The individual rationality of maintaining a sense of justice

Let us say that an individual possesses aprincipled preference if she prefers satisfying her preferences without violating the principles of justice governing her community to satisfying her preferences by violating these principles. Although living among possessors of principled preferences benefits individuals, maintaining such a preference is individually costly. Further, individuals can benefit from others possessing principled preferences without themselves possessing one. In this paper, I argue that occupying a choice situation which mirrors key aspects of our own situation, maximizing rationality requires individuals to develop and maintain principled preferences.To establish that maintaining a principled preference is individually rational for the occupants of such a choice situation, I define a range of individual strategies for them, model their choice of individual strategies as a game, and argue that this game involves an equilibrium in which all of its participants would choose to develop and maintain a principled preference.     

Bayesian boundedly rational agents play the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

In this paper a model of boundedly rational decision making in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is proposed in which: (1) each player is Bayesianrational; (2) this is common knowledge; (3) players are constrained by limited state spaces (their Bayesian minds) in processing (1) and (2). Under these circumstances, we show that cooperative behavior may arise as an individually optimal response, except for the latter part of the game. Indeed, such behaviorwill necessarily obtain in long enough games if belief systems satisfy a natural condition: essentially, that all events consistent with the players' analysis of the game be attributed by them positive (although arbitrarily small) subjective probability.     

Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information

Aumann's (1987) theorem shows that correlated equilibrium is an expression of Bayesian rationality. We extend this result to games with incomplete information.First, we rely on Harsanyi's (1967) model and represent the underlying multiperson decision problem as a fixed game with imperfect information. We survey four definitions of correlated equilibrium which have appeared in the literature. We show that these definitions are not equivalent to each other. We prove that one of them fits Aumann's framework; the agents normal form correlated equilibrium is an expression of Bayesian rationality in games with incomplete information.We also follow a universal Bayesian approach based on Mertens and Zamir's (1985) construction of the universal beliefs space. Hierarchies of beliefs over independent variables (states of nature) and dependent variables (actions) are then constructed simultaneously. We establish that the universal set of Bayesian solutions satisfies another extension of Aumann's theorem.We get the following corollary: once the types of the players are not fixed by the model, the various definitions of correlated equilibrium previously considered are equivalent.     

道德权利的价值原则初探

在道德权利的本质规定中,蕴涵着普遍性原则、合理性原则、社会性原则。普遍性原则强调道德权利中权利主体的普遍性,合理性原则强调道德权利中利益的价值合理性,社会性原则强调道德权利的社会本性。只有合乎三方面价值原则的权利要求,才能上升为道德权利。     

产权公共领域与农地确权颁证

由于地区差距、产业差别以及社区差异,使得公共领域的结构差异较大,且存在差序格局.而公共领域的存在正是公共利益构建的基础,也是个人理性与村社理性之间的桥梁.确权颁证的重点并不是对于产权公共领域的分解,而是在公共领域之上构建合作视角的产权合约.从近郊与远郊两个不同的确权颁证区域,可以得出农户对于产权的诉求的偏重存在较大差异,而产权公共领域的治理也存在较大的不同.但是,确权颁证的关键依然在于对产权公共领域的合理利用.     

“摸着石头过河”的经济学释义简

“摸着石头过河”是富有中国特色、符合中国国情的改革方法。从经济学的角度来看,这种方法承认有限理性,符合制度变迁的认知逻辑和演化逻辑;尊重群众首创,更有利于形成稳定的经济秩序;注重行之有效,主张从实践中获得真知;便于动态调整行为决策,更契舍经济社会发展的现实需要。     

Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem

A cornerstone of game theory is backward induction, whereby players reason backward from the end of a game in extensive form to the beginning in order to determine what choices are rational at each stage of play. Truels, or three-person duels, are used to illustrate how the outcome can depend on (1) the evenness/oddness of the number of rounds (the parity problem) and (2) uncertainty about the endpoint of the game (the uncertainty problem). Since there is no known endpoint in the latter case, an extension of the idea of backward induction is used to determine the possible outcomes. The parity problem highlights the lack of robustness of backward induction, but it poses no conflict between foundational principles. On the other hand, two conflicting views of the future underlie the uncertainty problem, depending on whether the number of rounds is bounded (the players invariably shoot from the start) or unbounded (they may all cooperate and never shoot, despite the fact that the truel will end with certainty and therefore be effectively bounded). Some real-life examples, in which destructive behavior sometimes occurred and sometimes did not, are used to illustrate these differences, and some ethical implications of the analysis are discussed.     

“满意化”和“适应性”:西蒙有限理性思想探析

本文将从西蒙对有限理性认识的几个重要阶段入手,考察有限理性在西蒙学术生涯中的历史呈现形态,进而解析西蒙有限理性思想的完整含义。本文的基本结论:满意化和适应性是西蒙有限理性思想不可或缺的两个方面。     

浅谈文艺典型的理性与合理性构建

在理性与合理性的关系发生转变的情况下,文学与理性之间的关系尤其紧密。西方艺术"典型"学说的流变及其与理性之间的关系,说明人们对于艺术"典型"的观点与理性观念的变化息息相关。艺术"典型"的崛起需要理性的支持,新的"典型"的再崛起同样伴随着新型理性的构建。     

“经济人”假定与经济学的发展

“经济人”是经济学中的基本假定 ,经济学发展的历史说明 :经济人假定是经济学大厦得以建立的基础 ,在经济分析中追求自身利益最大化比其相反的假设具有更强的解释力。当代经济学正是在经济人假定的基础上大大拓宽了经济学的研究范围 ,取得了重大成果 ,而传统社会经济学也因为忽视了经济人的假定而陷入了困境