Strategic Learning and the Topology of Social Networks

We consider a group of strategic agents who must each repeatedly take one of two possible actions. They learn which of the two actions is preferable from initial private signals and by observing the actions of their neighbors in a social network. We show that the question of whether or not the agents learn efficiently depends on the topology of the social network. In particular, we identify a geometric “egalitarianism” condition on the social network that guarantees learning in infinite networks, or learning with high probability in large finite networks, in any equilibrium. We also give examples of nonegalitarian networks with equilibria in which learning fails.     

The Benefits of Congruence

This study examined the relation between 3 aspects of congruence (vocational, leisure, and skill utilization) and 6 well-being (or strain) measures (occupational satisfaction, work satisfaction, anxiety, burnout, somatic complaints and self-esteem). The study was conducted among 120 participants (lawyers, psychologists, and physicians). Findings were that (a) correlations among the congruence aspects ranged between .24 and .36, (b) all correlations between each of the congruence aspects and each of the well-being measures were in the expected direction, and (c) all 3 congruence aspects showed an additive effect on all well-being measures. Thus, supportive evidence for the benefits of congruence in its broader meaning was found.     

Comprehensive Interests Measurement in Counseling for Congruence

This article suggests that counselors measure vocational interests by using three interest inventories: the Ramak Interest Inventory, the Courses Interest Inventory, and the Self-Directed Search (Holland, 1985). Some implications from studies on (a) vocational congruence, (b) environmental congruence, (c) the structure of occupational fields and (d) within-occupation congruence are discussed. Five defense mechanisms for clients who happen to be in an incongruent occupation or environment are presented.     

Complete characterization of functions satisfying the conditions of Arrow’s theorem

Arrow??s theorem implies that a social welfare function satisfying Transitivity, the Weak Pareto Principle (Unanimity), and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) must be dictatorial. When non-strict preferences are also allowed, a dictatorial social welfare function is defined as a function for which there exists a single voter whose strict preferences are followed. This definition allows for many different dictatorial functions, since non-strict preferences of the dictator are not necessarily followed. In particular, we construct examples of dictatorial functions which do not satisfy Transitivity and IIA. Thus Arrow??s theorem, in the case of non-strict preferences, does not provide a complete characterization of all social welfare functions satisfying Transitivity, the Weak Pareto Principle, and IIA. The main results of this article provide such a characterization for Arrow??s theorem, as well as for follow up results by Wilson. In particular, we strengthen Arrow??s and Wilson??s result by giving an exact if and only if condition for a function to satisfy Transitivity and IIA (and the Weak Pareto Principle). Additionally, we derive formulae for the number of functions satisfying these conditions.     

Examination of Interest Inventories Based on Roe's Classification

This article describes the adaptation of two interest inventories translated into English, based on Roe's (1956) classification of occupations. In an analysis based on the responses of 181 participants, the items followed the 6 rules for interest inventory items formulated by Meir and Gati (1981). The Cronbach alpha reliability of the 8 field scores in the 2 inventories ranged between .73 and .91. A Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) on 8 field scores on the Ramak, 8 field scores on the Courses and 6 personality type scores on Holland's (1973) Vocational Preference Inventory (VPI) supported the construct validity of the inventories.