On UMVU estimators and Bhattacharya bounds in exponential distributions

A subfamily of exponential distributions is considered and it is shown that the variance of the UMVU estimator of an estimable function g(θ) having power series expansion is the limit of Bhattacharya bounds.     

Two-Stage Variables Acceptance Sampling Plans Using Process Loss Functions

In this article, a variable two-stage acceptance sampling plan is developed when the quality characteristic is evaluated through a process loss function. The plan parameters of the proposed plan are determined by using the two-point approach and tabulated according to various quality levels. Two cases are discussed when the process mean lies at the target value and when it does not, respectively. Extensive tables are provided for both cases and the results are explained with examples. The advantage of the proposed plan is compared with the existing variable single acceptance sampling plan using the process loss function.     

RESERVE PRICE EFFECTS IN AUCTIONS: ESTIMATES FROM MULTIPLE REGRESSION‐DISCONTINUITY DESIGNS

We present evidence from 260,000 online auctions of second‐hand cars to identify the impact of public reserve prices on auction outcomes. We exploit multiple discontinuities in the relationship between reserve prices and vehicle characteristics to present causal regression‐discontinuity estimates of reserve price impacts. We find an increase in reserve price decreases the number of bidders, increases the likelihood the object remains unsold, and increases expected revenue conditional on sale. We then combine these estimates to calibrate the reserve price effect on the auctioneer's ex ante expected revenue. This reveals the auctioneer's reserve price policy to be locally optimal. (JEL D44, L11, L62)     

Human Capital Outflow and Economic Misery: Fresh Evidence for Pakistan

This paper visits the impact of economic misery on human capital outflow using time series data over the period of 1975–2012. We have applied the combined cointegration tests and innovation accounting approach to examine long run and causal relationship between the variables. Our results affirm the presence of cointegration between the variables. We find that economic misery increases human capital outflow. Foreign remittances add in human capital outflow from Pakistan. The migration from Pakistan to rest of world is boosted by depreciation in local currency. Income inequality is also a major contributor to human capital outflow. The present study is comprehensive effort and may provide new insights to policy makers for handling the issue of human capital outflow by controlling economic misery in Pakistan.

     

Wald's approximations to the average run length in cusum procedures

Wald's approximation to the ARL(average run length in cusum) (cumulative sum) procedures are given for an exponential family of densities. From these approximations it is shown that Page's (1954) cusum procedure is (in a sense) identical with a cusum procedure defined in terms of likelihood ratios. Moreover, these approximations are improved by estimating the excess over the boundary and their closeness is examined by numerical comparisons with some exact results. Some examples are also given.     

Optimal designing of skip-lot sampling plan of type SkSP-2 with group acceptance sampling plan as reference plan under Burr-type XII distribution

In this paper, skip-lot sampling plan of type SkSP-2 with group acceptance sampling plans is proposed when the lifetime of the product follows the Burr-type XII distributions. The optimal parameters of the proposed plan are determined when two points on operating characteristics curve namely acceptable quality level and limiting quality level and the number of testers are specified. We also considered the Burr-type XII distribution to find the plan parameters. Several tables are given for practical use. We compare the results of proposed plan with the existing plans. Results are explained using real-world examples.     

Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence From Personnel Data

We present evidence on the effect of social connections between workers and managers on productivity in the workplace. To evaluate whether the existence of social connections is beneficial to the firm's overall performance, we explore how the effects of social connections vary with the strength of managerial incentives and worker's ability. To do so, we combine panel data on individual worker's productivity from personnel records with a natural field experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial incentives, from fixed wages to bonuses based on the average productivity of the workers managed. We find that when managers are paid fixed wages, they favor workers to whom they are socially connected irrespective of the worker's ability, but when they are paid performance bonuses, they target their effort toward high ability workers irrespective of whether they are socially connected to them or not. Although social connections increase the performance of connected workers, we find that favoring connected workers is detrimental for the firm's overall performance.     

A remark on estimating the mean of a normal distribution with known coefficient of variation

Let X₁, X₂, …, X_n be iid N(μ, aμ²) (a>0) random variables with an unknown mean μ>0 and known coefficient of variation (CV) √a. The estimation of μ is revisited and it is shown that a modified version of an unbiased estimator of μ [cf. Khan RA. A note on estimating the mean of a normal distribution with known CV. J Am Stat Assoc. 1968;63:1039–1041] is more efficient. A certain linear minimum mean square estimator of Gleser and Healy [Estimating the mean of a normal distribution with known CV. J Am Stat Assoc. 1976;71:977–981] is also modified and improved. These improved estimators are being compared with the maximum likelihood estimator under squared-error loss function. Based on asymptotic consideration, a large sample confidence interval is also mentioned.     

TEAM INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE FROM A FIRM LEVEL EXPERIMENT

Many organizations rely on teamwork, and yet field evidence on the impacts of team‐based incentives remains scarce. Compared to individual incentives, team incentives can affect productivity by changing both workers’ effort and team composition. We present evidence from a field experiment designed to evaluate the impact of rank incentives and tournaments on the productivity and composition of teams. Strengthening incentives, either through rankings or tournaments, makes workers more likely to form teams with others of similar ability instead of with their friends. Introducing rank incentives however reduces average productivity by 14%, whereas introducing a tournament increases it by 24%. Both effects are heterogeneous: rank incentives only reduce the productivity of teams at the bottom of the productivity distribution, and monetary prize tournaments only increase the productivity of teams at the top. We interpret these results through a theoretical framework that makes precise when the provision of team‐based incentives crowds out the productivity‐enhancing effect of social connections under team production.     

A note on the asymptotic efficiency of the sobel–wald test

Let X₁,X₂, … be iid random variables with the pdf f(x,θ)=exp(θx?b(θ)) relative to a σ-finite measure μ, and consider the problem of deciding among three simple hypotheses H_i:θ=θ_i (1?i?3) subject to P(acceptH_i|θ_i)=1?α (1?i?3). A procedure similar to Sobel–Wald procedure is discussed and its asymptotic efficiency as compared with the best nonsequential test is obtained by finding the limit lim_a→0(E_iN(a)/n(a)), where N (a) is the stopping time of the proposed procedure and n(a) is the sample size of the best non-sequential test. It is shown that the same asymptotic limit holds for the original Sobel–Wald procedure. Specializing to N(θ,1) distribution it is found that lim_a→0$\text{(E}{}_{\mathrm{i}}\text{N(α)/n(α))=}\text{1}\text{4}$ (i=1,2) and lim_a→0 (E₃N(α)n(α))=δ²₁/4δ, where δ_i=(θ_i+1?θ_i) with 0<δ₁?δ₂. Also, the asymptotic efficiency evaluated when the X's have an exponential distribution.