Public relations critical intersections special section introduction

The theme of this special section arose from the idea that interdisciplinary interactions, or the cross-fertilization of methods, philosophies, theories, and modes of practice across disciplines, can open out productive ways of addressing complex issues and wicked problems. Our call for papers reached out to public relations scholars and to researchers in other fields to submit articles at these generative intersections at different time. They were invited to reflect on traditional concerns, or current issues, or projected trends in public relations and elsewhere. As editors making a call to open boundaries, we invited participation along a spectrum of possible intersections whether of content, methods, pedagogy or technology. Taking different positions on that spectrum, the articles in the section examine the nature, engagement and evaluation of intersections. In writing this introduction, the editors took an overview of the articles in the light of three fundamental questions: “How and where does interdisciplinarity occur in public relations?”; “Are there indications of how public relations intersects with other fields to engage existing and potential future challenges?”; and “What principles might serve to evaluate answers to questions one and two?” In addition, we explore how each of the selected intersections in the articles might add value to public relations as a discipline and a practice.     

MATCHING IN INFORMAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

This paper analyzes an informal financial institution that brings heterogeneous agents together in groups. We analyze decentralized matching into these groups, and the equilibrium composition of participants that consequently arises. We find that participants sort remarkably well across the competing groups, and that they re‐sort immediately following an unexpected exogenous regulatory change. These findings suggest that the competitive matching model might have applicability and bite in other settings where matching is an important equilibrium phenomenon. (JEL: O12, O17, G20, D40)     

不要改变

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The Effects of Group Incentives in an Indian Firm: Evidence from Payroll Data

Abstract. This paper estimates the effects of group incentives on productivity, pay and employment in a large unionized firm in India. Using plant‐level monthly time‐series data from the payroll office for the period 1985–95, and controlling for both (plant) fixed effects and (contract) time effects, the paper provides econometric evidence on the effectiveness of both the level and intensity of incentive pay on the outcome measures. In addition, the relative performance of two types of group incentives defined on the basis of group size is also analysed. The results generally confirm predictions from theory that productivity returns to incentives are non‐linear and concave in shape and that the effectiveness of incentives is decreasing in group size. It is argued that the latter is most likely due to the lessening of the free‐rider problem and the increased effectiveness of peer monitoring associated with smaller groups. The results also point to a negative relationship between the level of incentives and employment over time.     

On existence of pure strategy equilibrium with endogenous income

It is well known that in a voting-over-income-taxation game, there exists no pure strategy equilibrium when voters’ incomes are exogenous (i.e., when individual voters make only consumption choices). I prove that in an environment with endogenous income (i.e., where individual voters make labor-leisure choices, in addition to consumption choices) and candidates propose marginally progressive taxes, it is possible to get existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium tax schedule.