An additive–multiplicative mean model for panel count data with dependent observation and dropout processes

This paper discusses regression analysis of panel count data with dependent observation and dropout processes. For the problem, a general mean model is presented that can allow both additive and multiplicative effects of covariates on the underlying point process. In addition, the proportional rates model and the accelerated failure time model are employed to describe possible covariate effects on the observation process and the dropout or follow‐up process, respectively. For estimation of regression parameters, some estimating equation‐based procedures are developed and the asymptotic properties of the proposed estimators are established. In addition, a resampling approach is proposed for estimating a covariance matrix of the proposed estimator and a model checking procedure is also provided. Results from an extensive simulation study indicate that the proposed methodology works well for practical situations, and it is applied to a motivating set of real data.     

第一次石油危机后国际能源政治的情境变迁

国际政治的参与情境决定行动者的博弈行为类型，参与情境变迁将导致行动者行为发生变化。能源安全是国家对外政策的核心议题之一。1973年爆发的第一次石油危机，凸显了能源安全问题的重要性，改变了二战后国际能源政治的参与情境，构建了行动者新的博弈类型，调整了国际能源政治行动者的博弈策略。为了有效应对国际能源政治的情境变迁，美国通过协调与其他国家的能源关系，设置能源安全国际议程，最终确定了新的国际能源秩序。当前，我国在积极参与国际能源合作的过程中，第一次石油危机后国际能源政治的情境变迁以及国际社会的应对策略具有十分重要的启示意义。     

Esports consumer perspectives on match-fixing: implications for gambling awareness and game integrity

This article examines consumer perspectives on match-fixing in esports – professionalized competitive video game play – and the implications of these perspectives for understanding game and gambling integrity. The relationship between match-fixing, game integrity and gambling is a close one, as gambling markets are reliant on strong game integrity, but has not yet been studied in detail in the context of esports. Drawing on extensive qualitative data collected from esports fans around the world, this article examines perceptions of gambling awareness, integrity and esports gambling to assess esports consumers’ awareness of and attitudes towards gambling-related match-fixing. Results indicate that esports viewers are not deeply concerned by match-fixing. In addition, spectators typically view gambling as a cause of corruption among competitors, but also understand and accept some elements of the practice. Further, spectators tend to rely on rules to determine their assessment of what is ‘wrong’, rather than assessments based on ethics, and are often willing to forgive infractions through a range of reasons and justifications. We propose a need for education among esports spectators, extending existing anti-cheating programmes beyond just athletes to include the broader esports community.     

基于质量意识的复杂产品质量控制激励策略

激励在复杂产品供应链中对主供协同合作关系及质量控制发挥了重要作用。本文研究基于主制造商在复杂产品生产研发前按照客户要求形成的质量意识的激励策略是否可以实现复杂产品质量控制问题。考虑具有质量意识的主制造商和其系统供应商组成的两级供应链，建立以主制造商为领导者的Stackelberg博弈模型，分别讨论无激励和存在激励时的主供生产最优决策。基于激励方式的不同，将激励策略分为根据供应商产品质量水平激励以及根据主制造商质量意识水平激励两种方式。研究结果表明激励是供应商加强协同合作、改进产品质量的内在动力，主制造商根据质量意识激励供应商可以进一步促使双方协同合作，提高产品质量，使双方获得更高的利润从而实现供应链整体利润最大化。此外用灵敏度分析发现提高主制造商质量意识水平可以增加双方协同合作努力程度，有效提升产品质量水平并实现帕累托改进。     

医疗信息共享对患者转移数量和服务质量水平影响研究

当前我国医院间存在严重的"信息孤岛"，医院参与医疗信息共享意愿不高，患者的诊疗信息被静态碎片化储存而无法充分有效地利用。考虑到医院进行医疗信息共享将降低患者转移成本，本文构建一个多阶段双寡头动态博弈模型研究医疗信息共享对医院竞争过程中患者转移数量和服务质量水平决策的影响。首先，根据是否存在转移成本，将患者分为新患者和经验性患者，借助Hotelling模型刻画患者的效用函数，分析患者就诊决策。然后，在政府价格规制和不考虑医院利他性情景下，构建了医院累积期望收益目标函数，使用动态规划方法，求解实现医院累积期望收益最大化的服务质量水平，获得了实现患者相互转移且医院在市场中共存的马尔可夫完美均衡。最后，根据医院参与医疗信息共享后患者转移成本降为零，分析与比较信息共享前后患者转移数量和服务质量水平变化。研究发现：在不同医院间本身存在患者转移背景下，医院参与信息共享后，患者转移数量增加但存在一个上限，增加的转移量与患者在医院间的转移成本呈正相关，与初始感知效用的差值范围呈负相关；医院参与信息共享后，均衡状态下的医院服务质量水平高于信息共享前的服务质量水平。因此，在不改变当前医保支付方式下，要加快推进医疗信息共享，政府部门可以根据医院的患者数量和服务质量水平变化对其进行定期补贴，以激励医院积极参与医疗信息共享，本文给出了这个补贴的量化表达。     

