对经营者实施股权激励的法律分析

对经营者实施股权激励在中国法律上有两大障碍 ,一是经营者所持股份的来源如何解决 ,二是经营者如何取得股份。在借鉴国外立法经验对中国企业具体做法进行法律分析的基础上 ,提出了引入折衷资本制 ,让经营者通过合法途径取得股份等消除法律障碍的立法建议     

新形势下上海引进外资问题研究

基于新形势下上海引进外资出现的新情况、新问题,通过对上海投资环境、定位和区位的具体分析,建立上海吸引高端外资的系统框架,并提出上海在市场开放方面,应扩大外资进入领域,鼓励外资投向"上海制造"、"上海服务"、"上海创造"的高端产业,依次引导外资的产业结构升级;在投资环境方面,应建立统一和可预见的法制环境,完善社会信用制度,以此维护市场的竞争秩序;在市场准入方面,应放宽行业限制,不断调整和优化利用外资结构。     

Competition and Coordination in a Two‐Channel Supply Chain

We study competition and coordination in a supply chain in which a single supplier both operates a direct channel and sells its product through multiple differentiated retailers. We study analytically the supply chain with symmetric retailers and find that the supplier prefers to have as many retailers as possible in the market, even if the retailers' equilibrium retail price is lower than that of the supplier, and even if the number of retailers and their cost or market advantage prevent sales through the direct channel. We find that the two‐channel supply chain may be subject to inefficiencies not present in the single‐channel supply chain. We show that several contracts known to coordinate a single‐channel supply chain do not coordinate the two‐channel supply chain; thus we propose a linear quantity discount contract and demonstrate its ability to perfectly coordinate the two‐channel supply chain with symmetric retailers. We provide some analytical results for the supply chain with asymmetric retailers and propose an efficient solution approach for finding the equilibrium. We find numerically that the supplier still benefits from having more retailers in the market and that linear quantity discount contracts can mitigate supply chain inefficiency, though they no longer achieve perfect coordination.     

Information Sharing in a Manufacturer–Supplier Relationship: Suppliers' Incentive and Production Efficiency

While there have been vast discussions on the materialistic benefits of continuous improvement from the Toyota and Honda experiences, the academic literature pays little attention to information sharing. In this study, we construct a dynamic adverse selection model in which the supplier privately observes her production efficiency, and in the contractual duration the manufacturer obtains an informative but imprecise signal regarding this private efficiency. We show that despite the disclosure of proprietary information, information sharing may benefit the supplier; the supplier's voluntary participation is more likely to occur when the shared information is rather imprecise. On the other hand, our analysis also reveals that this information sharing unambiguously gives rise to an upward push of the production quantity, and may sometimes lead to an upward distortion that ultimately hurts the supply chain. We also document the non‐trivial impact of the timing of information sharing on the supplier's incentive to participate.     

Exploitation aversion: When financial incentives fail to motivate agents

Studies of the principal-agent relationship find that monetary incentives work in many instances but that they can also backfire. Various mechanisms for this failure have been examined (e.g., intrinsic motivation, image concerns). We posit that an aversion to being exploited, i.e., being used instrumentally for another’s benefit, can also cause incentives to fail. Using an experiment we find that compliance is lower for exploitative principals compared to neutral ones despite using the same contracts. To corroborate our results we show that surveyed “exploitation aversion” mediates this effect. Our results have implications for the design and implementation of incentives within organizations.     

股权激励绩效与股权结构关系

股权激励绩效与股权结构间的关系分析对股权激励制度的推行意义重大。运用分布滞后模型对中国上市公司中在相关的年份实施经营者股权激励的公司进行的全样本的动态研究发现：实施股权激励后．公司股权集中度降低；在注意提升内部人持股比例，加大激励力度的同时，提高了股票的流通性；上市公司实施股权激励当年的股权激励绩效与公司第一大股东、前五大股东、前十大股东持股比例均呈显著的负相关关系；股权激励绩效与国有股比例、非流通股比例呈显著的负相关关系，而与非国有股比例、流通股比例和内部人持股比例呈显著的正相关关系。     

果业财政补贴与激励机制设计

果业发展的关键在于技术和品种的更新,而引入新技术需要投入较多资金,更新品种也要几年后才有收益,这制约了广大果农对果业升级换代的积极性,影响了果业的发展。因此,政府应对果业提供产出补贴与品种更新补贴,以此来激励果农采用新技术及新优果树品种,提高果业的竞争力。政府的具体补贴数额可通过补贴激励机制模型计算得出。     

Smallholder Preferences for Agri‐environmental Change at the Bhoj Wetland,India

Incentive‐based approaches have gained policy interest in linking change in agricultural land management with environmental conservation. This article investigates how scheme design influences smallholder farmers' decisions to switch to organic farming to reduce water pollution, drawing on a study at a Ramsar wetland site providing water for the city of Bhopal. Results from a choice experiment suggest that transitional payments are necessary to overcome farmer constraints to adopt organic farming, and that effective land certification has the potential to act as a self‐enforcing mechanism linking farmer incomes with wetland conservation benefits.     

Trust in surveys and games – A methodological contribution on the influence of money and location

This paper explores methods to study trust. In a variety of settings, answers to survey questions and choices in a trust game are obtained from student sample pools. Some subjects are approached by mail and execute their task at home whereas others participate in classroom experiments. No differences between the results obtained by these methods are observed. Furthermore, one additional group plays the trust game with purely hypothetical payments, and another receives random lottery payments. This changes trust behavior dramatically, whereas trustworthiness is unaffected. Subjects without any financial incentives exhibit less trust and their trust choices are significantly correlated with survey trust answers. There is no such correlation for the corresponding choices with real payments.     

浅谈学校管理中的物质激励和精神激励

学校管理中经常需要使用物质激励和精神激励两种手段来提高教职工的积极性,但在市场经济条件下,如何正确认识物质激励和精神激励的特点和使用方式对于促进学校的管理和改革是十分重要的。