Managing Cost Salience and Procrastination in Projects: Compensation and Team Composition

The rising trend of projects with high‐skilled and autonomous contributors increasingly exposes managers to the risk of idiosyncratic individual behaviors. In this article, we examine the effects of an important behavioral factor, an individual's cost salience. Cost salience leads individuals to perceive the cost of immediate effort to be larger than the cost of future effort. This leads to procrastination in early stages and back‐loaded effort over the course of the project. We model the problem confronting the manager of a project whose quality is adversely impacted by such distortion of individual effort over time. Complementary to prior works focused on the planning and scheduling tasks of project management in the absence of human behavior, we find that managers should reward contributions made in earlier stages of a project. Our analysis also yields interesting insights on the project team performance: teams with diverse levels of cost salience will perform better than homogeneous teams. We also address another important facet of team composition, namely, the choice between stable and fluid teams, and find that the practice of creating fluid teams might have previously unrecognized benefits when behavioral aspects of projects are considered. We conclude with insights and organizational implications for project managers.     

Testing for Covariate Effect in the Cox Proportional Hazards Regression Model

This article presents methods for testing covariate effect in the Cox proportional hazards model based on Kullback–Leibler divergence and Renyi's information measure. Renyi's measure is referred to as the information divergence of order γ (γ ≠ 1) between two distributions. In the limiting case γ → 1, Renyi's measure becomes Kullback–Leibler divergence. In our case, the distributions correspond to the baseline and one possibly due to a covariate effect. Our proposed statistics are simple transformations of the parameter vector in the Cox proportional hazards model, and are compared with the Wald, likelihood ratio and score tests that are widely used in practice. Finally, the methods are illustrated using two real-life data sets.     

The Simplest Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of an Open Economy

This paper presents the simplest possible general-equilibrium model of an open economy in which producer and consumer decisions are both intra- and intertemporally consistent. Consumers maximize the present value of the utility of consumption; producers maximize the present value of profits. The model solves for the set of intertemporally consistent prices. The parsimonious structure of the model is achieved by dividing the economy into two producing sectors—exports and domestic goods—and two consumed goods—imports and domestic goods. As a result, there is only one endogenous price per period to be solved for (the price of the domestic good), although “structural” questions, such as the evolution of the real exchange rate, can be posed with the model. Furthermore, with this structural breakdown, the model can be calibrated with national accounts data only. In the paper, we show how to calibrate such a model (including specification of an adjustment-cost function, to avoid “bang-bang” behavior) and use the model to examine various questions where intertemporal issues are important, including terms-of-trade shocks and tariff reform.     

Managing Technology Selection and Development Risk in Competitive Environments

Managing development decisions for new products based on dynamically evolving technologies is a complex task, especially in highly competitive industries. Product managers often have to choose between introducing an incrementally better, safe new product early and a superior, yet highly risky, product later. Recommendations for managing such performance vs. time‐to‐market trade‐offs often ignore competitive reactions to development decisions. In this paper, we study how a firm could incorporate the presence of a strategic competitor in making technology selection and investment decisions regarding new products. We consider a model in which an innovating firm and its rival can introduce a new product immediately or pursue a more advanced product for later launch. Further, the firm can reduce the uncertainty surrounding product development by dedicating more resources; the effectiveness of this investment depends on the firm's innovative capacity. Our model generates two sets of insights. First, in highly competitive industries, firms can adopt different technologies and effectively use introduction timing to mitigate the effects of price competition. More importantly, the firm could strategically invest in the advanced product to influence its rival's technology choice. We characterize equilibrium development and investment decisions of the firms, and derive innovative capacity hurdles that govern a firm's choice between the risky and safe alternatives. The effects of development flexibility—where firms might have the option to revert to the safe product if the advanced product fails—are also considered.     

Municipal Groundwater Management: Optimal Allocation and Control of a Renewable Natural Resource

We study a municipal groundwater management problem to determine optimal allocation and control policies in the presence of water transfer opportunities. We establish and characterize threshold polices governing export or import decisions of a given municipality. In the spirit of the Triple Bottom Line (3BL), we ascertain that exporting (importing) water through a water market defined by an exogenous export/import price is detrimental (beneficial) to both society and the environment within the municipality. In contrast, fixed quantity trading between two municipalities defined by an endogenously negotiated export/import price can have positive as well as negative impacts from a global 3BL perspective. In particular, typical trading scenarios that occur between municipalities can be detrimental to the environment. We also study the implications of privatization, and find that a privatized municipality would be more (less) likely to export (import) water as compared to its non‐privatized counterpart, resulting in negative implications for society within the municipality. However, if exports are banned, privatization can benefit the environment by mitigating the damage caused by the extraction differential, a phenomenon analogous to the green paradox. Moreover, careful and restricted privatization of municipalities can lead to positive global 3BL impacts from fixed quantity trading.