会计核算软件逆向操作的利弊分析

为了迎合财务会计的需求,软件公司开发了不少带有逆向操作功能的软件,虽然在使用中对更正会计差错、减少系统数据冗余和提高工作质量等起到了一定的作用,但同样也给财务会计系统的安全带来了威胁。这里在简略介绍会计核算软件逆向操作内涵和功能作用的基础上,针对其可能产生的隐患和危害等进行了分析,并针对其弊端和可能的风险提出了防范性完善措施。     

语文课程素养培养模式的探索与建构——以湛江师范学院中文专业为例

语文课程素养是师范院校中文专业人才培养的综合素养,也是人才培养目标的高度浓缩。"课程整合、平台贯通、操作一体化"培养模式,则是针对当下中文专业人才培养中的问题及素养形成规律提出的具体方案。要使这个方案落实到教学中,既需要教师改变课程观念、确定语文课程素养的培养目标,又要通过教学评价进行引导。而这一方案一旦成为教学中的共识,将大大提高师范院校中文专业的人才培养效率和水平。     

上海郊区新型农业经营方式研究

通过剖析上海农业经营形式的现状及问题,重点结合区县的探索和实践,围绕发展家庭农场和专业合作社两种新型经营方式,提出加快转变上海农业经营方式的对策建议。     

利益分析视角下的公路班线客运集约化发展研究

公路班线客运集约化改革的难点在于利益关系的协调。在广泛调研和深入访谈的基础上，结合班线客运发展历程及现状，从利益分析的视角剖析了政府、企业、个体之间的利益诉求、利益冲突及利益博弈的内在机理，指出挂靠关系下企业与个体之间的利益争夺是集约化发展难以推进的根源。研究提出以当前利益分配格局为均衡点的“实收配股”集约化发展改革方案，同时强调政府应转变职能定位、完善相关政策，防止形成市场封锁或垄断。     

用工业CT技术测量储层岩芯饱和度分布

认识储层岩石中含油饱和度及饱和度分布,对驱替机理的深入研究是非常重要的。为了搞清储层岩石在驱替过程中的饱和度分布情况,应用工业CT技术,提出了一种储层含油岩芯被驱替后的饱和度分布的CT密度差测量方法。在岩样的同一断面,分别对干岩样、饱和岩样及在驱替后的岩样进行CT扫描,重建相应的断层图象,测量所建图象的灰度值,计算出相应的密度值,用密度差法计算出饱和度及其分布值。在γ射线工业CT机“CD-300BG”上对某油田岩样进行了实际测量,获得的结果说明,采用CT密度差法测量饱和度分布是有效的。该方法与常规驱替法相比较,具有快速、精度高、无损岩样和能模拟地层状态测量等特点,是油田开发、油藏描述和地层评价的一种新的有效方法。     

浅谈洁净手术部在医院基建工程中的特殊需求

随着现代医学的发展,洁净手术部成为各手术学科建设与发展的重要前提与支柱,对原有手术室功能进行改造势在必行。为了实现医院洁净手术部向信息化、智能化、集约化发展,从洁净手术部的选址、功能等方面介绍了当前省内部分二级以上医疗单位洁净手术室建设的新进展,总结近年来在洁净手术室规划、建设过程中的经验,为现代医院基建工程管理提供借鉴,保障医院医疗、教学、科研工作的顺利开展。     

高职《化工单元操作技术》课程改革中学生创新能力培养的探索与实践

目前,高职高专教育教学正在进行深层次的改革,工学结合的课程改革是高职高专教育面临的核心任务,而创新能力的培养则是高职高专课程改革的重要内容。在《化工单元操作技术》课程改革中,从教学模式、教学方式方法、教学评价体系和技能竞赛活动等方面进行了一系列探索,推进了学生创新能力的培养。     

以《狼图腾》的英译为例谈译文表达的识解操作

基于认知语言学框架下意义观与翻译观以及认知语言学中的识解理论的四个维度,在译文表达时的识解操作应该在考虑目的语读者辖域背景的基础上,保持或调整原文表征的详略度、突显和扫描方式等识解维度,使译文流畅,符合目的语读者的表达习惯,最终实现成功的交际。     

高含水期复杂断块油藏剩余油分布及挖潜

高含水期陆相复杂断块层状油藏剩余油分布复杂,油藏模拟难度大。马11复杂断块油藏在油藏精细描述基础上,利用动静态综合分析研究与密网格大规模数值模拟研究相结合,提高了剩余油研究精度和可信度;在此基础上,针对油藏剩余油分布特点并结合当前经济技术条件,部署实施了以调整井、调剖、堵水、油水井大修为主的剩余油挖潜方案,油藏含水上升率大幅度下降、采油速度上升、采收率提高了。     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.