中介机构参与下联盟企业知识转移的三方利益博弈分析

知识转移是企业保存知识、提升创新能力的重要途径，中介机构在转移过程中发挥了重要作用。本文以联盟企业间知识转移为研究对象，考虑了企业的不同心理压力，首先建立了联盟企业双方的讨价还价博弈模型；其次构建了考虑中介机构参与知识转移的博弈模型，分析和讨论三方收益变化的影响因素及策略选择。结果表明，在直接知识转移博弈中，转移主体的收益大小与自身的心理压力呈负相关，而与对方的心理压力呈正相关，同等心理压力下知识转出方占优；中介机构参与博弈情形下，中介机构作为协作角色的博弈收益仅受博弈双方心理压力影响，且与知识接收方协作可获得更大收益，而主导角色博弈情形下收益受到三方主体心理压力的综合影响，并在主导知识接收博弈时获得收益更大；中介机构的角色选择与知识转出方心理压力变化相关性不明显，主要受到知识接收方及自身心理压力影响。     

基于数量柔性契约的双源应急物资采购定价模型

针对灾害事件发生的不确定性以及灾害发生后应急物资需求量的爆发式增长，本文设计了一个政府主导的基于数量柔性契约的双源应急物资采购模型。在存在一个现货市场的情况下，政府除了常规采购外，还会与供应方签订一份数量柔性契约，用以建立政企联合储备应急物资的合作关系。通过数理推导，本文发现灾害事件发生概率，政府自身储备量，现货市场采购价格会对双方决策产生重要影响，并给出三个影响因素在满足不同条件时政企双方的最优决策，同时进一步分析了这三个因素对政府采购成本与供应方利润的影响。最后，通过数值模拟的方式对所得结论进行了验证。本文的研究为政府与企业构建联合储备应急物资的合作关系提供了指导与依据。     

A Shiny Update to an Old Experiment Game

ABSTRACT

Games can be a powerful tool for learning about statistical methodology. Effective game design involves a fine balance between caricature and realism, to simultaneously illustrate salient concepts in a controlled setting and serve as a testament to real-world applicability. Striking that balance is particularly challenging in response surface and design domains, where real-world scenarios often play out over long time scales, during which theories are revised, model and inferential techniques are improved, and knowledge is updated. Here, I present a game, borrowing liberally from one first played over 40 years ago, which attempts to achieve that balance while reinforcing a cascade of topics in modern nonparametric response surfaces, sequential design, and optimization. The game embeds a blackbox simulation within a shiny app whose interface is designed to simulate a realistic information–availability setting, while offering a stimulating, competitive environment wherein students can try out new methodology, and ultimately appreciate its power and limitations. Interface, rules, timing with course material, and evaluation are described, along with a “case study” involving a cohort of students at Virginia Tech. Supplementary materials for this article are available online.     

Is the beauty premium accessible to all? An experimental analysis

We conducted a trust game experiment to investigate whether women are trusted more when they wear makeup than when they do not. Facial attractiveness, which was manipulated through the application of makeup by a professional makeup artist, was measured before and after makeovers. Trustors were shown a photograph of their female counterparts before they made decisions about money transfers to trustees. The results showed that wearing makeup increased perceived attractiveness, which in turn led trustors to make larger transfers to female trustees during the trust game. Additionally, we discovered a pure makeup premium that was mediated by gender. Specifically, female trustees with makeup received larger transfers than female trustees without makeup when the trustors were men, even after controlling for female trustees’ levels of attractiveness.     

Defender–Attacker Games with Asymmetric Player Utilities

The presence of strategic attackers has become an important factor in the security and protection of systems, especially since the 9/11/2001 attacks, and considerable efforts have been dedicated to its study. When defending against the strategic attacker, many existing studies assume that the attacker would seek to minimize the defender's utility, which implies that the defender and attacker have symmetric utilities. However, the attacker's objective is determined by its own valuation of the system and target of the attack, which is not necessarily consistent with the defender's utility. If the attacker unexpectedly targets a different utility, then the defense strategy might no longer be optimal. In particular, the defense strategy could be inferior if the attacker's utility is not known to the defender. This study considers a situation where the defender's utility is the system survivability and the attacker's utility is the expected number of destroyed elements in the system. We investigate possible attack strategies under these two different utilities and compare (a) the conservative defense strategy when the attack utility is unknown to the defender with (b) the optimal defense strategy when the attack utility is known to the defender. We show that the conservative protection strategy is still optimal under asymmetric utilities when the contest intensity is smaller than one.