国有企业经理激励问题研究

导致国有企业经营绩效长期低下的重要原因之一 ,就是没有处理好国有企业的经理激励问题。在现有既定的制度安排下 ,要从根本上解决这个问题 ,就应该使国有企业经理获得与其人力资本价值相称的所有权收益 ,以此来激励经理们努力工作。     

Fairness and Contract Design

We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair‐minded players, but trust contracts that pay a generous wage up front are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts. These results are consistent with recently developed theories of fairness, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness, and incentives.     

Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time

This paper investigates a new class of two‐player games in continuous time, in which the players' observations of each other's actions are distorted by Brownian motions. These games are analogous to repeated games with imperfect monitoring in which the players take actions frequently. Using a differential equation, we find the set ℰ(r) of payoff pairs achievable by all public perfect equilibria of the continuous‐time game, where r is the discount rate. The same differential equation allows us to find public perfect equilibria that achieve any value pair on the boundary of the set ℰ(r). These public perfect equilibria are based on a pair of continuation values as a state variable, which moves along the boundary of ℰ(r) during the course of the game. In order to give players incentives to take actions that are not static best responses, the pair of continuation values is stochastically driven by the players' observations of each other's actions along the boundary of the set ℰ(r).     

Spillovers from targeting of incentives: Exploring responses to being excluded

A growing set of policies involve transfers conditioned upon socially desired actions, such as attending school or conserving forest. However, given a desire to maximize the impact of limited funds by avoiding transfers that do not change behavior, typically some potential recipients are excluded on the basis of their characteristics, their actions or at random. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the behavior of individuals excluded on different bases from a new incentive that encourages real monetary donations to a public environmental conservation program. We show that the donations from the individuals who were excluded based on prior high contributions fell significantly. Yet the rationale used for exclusion mattered, in that none of the other selection criteria used as the basis for exclusion resulted in negative effects on contributions.     

Determinants of Probability Neglect and Risk Attitudes for Disaster Risk: An Online Experimental Study of Flood Insurance Demand among Homeowners

Little is known about why individuals place either a high or a very low value on mitigating risks of disaster‐type events, like floods. This study uses panel data methods to explore the psychological factors affecting probability neglect of flood risk relevant to the zero end‐point of the probability weighting function in Prospect Theory, and willingness‐to‐pay for flood insurance. In particular, we focus on explanatory variables of anticipatory and anticipated emotions, as well as the threshold of concern. Moreover, results obtained under real and hypothetical incentives are compared in an experiment with high experimental outcomes. Based on our findings, we suggest several policy recommendations to overcome individual decision processes, which may hinder flood protection efforts.     

Local Control Strategy: Simple Analyses of Air Pollution Data Can Reveal Heterogeneity in Longevity Outcomes

Claims from observational studies that use traditional model specification searches often fail to replicate, partially because the available data tend to be biased. There is an urgent need for an alternative statistical analysis strategy, that is not only simple and easily understood but also is more likely to give reliable insights when the available data have not been designed and balanced. The alternative strategy known as local control first generates local, nonparametric effect‐size estimates (fair treatment comparisons) and only then asks whether the observed variation in these local estimates can be predicted from potential confounding factors. Here, we illustrate application of local control to a historical air pollution data set describing a “natural experiment” initiated by the federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. Our reanalysis reveals subgroup heterogeneity in the effects of air quality regulation on elderly longevity (one size does not fit all), and we show that this heterogeneity is largely explained by socioeconomic and environmental confounders other than air quality.     

Gray Markets and Supply Chain Incentives

“Gray markets” are unauthorized channels that distribute a branded product without the manufacturer's permission. Since gray markets are not officially sanctioned by the manufacturer, their existence is assumed to hurt the manufacturer. Yet manufacturers sometimes tolerate or even encourage gray market activities. We investigate the incentives of a manufacturer and its authorized retailer to engage in (or tolerate) gray markets. The firms need to consider the trade‐off between the positive effects of a gray market (price discrimination and cost savings) and the negative effects (cannibalization of sales and a loss in consumer valuation). Generally, gray markets can be categorized into two types: (i) a “local gray market,” where a retailer diverts products to unauthorized sellers operating in the same region as the retailer; and, (ii) “bootlegging,” where the retailer diverts products to unauthorized sellers in another market where the manufacturer sells through a direct channel. We characterize the equilibrium in each type of gray market and identify conditions under which the retailer will divert products to the gray market. Incentive problems are more complicated when the retailer bootlegs and, in this case, we show that conflicting incentives may lead to the emergence of a gray market where both the manufacturer's and retailer's profits decrease.     

论民事诉权滥用在我国出现的外在诱因

在我国经济转型和社会转型的背景下,民众权利的赋予与权利的法律规范之间的失衡带来诉权滥用的负面后果,纠纷解决的诉讼化趋势在一定程度上起到了对诉权滥用的推波助澜的作用.     

消费长效机制的构建及其法律保障

消费长效机制,是国家依法规制调控消费需求的一种协调持续平衡运行的动态法律机制。它具有强烈的居民、突出的消费者、鲜明的消费政策、多元因素融合的系统等属性。它有基本核心制度和相关配套制度两大类型内容,急需从居民基本收入及其社会保障、消费者核心地位及其权益保障、消费政策调控等方面,构建我国消费长效机制的主要法律制度。应从制定居民收入分配持续增长保障法、居民个人资料保护法,修订消费者权益保护法、民事诉讼法相关条款,打造消费者核心地位,专设消费纠纷诉讼制度等方面着手。     

Feedback quality and performance in organisations

The provision of feedback is fundamental for promoting employee performance in modern organisations; however, little is known about how the quality of feedback affects performance. We report an experiment where subjects perform a real-effort task repeatedly in a flat-wage environment which varies the quality of feedback across treatments. In the baseline treatment, subjects receive no feedback about their rank in their group. In the two main treatments, feedback quality varies in that subjects know (“High-Quality Feedback”) or do not know (“Low-Quality Feedback”) their exact rank in their group. We show that the quality of feedback is an important driver of productivity. Average performance is significantly higher for high-quality feedback than for low-quality or no feedback, where no significant overall performance differences are observed. Our results have significant implications for designing and implementing cost-effective policies within organisations.