关于进一步发展我国资本市场的几个问题

论述了我国资本市场的服务方向、国有股的流通和资本市场的对外开放三个问题。资本市场既然内涵于社会主义市场经济,那么它就应当是为所有的企业服务,而不应当定位于主要为国有企业服务;国有股流通与否属于公司行为,而不是政府行为,卖出价格可以低干净资产价值,因为投资者进行股票投资看中的是公司未来的成长性和未来收益;我国资本市场实行对外开放,既要积极实施请进来战略,更要实施积极走出去战略,分享经济全球化带来的益处。     

关于民事主体的内涵与外延的立法思考

民事主体制度,是民法理论和立法实践中的重要内容,特别是我国这样的成文法国家,民事主体的立法是关乎整个民法体系的建构和市场经济发展的重要环节。在自然人和法人当然和已然地成为民事主体的内核之情况下,文章对民事主体的内涵和外延在新的历史条件和时代环境下作出新的解释,特别就经济关系和生活关系中大量存在的“非法人团体”是否应该成为“第三主体”作出思考。     

19世纪后半期外资大规模进入美国原因分析

从殖民地时代起,美国就采取了对外开放的政策。19世纪后半期,对外开放的表现之一就是大规模引进外资。由于美国资源丰富、政策优惠、文化和政治体制与欧洲国家相似,外资尤其是欧洲资本进入美国。外资的进入弥补了美国国内资金的相对不足,促进了美国经济的高速发展。19世纪末,美国成为世界上的工业强国,并开始了资本的海外扩张。     

论“第六代导演”的电影美学风格

“第六代导演”及其作品所反映的美学风格主要有:刻意模糊线索的明晰性和淡化叙事的情节性,形成了“新写意风格”;追求“摄影机不撒谎”的发言模态,表达出一种新写实主义即“微观写实主义”;偏爱长镜头和追求画面的僵持意味,流露出一种中国式的新自然主义即“新本色主义”;作为“状态电影”或“大陆地下电影”的主体,他们的作品富有个性但亦被认为是伪个性。     

Shareholders Should Welcome Knowledge Workers as Directors

The most influential approach of corporate governance, the view of shareholders’ supremacy does not take into consideration that the key task of modern corporations is to generate and transfer firm-specific knowledge. It proposes that, in order to overcome the widespread corporate scandals, the interests of top management and directors should be increasingly aligned to shareholder’ interests by making the board more responsible to shareholders, and monitoring of top management by independent outside directors should be strengthened. Corporate governance reform needs to go in another direction altogether. Firm-specific knowledge investments are, like financial investments, not ex ante contractible, leaving investors open to exploitation by shareholders. Employees therefore refuse to make firm-specific investments. To gain a sustainable competitive advantage, there must be an incentive to undertake such firm-specific investments. Three proposals are advanced to deal with this dilemma: (1) The board should rely more on insiders. (2) The insiders should be elected by those employees of the firm who are making firm-specific knowledge investments. (3) The board should be chaired by a neutral person. These proposals have major advantages: they provide incentives for knowledge investors; they countervail the dominance of executives; they encourage intrinsic work motivation and loyalty to the firm by strengthening distributive and procedural justice, and they ensure diversity on the board while lowering transaction costs. These proposals for reforming the board may help to overcome the crisis corporate governance is in. At the same time, they provide a step in the direction of a more adequate theory of the firm as a basis for corporate governance.     

上市公司诚信问题的博弈分析及对策研究

上市公司诚信问题已成为制约我国证券市场健康发展的一个难题。上市公司之所以能屡屡造假成功,根源于委托———代理制下市场信息的严重不对称。本文通过对上市公司造假行为的博弈分析,指出引入上市公司内部的制衡机制,完善上市公司的法人治理结构,并辅之以及时、严格的外部监管,才能最大程度地减少上市公司的造假行为。     

Evaluating the Evaluators: Should Investors Trust Corporate Governance Metrics Ratings?

Companies are under increasing pressure to have their corporate governance rated by an independent corporate governance metrics firm, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) or Governance Metrics International (GMI). These rating firms claim to be able to determine how effective and responsive a company’s board is. Institutional investors have begun using these board governance ratings when deciding which firms to include in their stock portfolios. This paper considers whether investors, many of whom claim to be socially responsible, should be relying upon board governance metrics. We find that these metrics are not good indicators of either the quality of a firm’s earnings or of its ethics.     

交易所治理结构比较研究综述

作为交易所两种主要的治理模式,会员制交易所与公司制交易所的本质区别表现为交易所三权(所有权、经营权和交易权)分配与营利性两方面。这两方面特征的差异导致了会员制与公司制交易所在决策机制、融资渠道、利益冲突、定价机制、技术、激励机制、创新能力、流动性、自律效率九个方面的差异。经过对会员制与公司制以上九个方面的比较,研究发现公司制交易所较之会员制交易所在多个方面更加优越,或者更加适合于目前的市场环境。     

Gambling Reputation: Repeated Bargaining With Outside Options

We study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bargaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long‐run player and a sequence of short‐run players. The outside option is not only a disagreement point, but reveals information privately held by the long‐run player. In equilibrium, the uninformed short‐run players' offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the informed long‐run player's payoffs are discontinuous. The long‐run player invokes inefficient random outside options repeatedly to build reputation to a level where the subsequent short‐run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff, but he also runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power. We investigate equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness of outside options diffuses. In both cases, bargaining outcomes become more inefficient and the limit reputation‐building probabilities are interior.     

上市公司董事薪酬决定的利益冲突及法律规制研究

上市公司董事薪酬制度是公司治理的重要组成部分,各国公司法大多允许股东会或董事会决定董事薪酬并规定相应的决定机制。在公司董事薪酬决定过程中存在着利益冲突问题,从而削弱了公司治理的有效性,导致董事对公司与股东利益的侵害。为此,有必要通过关联董事表决权回避、股东参与权保障、股权激励机制运用以及董事薪酬信息披露等制度对董事薪酬决定的利益冲突进行法律规制。