support of our model. Even though we find no impact on WTP from introducing an economic incentive, we find marked benefits in relation to a number of behavioral aspects that together would favor the use of an economic incentive regardless of hypothetical bias being present or not.     

Underprotection of Unpredictable Statistical Lives Compared to Predictable Ones

Existing ethical discussion considers the differences in care for identified versus statistical lives. However, there has been little attention to the different degrees of care that are taken for different kinds of statistical lives. Here we argue that for a given number of statistical lives at stake, there will sometimes be different, and usually greater, care taken to protect predictable statistical lives, in which the number of lives that will be lost can be predicted fairly accurately, than for unpredictable statistical lives, where the lives are at stake because of a low‐probability event, such that most likely no one will be affected by the decision but with low probability some lives will be at stake. One reason for this difference is the statistical challenge of estimating low probabilities, and in particular the tendency of common approaches to underestimate these probabilities. Another is the existence of rational incentives to treat unpredictable risks as if the probabilities were lower than they are. Some of these factors apply outside the pure economic context, to institutions, individuals, and governments. We argue that there is no ethical reason to treat unpredictable statistical lives differently from predictable statistical lives. Moreover, lives that are unpredictable from the perspective of an individual agent may become predictable when aggregated to the level of a societal decision. Underprotection of unpredictable statistical lives is a form of market failure that may need to be corrected by altering regulation, introducing compulsory liability insurance, or other social policies.     

The Relative Effects of Different Frequencies of Feedback on Work Performance

Abstract

This laboratory simulation examined the relative effects of two frequencies of feedback on work performance under hourly pay and incentive pay. The study had four experimental conditions: feedback delivered after every session under hourly pay and under incentive pay, and feedback delivered after every fourth session under hourly pay and under incentive pay. Thirty-five college students were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. Each participant attended 24 thirty-minute sessions. Participants performed a simulated work task on the computer that consisted of computer-related activities such as dragging, clicking, and typing. The dependent variable was the number of correctly completed units of work. An analysis of covariance was conducted to analyze the data using pretest scores as a covariate. Participants who received feedback every session completed significantly more work units than participants who received feedback every fourth session. In addition, an interaction between feedback frequency and pay systems was found: Feedback delivered every session was more effective than feedback delivered every fourth session under the incentive pay system, but not under the hourly pay system. The results suggest that the relative effects of feedback frequency may depend upon the extent to which feedback is correlated with differential consequences for performance.     

Do Nonprofits Treat Their Employees Differently? Incentive Pay and Health Benefits

We examine how nonprofit, public, and for‐profit establishments vary in the provision of health benefits and insurance and performance‐based incentives using the 2002 National Organization Survey of establishments in the United States. We found that in comparison to for‐profit firms, both nonprofit and public organizations are less likely to use performance‐based incentives, although they provide their employees with better health benefits and insurance. Sectoral differences in the provision of health benefits and insurance and use of performance‐based incentives persist after controlling for correlates of sector that predict these outcomes, including establishment size, independence of establishment, market competition, establishment age, and unionization. We also found trade‐offs between the provision of health benefits and insurance and use of performance‐based incentives. Our results are generally consistent with the prediction from agency theory and also consistent with a view that public and nonprofit organizations are more concerned with the well‐being of their employees.     

The pric(z)e of hard work: Different incentive effects of non-monetary and monetary prizes

Do non-monetary or monetary prizes induce the highest work performances in competitions? We conducted a real-effort lab experiment to test for differences in the effect of both incentives on work productivity. Our main findings are that the performances of subjects in pursuit of a monetary prize exceed those of subjects in pursuit of non-monetary incentives. However, the work quality and the retrospective feeling of having had fun at work, which is associated with the received prizes, decrease in combination with greater effort. Furthermore, a competition with monetary prizes appears to label winners and losers. If non-monetary prizes are used, losers are, to a certain extent, more able to adjust their feeling of satisfaction by changing the subjectively perceived prizes.     

论行政奖励的立法规制

由于传统法学理论忽视奖励对社会的调整作用、立法机关对奖励机制存在偏见等原因,我国立法对行政奖励的规制很不完善,有必要对行政奖励进行规制以制约行政主体滥用权力,依据其他规范性文件和自由裁量权实施某些行政奖励.行政奖励客体应当包括政府认可的非义务行为、仅通过强制手段无法实现行政目标的义务性行为和对行为结果无法控制的义务性行为.在行政奖励立法时应当充分考虑行政奖励的功能,分析影响行政奖励方式的因素,如受激励群体的偏好,成本与效益的分析,是否违反法律、社会公德和其他更重要的利益等.     

股权激励、盈余操纵与国有股减持

该文基于一个代理模型从理论上分析盈余操纵和国有股减持对股权激励合约的影响。股权激励具有双重效应,既激励管理层努力工作以增加股东价值,也诱使其操纵盈余而耗费公司资源,最优股权激励计划需要降低激励强度以权衡此两种效应。在部分投资者低估盈余操纵程度的情况下,国有股减持会促使控股股东加大股权激励强度,盈余操纵程度相应上升。研究结果揭示,过高的股权激励不仅会带来内部人侵占国有资产、大股东损害中小股东的利益的后果,而且可能使抑制盈余操纵活动的市场监管措施失效,这为近期国资委和财政部联合发布国有控股上市公司的股权激励试行办法提供了理论解释。