Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners

We characterize sets of alternatives which are Condorcet winners according to preferences over sets of alternatives, in terms of properties defined on preferences over alternatives. We state our results under certain preference extension axioms which, at any preference profile over alternatives, give the list of admissible preference profiles over sets of alternatives. It turns out to be that requiring from a set to be a Condorcet winner at every admissible preference profile is too demanding, even when the set of admissible preference profiles is fairly narrow. However, weakening this requirement to being a Condorcet winner at some admissible preference profile opens the door to more permissive results and we characterize these sets by using various versions of an undomination condition. Although our main results are given for a world where any two sets – whether they are of the same cardinality or not – can be compared, the case for sets of equal cardinality is also considered. Received: 15 March 2001/Accepted: 31 May 2002 This paper was written while Barış Kaymak was a graduate student in Economics at Boğazi?i University. We thank ?ağatay Kayı and İpek ?zkal-Sanver who kindly agreed to be our initial listeners. The paper has been presented at the Economic Theory seminars of Bilkent, Ko? and Sabancı Universities as well as at the Fifth Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, July 2001, Ischia, Italy and at the 24^th Bosphorus Workshop on Economic Design, August 2001, Bodrum, Turkey. We thank Fuad Aleskerov, İzak Atiyas, ?zgür Kıbrıs, Semih Koray, Gilbert Laffond, Bezalel Peleg, Murat Sertel, Tayfun S?nmez, Utku ünver and all the participants. Remzi Sanver acknowledges partial financial support from İstanbul Bilgi University and the Turkish Academy of Sciences and thanks Haluk Sanver and Serem Ltd. for their continuous moral and financial support. Last but not the least, we thank Carmen Herrero and two anonymous referees. Of course we are the sole responsible for all possible errors.     

More than Subversion: Four Strategies for the Dominated

This article asks what strategies are available to dominated actors in fields of cultural production. Using archival and biographical materials on Ottoman/Turkish women intellectuals, we show that they effectively used, depending on their social and cultural capital and their past practices, at least four strategies. Apart from the well-theorized strategy of subversion, they could also deploy acquiescence, collaboration, and defiance. These four strategies, we argue, constitute a two-dimensional space defined by loyalty vs. resistance on one hand and the overtness vs. covertness of loyalty or resistance on the other. While much of this space is best understood in terms of reciprocal social exchange, the assumptions of exchange break down in the case of overt resistance, showing that strategy goes beyond negotiation and that the understanding of power as always-already implicated with resistance has limits.     

Population monotonic path schemes for simple games

A path scheme for a game is composed of a path, i.e., a sequence of coalitions that is formed during the coalition formation process and a scheme, i.e., a payoff vector for each coalition in the path. A path scheme is called population monotonic if a player’s payoff does not decrease as the path coalition grows. In this study, we focus on Shapley path schemes of simple games in which for every path coalition the Shapley value of the associated subgame provides the allocation at hand. Obviously, each Shapley path scheme of a game is population monotonic if and only if the Shapley allocation scheme of the game is population monotonic in the sense of Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990). We prove that a simple game allows for population monotonic Shapley path schemes if and only if the game is balanced. Moreover, the Shapley path scheme of a specific path is population monotonic if and only if the first winning coalition that is formed along the path contains every minimal winning coalition. We also show that each Shapley path scheme of a simple game is population monotonic if and only if the set of veto players of the game is a winning coalition. Extensions of these results to other efficient probabilistic values are discussed.     

A useful approach to identify the multicollinearity in the presence of outliers

The presence of outliers in the data sets affects the structure of multicollinearity which arises from a high degree of correlation between explanatory variables in a linear regression analysis. This affect could be seen as an increase or decrease in the diagnostics used to determine multicollinearity. Thus, the cases of outliers reduce the reliability of diagnostics such as variance inflation factors, condition numbers and variance decomposition proportions. In this study, we propose to use a robust estimation of the correlation matrix obtained by the minimum covariance determinant method to determine the diagnostics of multicollinearity in the presence of outliers. As a result, the present paper demonstrates that the diagnostics of multicollinearity obtained by the robust estimation of the correlation matrix are more reliable in the presence of outliers.     

Predicting Maternal Resolution of Preterm Birth at One Month Corrected Age

Early maternal resolution with preterm birth was assessed at one month corrected age (CA), and potential maternal and infant characteristics that may be associated with early resolution were examined. Fifty‐five mothers of preterm infants (≤34 weeks) participated. Data regarding pregnancy, prenatal risk, delivery, infant's medical risk, maternal well‐being status, and infant's early developmental status were collected. Resolution was examined using the Reaction to Diagnosis Interview (RDI). A total of 38.2% of the mothers were classified as resolved. Only completion of antenatal corticosteroids (ACS) treatment and high prenatal risk significantly predicted maternal resolution. Early maternal resolution of preterm birth is associated with early knowledge regarding the preterm birth.     

Evaluating Time Streams of Income: Discounting What?

For decisions whose consequences accrue over time, there are several possible techniques to compute total utility. One is to discount utilities of future consequences at some appropriate rate. The second is to discount per-period certainty equivalents. And the third is to compute net present values (NPVs) of various possible streams and to then apply the utility function to these net present values. We find that the best approach is to first compute NPVs of various possible income streams and then take the utility of such NPVs. We show the drawbacks of other alternative models of evaluating income streams. The article discusses the advantages of the power and logarithmic forms in the modeling of time preference. These are the only forms for which utility of income and utility of consumption are strategically equivalent. Further, these forms permit the flexibility in the choice of a time period (e.g., monthly or quarterly) without modifying the utility function, thus simplifying analysis.     

MANLY AFTER-EFFECTS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001: READING WILLIAM J. BENNETT’S WHY WE FIGHT: MORAL CLARITY AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM

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