GENDER MATCHING AND COMPETITIVENESS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

This paper experimentally investigates if and how people's competitiveness depends on their own gender and on the gender of people with whom they interact. Participants are given information about the gender of the co‐participant they are matched with, they then choose between a tournament or a piece rate payment scheme, and finally perform a real task. As already observed in the literature, we find that significantly more men than women choose the tournament. The gender of the co‐participant directly influences men's choices (men compete less against other men than against women), but only when the gender information is made sufficiently salient. A higher predicted competitiveness of women induces more competition. Giving stronger tournament incentives, or allowing the participants to choose the gender of their co‐participant, increases women's willingness to compete, but does not close the gender gap in competitiveness. (JEL C70, C91, J16, J24, J31, M52)     

Sponsored Places: The Use of Independent Day-Care Services to Support Children in Need

Correspondence to: Dr June Statham, Project Director, Thomas Coram Research Unit, 27-28 Woburn Square, London WC1H OAA Summary The implementation of the Children Act 1989, with its emphasison family support through the provision of non-stigmatizinglocal services and on local authorities working in partnershipwith voluntary and private service providers, has given a newfocus to the use of independent day-care services to supportchildren in need and their families. This article uses datafrom research in England and Wales on the implementation ofthe Children Act as it affects early years services, to considerthe extent of sponsored day-care, the circumstances in whichit is used, and the issues it raises for local authorities,independent day-care providers and the children themselves.     

THREAT AND PUNISHMENT IN PUBLIC GOOD EXPERIMENTS

Experimental studies of social dilemmas have shown that while the existence of a sanctioning institution improves cooperation within groups, it also has a detrimental impact on group earnings in the short run. Could the introduction of pre‐play threats to punish have enough of a beneficial impact on cooperation, while not incurring the cost associated with actual punishment, so that they increase overall welfare? We report an experiment in which players can issue non‐binding threats to punish others based on their contribution levels to a public good. After observing others' actual contributions, they choose their actual punishment level. We find that threats increase the level of contributions significantly. Efficiency is improved, but only in the latter periods. However, the possibility of sanctioning differences between threatened and actual punishment leads to lower threats, cooperation, and welfare, restoring them to levels equal to or below the levels attained in the absence of threats. (JEL C92, H41, D63)     

Towards the Use and Development of Games for Social Work Practice

Summary This paper reviews games that may be of use to social workersin their work with individuals, couples, families and groups.A typology of games is presented, which categorizes games accordingto their structure and their function. Games are seen as eitherunstructured or structured, and as stressing either cognitiveor behavioural goals. Selected games are presented in more detailas examples and others are presented in brief in an annotatedbibliography. Issues relating to designing games are discussedas well as issues in applying games to social work practice.