Parameter estimation of the flexible Weibull distribution for type I censored samples

Often in practice one is interested in the situation where the lifetime data are censored. Censorship is a common phenomenon frequently encountered when analyzing lifetime data due to time constraints. In this paper, the flexible Weibull distribution proposed in Bebbington et al. [A flexible Weibull extension, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Safety 92 (2007), pp. 719–726] is studied using maximum likelihood technics based on three different algorithms: Newton Raphson, Levenberg Marquardt and Trust Region reflective. The proposed parameter estimation method is introduced and proved to work from theoretical and practical point of view. On one hand, we apply a maximum likelihood estimation method using complete simulated and real data. On the other hand, we study for the first time the model using simulated and real data for type I censored samples. The estimation results are approved by a statistical test.     

Parameter estimation in an alternating repair model

The Weibull intensity is often used in survival analysis of technical products, it is an extremely important intensity to characterize the probabilistic behavior of a large number of real phenomena. This intensity is especially useful as a failure model analyzing the reliability of different types of systems. In this paper we develop statistical methods for an alternating repair model using Weibull intensity. The maximum likelihood estimator is considered for determining the estimations of the model parameters. The distribution of the life times after perfect repairs and imperfect repairs are obtained. The estimation of the Fisher information matrix is given. Simultaneous confidence regions based on the likelihood ratio statistics are developed for the estimators of the shape and scale parameter of the Weibull intensity. Finally simulation study will be given.     

Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees

This paper analyzes a 3-person voting game in which two or three players have the ability to choose alternatives to be considered. Once the set of possible alternatives and the structure of the voting procedure are known, the players can solve for the outcome. Thus, the actual choice over outcomes takes place in the choice of alternatives to be voted on, i.e., the agenda. An equilibrium to this agenda-formation game in shown to exist under different assumptions about the information relative to the order of the players in the voting game. Further, this equilibrium is computed and found to possess certain features which are attractive from a normative point of view.Prepared for delivery at the 1985 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The New Orleans Hilton, August 29–September 1, 1985. We would like to thank Richard McKelvey, Norman Schofield and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. We retain responsibility for remaining errors.