热奈特的类文本理论及其效应

杰拉德·热奈特的类文本理论受到中西方学界的关注与重视,一些学者对该理论进行了一定的补充和修正工作,也有不少学者将其用于文学研究。类文本理论视阈下,文学研究的对象为环绕于文本边缘的类文本要素,如作者的署名、序言、献词、题记、版权页信息等。将作者重新纳入批评视野,类文本理论有效修正了文本理论将文本与作者相割裂的不当做法;将出版商引入批评框架,类文本理论不仅拓展了传统文学批评体系,还起到限制读者过度阐释的目的。同时,类文本理论促进了叙事学的进一步发展,使文学研究从文本中心走向文本边缘,并将文学的内部研究和外部研究相结合,从而推进了文学批评理论的发展。鉴于类文本与文本的互存关系,某些类文本和文本之间的界限模糊不清,它们在具备类文本属性的同时,又不乏文本的属性,而这一特性又恰恰佐证了类文本之于文本而存续的重要性。     

Interval estimation in discriminant analysis for large dimension

This paper is concerned with the interval estimation for the log odds of the posterior probability that the observation vector belongs to one of two homoscedastic multivariate normal distributions (Π₁ and Π₂). We give the limiting distribution of the unbiased estimator for the log odds as the sample sizes and the dimension jointly tend to infinity, and approximate the confidence interval based on the asymptotic distribution. Small-scale simulations are performed to check the precision of the approximation.     

语义启动范式下显性水平对N200的影响

为探讨显性水平对N200的影响,选择高、低不同显性水平的隐喻与直义材料,采用启动词-目标词语义启动范式呈现双字词对,结果发现,高、低不同显性水平诱发的N200无差异,语义网络远、近距离的隐喻与直义材料也导致了无差异的N200.这些结果说明显性水平不影响N200,同时也证明,N200对语义加工不敏感.     

继承与创新：沃尔兹新现实主义理论定位再探讨

肯尼思·沃尔兹的新现实主义是国际政治研究的里程碑,但学界对这一里程碑含义的理解可能存在偏差。这一理论不是国际政治研究科学化的起点,而是对古典现实主义核心论点的历史性再诠释。沃尔兹和其他古典现实主义者一样认为人的理性能力存在限度,相信实力对比是进行利益划分的客观依据,劝告政治家遵行责任伦理。古典现实主义者与沃尔兹之间的差异并没有想象的大,古典现实主义者也强调安全,他们发现国际政治中存在着安全困境,追求过多权力会导致不安全,国家追求权力应适可而止。古典现实主义者还发现世界政治中因果关系非常复杂,事件的结果绝少和当事者的动机一致,“事与愿违”是政治中的常态,这与沃尔兹强调的“系统效应”相似。新古典现实主义者试图将沃尔兹的理论进一步科学化,他们希望结合结构变量与单元变量,提出更科学的理论解释、预测国家的行为,这不仅误解了沃尔兹,也背离了现实主义传统。     

Why Frequency is Not Well Defined for Engineering Systems with Nonexponential Failure Times

Dr. Yellman proposes to define frequency as “a time‐rate of events of a specified type over a particular time interval.” We review why no definition of frequency, including this one, can satisfy both of two conditions: (1) the definition should agree with the ordinary meaning of frequency, such as that less frequent events are less likely to occur than more frequent events, over any particular time interval for which the frequencies of both are defined; and (2) the definition should be applicable not only to exponentially distributed times between (or until) events, but also to some nonexponential (e.g., uniformly distributed) times. We make the simple point that no definition can satisfy (1) and (2) by showing that any definition that determines which of any two uniformly distributed times has the higher “frequency” (or that determines that they have the same “frequency,” if neither is higher) must assign a higher frequency number to the distribution with the lower probability of occurrence over some time intervals. Dr. Yellman's proposed phrase, “time‐rate of events … over a particular time interval” is profoundly ambiguous in such cases, as the instantaneous failure rates vary over an infinitely wide range (e.g., from one to infinity), making it unclear which value is denoted by the phrase “time‐rate of events.”