Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences

We characterize the set of all individual and group strategy-proof rules on the domain of all single-dipped preferences on a line. For rules defined on this domain, and on several of its subdomains, we explore the implications of these strategy-proofness requirements on the maximum size of the rules’ range. We show that when all single-dipped preferences are admissible, the range must contain two alternatives at most. But this bound changes as we consider different subclasses of single-dipped preferences: we provide examples of subdomains admitting strategy-proof rules with larger ranges. We establish exact bounds on the maximal size of strategy-proof functions on each of these domains, and prove that the relationship between the sizes of the subdomains and those of the ranges of strategy-proof functions on them need not be monotonic. Our results exhibit a sharp contrast between the structure of strategy-proof rules defined on subdomains of single-dipped preferences and those defined on subsets of single-peaked ones.     

Subjective well‐being: what do adolescents say?

The aim of this paper is to analyse how 10‐ to 15‐year‐old adolescents define their own perceptions of well‐being and the factors influencing it at their age. Ten focus groups were organized, two from each age group. One group for each age included the students with the lowest scores in subjective well‐being (SWB) and the other included those with the highest, according to their responses to previously administered psychometric scales. The views of the participating adolescents were explored by means of a content analysis. In general, the children mentioned both positive and negative elements of participating in defining what constitutes well‐being. According to these children, well‐being is related to both affects and attitudes, relations with family and friends being key factors in it. Differences in the information provided reveal some variations according to age and SWB score. Children scoring lower in SWB tend to refer more to relationships with friends and basic needs covered, whereas those scoring higher tend to refer more to family relationships and not having problems. The results of this research can contribute to both social policy design and appraisal as they provide an in‐depth understanding of how SWB works at these ages.     

Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences

We concentrate on the problem of the provision of one pure public good whenever agents that form the society have either single-plateaued preferences or single-peaked preferences over the set of alternatives. We are interested in comparing the relationships between different nonmanipulability notions under these two domains. On the single-peaked domain, under strategy-proofness, non-bossiness is equivalent to convexity of the range. Thus, minmax rules are the only strategy-proof non-bossy rules. On the single-plateaued domain, only constant rules are non-bossy or Maskin monotonic; but strategy-proofness and weak non-bossiness are equivalent to weak Maskin monotonicity. Moreover, strategy-proofness and plateau-invariance guarantee convexity of the range. We thank Salvador Barberà, Matthew Jackson, Bettina Klaus, Jordi Massó, John Weymark, and two anonymous referees and the Associate Editor for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank the participants in the 3rd Workshop on Social Decisions that took place in Málaga in November 2007. Dolors Berga acknowledges the financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science through Research Grants SEJ2004-03276 and SEJ2007-60671 and also by the Generalitat de Catalunya through Research Grant 2005SGR-213 and the Barcelona Economics Program (CREA). Bernardo Moreno gratefully acknowledges financial support from Junta de Andalucía through grant SEJ522 and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology through grant SEC2005-04805.     

Stability and voting by committees with exit

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà et al. 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founders sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.A previous version of this paper was entitled Voting by Committees with Exit. We are very grateful to the associate editor and two anonymous referees for their detailed suggestions and comments. We also thank Salvador Barberà, Carmen Beviá, Anna Bogomolnaia, Renan Goetz, Matthew Jackson, Howard Petith, Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, James Schummer, and Tayfun Sönmez for their helpful comments and suggestions. The work of D. Berga, G. Bergantiños, and J. Massó is partially supported by Research Grants AGL2001-2333-C02-01, BEC2002–04102-C02-01, and BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, respectively. The work of A. Neme is partially supported by Research Grant 319502 from the Universidad Nacional de San Luis. The work of D. Berga is also partially supported by Research Grant 9101100 from the Universitat de Girona. The work of G. Bergantiños is also partially supported by Research Grant PGIDT00PXI30001PN from the Xunta de Galicia. The work of J. Massó is also partially supported by Research Grant 2001SGR-00162 and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA from the Generalitat de Catalunya. The paper was partially written while A. Neme was visiting the UAB under a sabbatical fellowship from the Generalitat de Catalunya.     

Restructuring Long-Term Care in Spain: The Impact of The Economic Crisis on Social Policies and Social Work Practice

ABSTRACT

Care needs of the aging population are increasing in Southern European countries. The purpose of this article is to explore the implications of meeting these needs while taking into account the recent economic crisis, which has deeply affected countries such as Spain. This study is part of a European project (ISCH COST Action IS1102) and is based mainly on qualitative information that focuses on in-depth interviews with social service workers (n = 19) who provide the service and program recipients or their caregivers (n = 14). In addition, two discussion groups were conducted with professionals (n = 9) and program volunteers (n = 5), as well as a workshop/discussion group (n = 28) with politicians, service providers, and participants. Six thematic premises were identified with differing views being highlighted relevant to the participants' roles in the program. Future research should explore social service strategies to deal with the increase in care needs as well as community-based responses.     

Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes

We identify, in a continuous multidimensional framework, a maximal domain of preferences compatible with strategy-proofness for a given generalized median voter scheme. It turns out that these domains are a variation of single-peakedness. A similar but stronger result for the discrete case and single-peakedness has been already obtained by Barberà et al. (1999). However, both results are independent and their proofs involve different arguments. Received: 27 July 1998/Accepted: 11 September 2000