从主权国家的兴衰看权力博弈形态的转型

传统的国际关系理论,无论是现实主义、自由主义、建构主义还是科学行为主义理论,都是把主权国家抽象成一个统一的国际关系行为体。这一行为主体有一致的利益,也自然要有一致的对外政策目标和手段。在20世纪,尤其是在两次世界大战和冷战期间,这一概念抽象是非常准确的。但冷战结束以后,尤其是进入21世纪以后,这一概念抽象逐渐与国际关系的现实相违背。一方面,国家综合实力并不能直接转化为具体领域的竞争优势;另一方面,很多国家,包括超级大国在内,其对外政策的主要阻力可能不是所谓的竞争对手,而是其国内不同的利益集团。这导致传统的国际关系理论,从假设到概念和推理层面,都已经无法解释和预测今天的世界,而权力小博弈理论可以为认识多元复杂互动博弈时代的国际关系提供一个新的解释框架。     

Configuration of flexibility strategies under supply uncertainty

In this paper, we study a buyer׳s configuration of flexibility strategies under supply uncertainty. His main supplier׳s production process is uncertain, and he can either choose pricing flexibility (setting prices depending on the available supply) or operational flexibility (requesting a contingent order from a backup supplier). As the buyer may or may not find a suitable contingent supplier ex post, we study two scenarios that the backup supplier׳s supply is infinite, and that this supply is random. We also include the factor that the main supplier may determine the wholesale price. We demonstrate that the adoption of flexibility strategies is controlled by threshold policies in different scenarios whether the main supplier determines the wholesale price or not. We also investigate how the buyer׳s attribute (finding a suitable contingent supplier) affects the configuration of flexibility strategies.     

Allocation of resources in asymmetric competitions: How do the weak maintain a chance of winning?

To maintain a chance of occasionally beating a stronger player in a competition waged over several fields, a weaker player should give up on some of the fields and concentrate resources on the remaining ones. But when do weak players actually do this? And which fields do they give up when the fields differ in their likelihood of being assessed? We report an experimental study of resource allocation in which asymmetric pairs of players compete over asymmetric fields. Symmetric players and symmetric fields are used for control. We find that players behave as follows: (1) Average wins are the same in the symmetric and asymmetric fields conditions and correspond to relative player strength. (2) The proportion of fields given up on decreases with a player’s greater relative strength, increases for asymmetric field likelihoods, and increases when competitions are framed in meaningful context; this proportion is related to wins. (3) When field likelihoods are asymmetric, players’ resource allocation is correlated with likelihood. Wins generally increase with that correlation but the relation is different for players of different strength. (4) The proportion of fields given up on and the correlation with likelihood change with experience towards the values corresponding to higher wins.     

Rent-seeking and competitive preferences

In this experiment, I examine the extent to which competitive social preferences can explain over-bidding in rent-seeking contests. The Human treatment is a standard two-player contest. In the Robot treatment, a single player bids against a computerized player, eliminating potential social preference motives. The results show no difference in bids between treatments at the aggregate level. Further analysis shows evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects between impulsive and reflective subjects. Moreover, impulsive subjects are more likely than reflective subjects to deviate qualitatively from the shape of the theoretical best response function.     

我国保险公司合作竞争的博弈分析

竞争与合作相互依存,互利共生。纯粹的竞争或合作均不利于保险市场的健康发展。竞争抑或合作的最大困扰乃收益分配问题。通过构建博弈模型对我国保险公司之间竞争与合作的关系进行博弈分析,可以看到在完全信息静态博弈、非完全信息静态博弈和完全信息动态博弈三种情况下保险公司竞争与合作的难点,因此需要采取相应的对策。     

农村公共服务的自主供给困境及其治理路径

作为最原始的供给模式,农村公共服务的自主供给是指村社居民承担成本、主动参与到公共物品或服务生产提供的过程,表现为家庭自我供给、村民团队供给和村庄集体供给等。虽然其对政府、市场和志愿供给的补充有效缓解了农村公共服务供给匮乏的困局,但理性选择框架下的利益博弈和村社道德缺失、政府角色缺位等限制了自主供给作用的进一步发挥,存在资源浪费、供给不足、合作失败等困境。重塑乡村社会资本、完善服务供给机制、重新定位政府角色等成为可能的路径依赖。     

征收征用与公民基本权利保护

在我国的征收征用工作中时常出现侵权问题。为了解决这些问题,社会各界都提出了建议和对策。但现实中侵权现象仍不断出现,公民基本权利所受到的侵害始终得不到救济。本文拟从这个问题展开,探讨我国征收征用中相关公民基本权利保护问题。同时,征收征用中的侵权主要还涉及补偿问题,因而本文还将对补偿协商机制作一些探讨。     

中美中东石油关系解析

作为居世界前两位的石油进口和消费大国，中美都离不开中东石油。中美在中东必然因石油而发生关系，这种关系具有双重性——事实上的竞争与合作关系。在中东石油领域，如果两国展开过度竞争甚至恶性竞争，双方可能走向“零和”或两败俱伤的“负数”结局；如果两国开展对话、合作或实现竞争下的合作，则完全可以在中东石油甚至其他能源领域实现互利双赢。     

多维理论视角下的合作行为探析

合作行为一直是国内外学者们的重要研究课题,不同的学科、不同的理论给出了不同的解释。学者们以"行为体之间的合作行为的发生和维持"作为研究主题,分别从以基因为核心变量下的合作行为、文化影响下的合作行为、博弈互动影响下的合作行为和认知影响下的合作行为等多维理论视角对合作行为做出阐释,这些理论阐释既有共同点,也有不同点,既有相一致的方面,也有相冲突的方面。通过对这些理论阐释的基本内容和关键变量进行系统梳理和逻辑剖析,展现这些理论阐释的各自优缺点,并在此基础上对这些理论观点加以综合比较,最终揭示行为体之间的合作行为是如何发生并维持下去的。     

中美俄博弈模式分析:决策层级、动机及过程

以中美俄博弈的决策模式为研究对象,并通过列举中美和中俄两个具有合作性质的博弈案例,进而深入分析中美俄博弈的决策角色、决策动机和决策过程,指出决策角色可分为第一层级、第二层级和辅助层级,而国家利益是最重要的决策动机.为了追求决策效率,三国决策者紧密控制决策过程,防止其他权力部门分享决策权.