Dutch books and agent rationality

According to the Dutch Book Argument (DBA), if an agent's subjective probabilities fail to satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus and so make the agent vulnerable to a Dutch Book, the agent's subjective probabilities are incoherent and the agent is therefore irrational. Critics of DBA have argued, however, that probabilistic incoherence is compatible with various kinds of rationality – logico-semantic, epistemic, instrumental and prudential. In this paper, I provide an interpretation of DBA on which it is true that probabilistic incoherence entails agent irrationality. Articulating this interpretation requires the specification of some of the connections among the varieties of rationality. Once this is done, it becomes possible to vindicate a modest version of DBA.     

贝叶斯主义科学方法论的解题功能及困境

贝叶斯主义兴起于20世纪30年代，在90年代得到复兴，目前已成为科学方法论的重要研究纲领。在科学推理领域，贝叶斯主义具有如下优势：能够将传统科学方法论中的重要直觉形式化；避开传统科学方法论中的困难；解决传统科学方法论中的“未解之谜”。但它也面临旧证据问题、逻辑全知问题和简单性问题以及可列可加性问题等困境。当前贝叶斯主义的研究活力主要表现在两个方面：认知科学中的贝叶斯推理和人工智能领域中的贝叶斯网络研究。