Value of Sharing Production Yield Information in a Serial Supply Chain

New developments in corporate information technology such as enterprise resource planning systems have significantly increased the flow of information among members of supply chains. However, the benefits of sharing information can vary depending on the supply chain structure and its operational characteristics. Most of the existing research has studied the impact of sharing downstream information (e.g., a manufacturer sharing information with its suppliers). We evaluate the benefits of sharing upstream yield information (e.g., a supplier sharing information with the manufacturer) in a two‐stage serial supply chain in which the supplier has multiple internal processes and is faced with uncertain output due to yield losses. We are interested in determining when the sharing of the supplier's information is most beneficial to the manufacturer. After proposing an order‐up‐to type heuristic policy, we perform a detailed computational study and observe that this information is most beneficial when the supplier's yield variance is high and when end‐customer demand variance is low. We also find that the manufacturer's backorder‐to‐holding cost ratio has little, if any, impact on the usefulness of information.     

Self‐Selecting Priority Queues with Burr Distributed Waiting Costs

Service providers, in the presence of congestion and heterogeneity of customer waiting costs, often introduce a fee‐based premier option using which the customers self‐segment themselves. Examples of this practice are found in health care, amusement parks, government (consular services), and transportation. Using a single‐server queuing system with customer waiting costs modeled as a Burr Distribution, we perform a detailed analysis to (i) determine the conditions (fees, cost structure, etc.) under which this strategy is profitable for the service provider, (ii) quantify the benefits accrued by the premier customers; and (iii) evaluate the resulting impact on the other customers. We show that such self‐selecting priority systems can be pareto‐improving in the sense that they are beneficial to everyone. These benefits are larger when the variance in the customer waiting costs is high and the system utilization is high. We use income data from the poorest and richest areas (identified by zipcode) in the United States along with the countrywide income distribution to illustrate our results. Numerical results indicate that planning for a 20–40% enrollment in the high‐priority option is robust in ensuring that all the stakeholders benefit from the proposed strategy.     

Dedicated Transportation Subnetworks: Design,Analysis, and Insights

A dedicated subnetwork (DSN) refers to a subset of lanes, with associated loads, in a shipper's transportation network, for which resources—trucks, drivers, and other equipment—are exclusively assigned to accomplish shipping requirements. The resources assigned to a DSN are not shared with the rest of the shipper's network. Thus, a DSN is an autonomously operated subnetwork and, hence, can be subcontracted. We address a novel problem of extracting a DSN for outsourcing to one or more subcontractors, with the objective of maximizing the shipper's savings. In their pure form, the defining conditions of a DSN are often too restrictive to enable the extraction of a sizable subnetwork. We consider two notions—deadheading and lane‐sharing—that aid in improving the size of the DSN. We show that all the optimization problems involved are both strongly NP‐hard and APX‐hard, and demonstrate several polynomially solvable special cases arising from topological properties of the network and parametric relationships. Next, we develop a network‐flow‐based heuristic that provides near‐optimal solutions to practical instances in reasonable time. Finally, using a test bed based on data obtained from a national 3PL company, we demonstrate the substantial monetary impact of subcontracting a DSN and offer useful managerial insights.     

Transfer Pricing and Sourcing Strategies for Multinational Firms

Taking advantage of low tax rates using transfer pricing and taking advantage of low production costs using offshoring are two strategies multinational firms (MNFs) use to increase profits. We identify an important trade‐off that MNFs face in setting their transfer prices: the conflict between (i) the incentive role and (ii) the tax role of the transfer price. For MNFs, we find the profit‐maximizing transfer‐pricing strategies that motivate divisional management to (i) make good sourcing decisions and (ii) take advantage of favorable tax rates. We quantify the absolute and relative maximum inefficiency in terms of the after‐tax MNF's profit change from using a single transfer‐pricing system as compared to the dual transfer‐pricing system. We show that the highest relative loss is attained when the average sourcing cost and the tax differential are high. We demonstrate that the highest absolute loss is attained when the average outsourcing cost is approximately equal to the offshoring cost. We extend our results to two practical variations in MNF structures: an MNF that faces operational constraints on its offshoring capacity and an MNF that uses compensation contracts linked to after‐tax firm‐wide profits. Our insights help MNFs' managers identify when to use single and dual transfer‐pricing systems.