兼并效应与产品覆盖策略

在行业寡头垄断竞争中, 引入产品覆盖策略竞争的变量, 把企业兼并时的竞争假定为两 个阶段两种变量: 先是产品覆盖策略竞争, 后是产品产量竞争, 并设计了一个描述这种兼并竞 争的模型. 在此基础上, 分析了参与和未参与兼并的企业的产品覆盖策略变化对各企业利润和 价格的影响, 在一定程度上解释了兼并悖论. 我们赞成适度的兼并控制政策, 但在经济萧条时 期可适当放宽.     

寡占型市场结构与石油产业组织效率

寡占型市场结构有利于实现石油产业的规模经济、提高产业技术创新能力、促进政府对石油产业的有效调控。长期以来，石油产业组织效率低下，一个很重要的原因是没有形成寡占型市场结构。现阶段，要从市场化推进、集团组织结构的有效构建、政府产业组织政策的正确指导及市场竞争秩序的完善上采取多种措施，加快塑造中国石油产业寡占型的市场结构。     

我国电信产业寡头垄断合谋研究——以中国电信、中国网通两大集团《合作协议》为例

运用产业经济学、垄断竞争理论，以中国电信、中国网通两大集团《合作协议》为例，分别从六个方面具体阐述了双寡头合谋行为的危害和成因，提出了打破寡头合谋的路径选择：一是通过准入管制，强制垄断者提供已有网络的互联权；二是开展全业务经营；三是实行不对称管制；四是建立独立的电信规制机构，组建新的“国家电信管理委员会”或“电信管理局”；五是倾听用户意见，保护消费者利益；六是倡导竞争合作，实现运营商的共赢。     

基于寡头垄断的我国医药零售业市场结构合理化研究

我国医药零售业市场结构的典型特征主要表现为过度竞争.作为一种极具效率的市场结构,寡头垄断市场结构的构建有利于我国医药零售业市场结构的优化和产业组织效率的提升.通过制定实施以提高市场集中度为导向的产业组织政策、建立医药联盟等方式可以尽快促成寡头垄断市场结构的形成.     

国际工程承包市场竞争的博弈模型

本文对国际工程承包的市场竞争进行了实证分析并指出其基本特征,在此基础之上建立了国际工程承包的市场竞争模型。并给出了该模型的一个均衡解,最后对均衡解进行了解释并指出该模型带来的深刻影响。     

网络效应强度对最优许可决策的影响分析

在古诺双寡头竞争条件下,引入网络效应强度参数,建立三种技术许可最优决策模型,并得出最优决策。将网络效应参数对最优决策中各决策变量的影响进行分析,得出:只要技术创新是激烈的,专利许可方的利润都会随着网络效应强度的增强而增加;无论是在固定转让费许可,还是在混合许可时,只要技术创新是激烈的,专利许可方的固定转让费都会随着网络效应强度的增强而增加;而其对单位转让费的影响在单位许可和混合许可时是不同的。     

Estimating Merging Costs by Merger Preconditions

This article provides a method for estimating the bounds of transaction costs in horizontal mergers. Consider, for example, a completed monopoly merger in linear Cournot oligopolies with 10 symmetric firms. The method shows that its transaction costs are at most 25% (78%) of total premerger profits if there is zero (100%) excess capacity. Such estimations can be extended in a straightforward manner to other mergers and other oligopoly models. The estimation is based both on the profitability precondition, and on the non-empty core precondition, which postulates that the split of a merger’s profits be in its core. The article shows that the core in linear Cournot oligopolies has a non-empty interior, and indicates that the non-empty core precondition also sheds new lights on understanding important issues such as the stylized fact that mergers are likely to occur in markets plagued by excess capacities; why profitable mergers might not be formed; and why completed mergers might break up in the future.      

我国电信产业寡头垄断合谋研究——以中国电信、中国网通两大集团《合作协议》为例

运用产业经济学、垄断竞争理论，以中国电信、中国网通两大集团《合作协议》为例，分别从六个方面具体阐述了双寡头合谋行为的危害和成因，提出了打破寡头合谋的路径选择：一是通过准入管制，强制垄断者提供已有网络的互联权；二是开展全业务经营；三是实行不对称管制；四是建立独立的电信规制机构，组建新的“国家电信管理委员会”或“电信管理局”；五是倾听用户意见，保护消费者利益；六是倡导竞争合作，实现运营商的共赢。     

从美国的反垄断到遏制我国的行政性垄断--从微软分拆案中得到的启示

结合国内的反垄断,分析垄断含义的变迁,提出我国在反垄断问题上关键要遏制行政性垄断,限制不正当竞争行为.     

Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games

This paper studies the estimation of dynamic discrete games of incomplete information. Two main econometric issues appear in the estimation of these models: the indeterminacy problem associated with the existence of multiple equilibria and the computational burden in the solution of the game. We propose a class of pseudo maximum likelihood (PML) estimators that deals with these problems, and we study the asymptotic and finite sample properties of several estimators in this class. We first focus on two‐step PML estimators, which, although they are attractive for their computational simplicity, have some important limitations: they are seriously biased in small samples; they require consistent nonparametric estimators of players' choice probabilities in the first step, which are not always available; and they are asymptotically inefficient. Second, we show that a recursive extension of the two‐step PML, which we call nested pseudo likelihood (NPL), addresses those drawbacks at a relatively small additional computational cost. The NPL estimator is particularly useful in applications where consistent nonparametric estimates of choice probabilities either are not available or are very imprecise, e.g., models with permanent unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, we illustrate these methods in Monte Carlo experiments and in an empirical application to a model of firm entry and exit in oligopoly markets using Chilean data from several retail industries.