Seymour Martin Lipset: The social uses of anomaly

Let me preface my remarks by saying that we are here to honor a living, breathing colleague. My great concern, and in this I am sure that I speak for my colleagues as well, is that any imputation of a postmortem be avoided. Indeed, I would like to believe that Marty will review these various contributions and make his own assessments-critical or approvingly. The fact that he is not present in this conference hall should not deter us from speaking frankly and forthrightly. Marty merits nothing less. What binds us all is the sure knowledge that the work of Lipset speaks to us in personal as well as professional ways. That he has touched so many of us in both the private and public realms is itself a testimonial of the magnitude of his contribution to the field of political sociology. So it is in that spirit of a collégial dialogue that I offer these remarks. Let us hope that a year from now a session of one person can be held, at which S. M. Lipset will provide rebuttals and responses to those of us herein gathered. His most recent work in the field is Behemoth: Main Currents in the History and Theory of Political Sociology. The two major sources for traching the written works of Seymour Lipset are contained in Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset, edited by Gary Marx and Martin Diamond. Newberry Park, California: Sage Publishers. 1992, especially pp. 332–355. For work done by Lipset after 1991; as embodied in his later work, see Lipset's essay on “Steady Work: An Academic Memoir,” Annual Review of Socialogy: Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1996, pp. 1–27. My reference to works mentioned in the narrative can be found in either of these bibliography sources.     

A solution of the externality problem using strategic matching

This paper develops a Coase-like solution of the problem of inducing Pareto optimal behavior in the presence of reciprocal externalities. In place of Coasean direct compensation between the parties to an externality problem, actors strategically match each other's externality-producing activity, and thus induce counterparts to internalize the external benefits or costs of their actions. The analysis suggests a general framework for analyzing social interactions in the presence of reciprocal externalities. As an application of the theory, a solution of the duopoly problem is noted.We are indebted to L. Danziger, D. Samet, participants in faculty seminars at Bar-Ilan and New York Universities and at the University of Maryland, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions. All remaining errors are our own.     

Socialist utopias and scientific socialists: Primary fanaticisms and secondary contradictions

Early utopias envisioning a perfect order were superseded by small-scale versions in utopian communities. Scientific socialism then held that utopian socialism was doomed to failure in a hostile capitalistic world. As the Soviet experience elicited anti-utopias, utopianism has been unable to resolve its own contradictions in an imperfect world. This tragic outcome is an opportunity for sociology in its study of human interactions to analyze both the possibilities and the inherent limitations of proposed social systems. By monitoring the rich variety of social experience, it may help to restrain some of the fanaticisms that now surround us.These remarks were presented at the 1988 annual meetings of the Eastern Sociological Society in Philadelphia, March 1988.     

Economics of Radiation Protection: Equity Considerations

In order to implement cost-benefit analysis of protective actions to reduce radiological exposures, one needs to attribute a monetary value to the avoided exposure. Recently, the International Commission on Radiological Protection has stressed the need to take into consideration not only the collective exposure to ionising radiation but also its dispersion in the population. In this paper, by using some well known and some recent results in the economics of uncertainty, we discuss how to integrate these recommendations in the valuation of the benefit of protection.     

Three pseudo-paradoxes in ‘quantum’ decision theory: Apparent effects of observation on probability and utility

In quantum domains, the measurement (or observation) of one of a pair of complementary variables introduces an unavoidable uncertainty in the value of that variable's complement. Such uncertainties are negligible in Newtonian worlds, where observations can be made without appreciably disturbing the observed system. Hence, one would not expect that an observation of a non-quantum probabilistic outcome could affect a probability distribution over subsequently possible states, in a way that would conflict with classical probability calculations. This paper examines three problems in which observations appear to affect the probabilities and expected utilities of subsequent outcomes, in ways which may appear paradoxical. Deeper analysis of these problems reveals that the anomalies arise, not from paradox, but rather from faulty inferences drawn from the observations themselves. Thus the notion of quantum decision theory is disparaged.     

Improving Risk Management: From Lame Excuses to Principled Practice

The three classic pillars of risk analysis are risk assessment (how big is the risk and how sure can we be?), risk management (what shall we do about it?), and risk communication (what shall we say about it, to whom, when, and how?). We propose two complements as important parts of these three bases: risk attribution (who or what addressable conditions actually caused an accident or loss?) and learning from experience about risk reduction (what works, and how well?). Failures in complex systems usually evoke blame, often with insufficient attention to root causes of failure, including some aspects of the situation, design decisions, or social norms and culture. Focusing on blame, however, can inhibit effective learning, instead eliciting excuses to deflect attention and perceived culpability. Productive understanding of what went wrong, and how to do better, thus requires moving past recrimination and excuses. This article identifies common blame‐shifting “lame excuses” for poor risk management. These generally contribute little to effective improvements and may leave real risks and preventable causes unaddressed. We propose principles from risk and decision sciences and organizational design to improve results. These start with organizational leadership. More specifically, they include: deliberate testing and learning—especially from near‐misses and accident precursors; careful causal analysis of accidents; risk quantification; candid expression of uncertainties about costs and benefits of risk‐reduction options; optimization of tradeoffs between gathering additional information and immediate action; promotion of safety culture; and mindful allocation of people, responsibilities, and resources to reduce risks. We propose that these principles provide sound foundations for improving successful risk management.     

Why Frequency is Not Well Defined for Engineering Systems with Nonexponential Failure Times

Dr. Yellman proposes to define frequency as “a time‐rate of events of a specified type over a particular time interval.” We review why no definition of frequency, including this one, can satisfy both of two conditions: (1) the definition should agree with the ordinary meaning of frequency, such as that less frequent events are less likely to occur than more frequent events, over any particular time interval for which the frequencies of both are defined; and (2) the definition should be applicable not only to exponentially distributed times between (or until) events, but also to some nonexponential (e.g., uniformly distributed) times. We make the simple point that no definition can satisfy (1) and (2) by showing that any definition that determines which of any two uniformly distributed times has the higher “frequency” (or that determines that they have the same “frequency,” if neither is higher) must assign a higher frequency number to the distribution with the lower probability of occurrence over some time intervals. Dr. Yellman's proposed phrase, “time‐rate of events … over a particular time interval” is profoundly ambiguous in such cases, as the instantaneous failure rates vary over an infinitely wide range (e.g., from one to infinity), making it unclear which value is denoted by the phrase “time‐rate of events.”