房产税是市场规制权与对策权的博弈选择

白晓峰在2013年11月18日《光明日报》撰文认为，政府通过限购、限价等直接干预房地产达到房价降低的目的，无论是从实践效果还是从经济发展的规律来看，都变得非常困难。经济的复杂性和住房公共品的属性使得原本目标明确的规则行动带来越来越多的非意图后果。这正是市场规制权与对策权博弈的后果，也是房地产市场调控面临的挑战。是故，政府致力于一般性规则的制定与推行可能使房地产市场调控目标能够看到曙光。房产税则是这场博弈当中的必然选择。     

国外经验对我国利率市场化的启示

正利率市场化是早晚的事,如何应对?这是我们要做的功课。利率市场化的意义利率市场化在有些国家或教科书上又被称为利率自由化,是指一个国家利率主要取决于这个国家的金融交易主体,或者说在金融机构运作过程中,利率通过整个市场的供需均衡来自由决定,其不再受到国家或政府的管制,国家或政府只能被动或间接地实施一些政策对其产生一定的影响,而这些影响很多时候都只是滞后的或起不了太大的作用。     

垄断国企收入分配改革中的利益集团分析

垄断国企内部的高收入拉大了社会的贫富差距，引发了不少社会成员的不满。从2004年启动的，连续拖延了10年的收入分配制度改革，一再被搁浅，迟迟难以获得通过，其根本原因，是包括少数垄断国企高管们在内的既得利益集团的强势阻挠的结果。垄断企业收入分配改革过程中存在着不同的利益集团，他们是社会不同阶层的代表，有着各自不同的目标函数，因此会通过在政治、经济、社会等领域采取各种形式的努力，相互竞争、相互博弈，以实现各自的利益目标。目前看来，垄断国企集团虽然数量少，但规模较大，由于存在与政府规制集团利益的“共容性”，以及强大的经济实力和政治话语权，在与其他利益集团的博弈中占据优势。当前，中央关于限制垄断国企高管薪酬的“破冰之举”，有助于打破垄断国企利益集团的优势地位。     

跨区域大气污染联合防治中的地方政府 演化博弈分析

针对大气污染呈现出的复合型、流动性和跨区域的特点，将地方政府在大气污染联合防治中的相互影响总结为“同向外部效应”和“部分排他效应”，应用演化博弈分析法，剖析地方政府之间大气污染联合防治的演化过程和演化结果。研究结果表明：地方政府治污成本的降低、对不治理污染地方政府惩罚力度的加大、地方政府治理大气污染效果的提高、地方政府不治理大气污染可见性的提升、大气污染治理外部性的减弱等都有助于演化博弈的稳定策略向地方政府跨区域联合防治的方向演进，从而有助于提升大气污染的治理效果，达到改善生态环境的目的。     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

联合订货区间值EOQ模型及变权Shapley值成本分摊方法

研究多个销售商企业组成联盟向一个供应商订购同种商品的联合订货问题。考虑到实际问题中很难预测到精确的需求，本文用区间表示单位时间需求量，研究允许缺货的销售商企业联合订货区间值EOQ模型，其中缺货完全回补。以联合订货平均成本最小为目标，结合连续有序加权集结算子求解出联合订货的周期、区间值订货量和区间值平均成本。定义变权Shapley值，给出区间值合作博弈的区间值变权Shapley值的求解方法，得出区间值变权Shapley值的表达式可直接利用相关联盟值的左、右端点计算得到。考虑联盟和局中人的相对重要性，结合需求率确定合成权重，提出基于区间值变权Shapley值的联合订货成本分摊方法。利用数值算例验证模型和方法的有效性。本文可为解决联合订货成本分摊问题提供决策参考。