网络时代大学生思想政治教育工作的思路创新

如何利用互联网等新媒体为大学生思想政治教育工作服务,是高校思想政治教育工作需要迫切解决的现实问题。因此必须从四个方面积极拓展大学生思想政治教育工作的新思路：（1）从高校意识形态较量的宏观战略高度出发,重视网络思想政治教育工作;（2）思想政治教育的领域和渠道应该从现实世界向网络虚拟世界拓展;（3）掌握网络虚拟世界思想政治教育的主动权;（4）组织开展丰富多彩的校园文化活动,积极营造现实世界思想政治教育的宽松环境。     

Are Friendly Acquisitions Too Bad for Shareholders and Managers? Long‐Term Value Creation and Top Management Turnover in Hostile and Friendly Acquirers

The well‐documented failure of the majority of acquisitions to create value is often identified in popular discussion with hostile acquisitions, whereas friendly acquirers seem to get a friendly press. The relative performance of friendly and hostile acquirers therefore warrants a rigorous empirical investigation. Clear evidence of superior value creation in hostile over friendly acquisitions allows us to judge the efficacy of the market for corporate control. In this article we examine the long‐term shareholder wealth performance of four types of acquirers – friendly bidder, hostile bidder, white knight and hostile bidder facing a white knight or another hostile bidder. For a sample of 519 acquisitions of UK target firms during 1983–1995, we estimated the three‐year post‐acquisition gains to acquirer shareholders and found that hostile acquirers deliver significantly higher shareholder value than friendly acquirers. We found that friendly acquirers with high stock‐market ratings destroyed more value than hostile acquirers with a similar rating. Friendly acquirer top managers suffered greater job losses than those of hostile acquirers, perhaps paying the price for their inferior value‐creation performance. Our study provides evidence of the superior value‐creation performance of hostile acquirers and makes the case against takeover regulatory rules that may impede hostile takeovers.     

Corporate Financial Distress and Turnaround Strategies: An Empirical Analysis

Extant research on corporate turnaround from financial distress has prescribed a range of strategies to effect corporate recovery. However, no large sample study has examined the general applicability and effectiveness of these strategies. We set out to test the effectiveness of strategies and identify the underlying factors of effectiveness – the impact of timing, intensity and implementation of strategies on corporate recovery. We examine a sample of 166 potentially bankrupt UK firms drawn from 1985 to 1993 and track their turnaround strategies for a period of three years from distress. These strategies include operational, asset, managerial and financial restructuring. Our results show recovery and non-recovery firms adopt very similar sets of strategies, and managers of non-recovery firms restructure more intensively than recovery firms Nevertheless, non-recovery firms seem far less effective in strategy implementation than their recovery counterparts. Whereas recovery firms adopt growth-oriented and external-market focused strategies, non-recovery firms engage in fire-fighting strategies.     

Corporate governance convergence in Germany through shareholder activism: Impact of the Deutsche Boerse bid for London Stock Exchange

This case study examines the shareholder revolt initiated by a small activist shareholder, which eventually thwarted a takeover bid by Deutsche Boerse for the London Stock Exchange and forced the resignation of two of its highest profile board members. Primarily the case marks the emergence of the Anglo-American style shareholder rights movement in a country that offers only limited power to the shareholders of corporations. In the process it illustrates the mechanisms by which functional convergence of corporate governance regimes can occur long before the legal framework catches up. In Germany, the corporate governance regime requires stakeholder interests to be maximised rather than the sole interests of shareholders. This paper chronicles the shareholder actions that forced the takeover bid to be abandoned and seeks to provide an understanding of the motivations behind the activists’ campaign and the process by which they were able to overcome difficult odds and win their campaign. In this respect, it provides a useful insight into the processes used by relatively small investors to exercise their rights to thwart a takeover offer and topple some powerful corporate executives. Furthermore, the case illustrates how a single issue such as the strategic logic or the value creation potential of a takeover bid can rapidly spiral to become a wider campaign over deeply rooted governance concerns at targeted companies. Event study analysis reveals the stock market reaction to the activists’ intervention. Thirdly, the case sheds light on the importance of communication between management and shareholders especially when corporate decisions of great strategic import, such as a takeover, are being implemented. The globalisation of stock markets is empowering shareholders to assert their rights and their activism is driving corporate governance regimes towards greater convergence and recognition of the primacy of shareholder interests. Overall, the case raises a number of important issues regarding the corporate governance regime in Germany, the challenges posed by overseas investors, and the international convergence of corporate governance regimes. The case further suggests an additional mechanism by which international governance systems can converge functionally towards a common theme even if the form of national regimes remains largely unaltered. Our results are consistent with the institutional theory perspective of coercive isomorphism in adopting the shareholder value paradigm by Deutsche Boerse.