Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game

This paper proposes an estimation method for a repeated auction game under the presence of capacity constraints. The estimation strategy is computationally simple as it does not require solving for the equilibrium of the game. It uses a two stage approach. In the first stage the distribution of bids conditional on state variables is estimated using data on bids, bidder characteristics, and contract characteristics. In the second stage, an expression of the expected sum of future profits based on the distribution of bids is obtained, and costs are inferred based on the first order condition of optimal bids. We apply the estimation method to repeated highway construction procurement auctions in the state of California between May 1996 and May 1999. In this market, previously won uncompleted contracts reduce the probability of winning further contracts. We quantify the effect of intertemporal constraints on bidders' costs and on bids. Due to the intertemporal effect and also to bidder asymmetry, the auction can be inefficient. Based on the estimates of costs, we quantify efficiency losses.     

Is there no “I” in “Team”? Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect in a Cournot competition experiment

Even though firms consist of teams of individuals, industrial organization experiments are typically conducted under the unitary player assumption with individuals representing firms. Against this practice, there is evidence that individuals’ decisions differ from those made by teams, and also from individuals’ decisions which affect both oneself and others. This study examines the empirical scope of the unitary player assumption (alternatively the “interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect”) in the context of a Cournot competition experiment. In the first, standard, experiment (216 participants), we find no evidence for the discontinuity effect. Output choices of both individuals and teams are around the Cournot outcome. In a second experiment (198 participants), we use a recommendation to shift participants’ initial disposition towards the (off-equilibrium) collusive output. This triggers the discontinuity effect; individuals choose lower outputs and collude more than teams. This effect is persistent in the second half of the experiment, and is not caused by team-member discussion or by seating team members together. We discuss the interpretations and implications of our results.     

跨国粮商控制下巴西大豆在中国进口市场上的竞争潜力

中国是世界大豆进口大国,美国、巴西和阿根廷形成了向中国出口大豆的寡头垄断格局。但由于跨国粮商对大豆产业链的控制,中国在国际大豆市场缺乏定价权,卖方寡头垄断也被弱化。追求出口利益诱使巴西与美国在中国大豆市场竞争。从巴西大豆对中国的出口潜力、定价能力和政策动向3个维度考察了在跨国粮商控制下的中国大豆进口市场上巴西与美国之间的竞争关系。研究发现：长期内巴西对中国出口的大豆数量替代美国,短期内巴西出口旺季垄断能力加强且旺季持续时间延长;巴西积极调整大豆生产和贸易政策既提高了大豆出口自主定价能力和国际竞争力,又有利于拓展中国大豆进口政策选择空间,改善中国从大豆进口中的贸易获益。最后,简要阐述了该结论蕴含的政策意义。     

国际种业垄断：理论解释、实证测算及趋势

运用“跑步机”理论与剩余价值理论全面分析种业垄断形成原因。使用绝对市场集中度（ CR）与相对市场集中度（ HHI）测算方法,利用国际前10名种业公司数据及国内上市种业公司数据分别测算国际种业垄断程度与国内种业市场现状。结果表明,近年来（2006年至2013年）国际种业市场被国际种业寡头垄断,尤其集中于前4名种业集团,约占国际种业市场的二分之一,且寡头之间以互相持股或合资成立种业公司的形式加强了联系,并进一步控制世界种业市场;国内数据表明我国种业公司对国内种业市场的占有率（ CR指数、HHI指数）相当低,年均占有率之和不到10％,因此,培育大型跨国种业集团成为我国种业发展的迫切需一是种业内部通过兼并、合并成立跨国集团,二是由其它资本实力较强的产业企业进入种业领域形成种业集团。     

开放经济条件下我国银行业市场结构的选择

产业市场结构的形成是产业内在运行规律和政府规制、产业政策两类因素共同作用的结果,内外因素的变化将导致市场结构的调整。在金融全面开放的背景下,寡头垄断依然是我国银行业市场结构的优选目标。     

我国彩票发行的市场结构效率分析

从中国彩票发行中出现的诸多违规案件、发行量偏低以及某些地区私彩泛滥的问题出发,揭示彩票发行市场结构效率的重要性;进而从中国彩票发行市场结构的彩票类型完全竞争性、发行机构寡头垄断性、主管机关完全垄断性入手,剖析了中国彩票发行市场混合型治理结构导致的市场无效率,即完全竞争导致的资源浪费、寡头垄断引发的恶性竞争、完全垄断产生的官僚主义,揭示了诸多现实诘难后面的制度性诱因,在此基础上提出了改善市场结构效率的思路。     

论战略性贸易政策

战略性贸易政策理论的出现对国际贸易理论体系和各国对外贸易政策产生了重大影响。论题对该理论的产生、演进和主要内容进行述评,并力图表明国际分工是动态和随机的。政府可以通过积极的政策干预形成对本国有利的均衡格局。     

Communication in Cournot competition: An experimental study

This study investigates the impact of communication on outcomes in Cournot duopoly and triopoly experiments. Communication is implemented by two different devices, a ‘standardized-communication’ and a ‘free-communication’ device. Using both students and managers as subjects, we find that managers behave in a similar way under both communication devices, while students collude slightly better under free than under standardized communication. Second, while under standardized communication managers select lower outputs than students, we observe no difference in subject pools under free communication. Finally, we observe more collusion in duopoly than in triopoly.     

委托授权下企业横向兼并效应与激励机制研究

针对异质产品Cournot寡头竞争市场,研究两种不同委托授权下企业的横向兼并效应与内部激励机制调整问题.首先证明了无论企业采用何种类型委托授权模式都具有较大的横向兼并动机,且产品替代性程度越低,兼并动力越大,只是在分散委托授权模式下企业的兼并动机比集中委托授权模式稍弱一些.并且证明兼并企业采用分散委托授权模式时与采用集中委托授权模式时其经营者激励机制调整有明显不同,集中委托授权模式所采用的经营者激励机制其攻击性普遍增强,而分散委托授权模式所采用的经营者激励机制其攻击性普遍减弱,但未兼并企业所采用的经营者激励机制其攻击性总是随兼并规模的增大而增加.     

相继产业链条件下的内生纵向一体化研究

在由多个上游和下游企业组成的相继产业链中,上下游厂商通过纵向一体化可降低产品价格,增加利润及社会福利.但当企业数目较少时,双重边际效应使得价格增加,同时一体化厂商会提高非一体化厂商成本,形成价格歧视、甚至市场封闭等问题.本文给出一体化厂商与非一体化厂商共存的内生解,并给双重边际、价格歧视和市场封闭的解决途径.