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The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods. 相似文献
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废旧电器回收再生利用是开辟城市矿山的资源源泉。本文从技术、经济、社会三个层面研究其物质、价值和行为三个形态的循环机理是其产业链构建和有效逆行的理论基础。价值循环要考虑以自然资源资本和环境保护与恢复的成本来分析其价值保值与增值过程;行为循环要以基于生产者责任延伸制的主体责任体系为纽带,分析其行为活动规律及其相互关系;物质循环要按照循环经济的原则考虑各种物质形态的有效转换与有机联系,以实现资源到资源的物质闭路循环。 相似文献
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质量监督机构与承包商施工阶段博弈分析 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
施工阶段监督管理是建设工程质量政府监督的重要组成部分。政府质量监督机构与承包商之间的监督与被监督行为策略,直接影响双方收益和质量监督管理效益。考虑双方期望行为与实际行为的差异对其收益的影响,引入收益修正函数,便解决了博弈分析的奇异解问题,更为合理地揭示监督与被监督之间的行为策略特征,政府质量监督机构应该选择最适度的监督力度和监督概率,承包商也应选择最适度的努力工作程度和工作概率。 相似文献
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管理决策的科学性取决于管理方法、手段和技术的有效性。基于决策问题的系统分析方法是实施科学决策的基础,决策问题的提出是系统科学发展的动因。建设工程管理决策树立系统观点、应用系统方法进行量化和优化是提高其决策质量的有效方法。从系统分析与决策、建设工程管理决策的系统观以及建设选址问题中系统分析方法的应用三个方面理论与实际相结合,阐明了系统量化与优化对于建设工程管理决策的辅助支持作用,以期增强建设工程管理决策活动应用系统方法的自觉性,提高管理决策的质量和能力,促进建筑业的健康良性发展。 相似文献
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既有建筑节能改造项目收益分配优化是提升项目收益分配科学合理性的有效途径.基于既有建筑节能改造实现主体节能服务公司的企业属性,利用“一般到特殊”的研究思路,梳理了国外企业间收益分配重要性、分配方式、契约设计及实施方法4个方面的理论研究动态;概述了基本原则、影响因素、契约模型及有效性评价4个方面的国内企业间收益分配理论研究进展.基于合同能源管理模式下既有建筑节能改造项目收益分配特征分析,从收益分配构成要素、影响关系、契约设计、有效性评价与契约优化4个方面架构既有建筑节能改造项目收益分配优化机理研究框架,阐述研究框架的具体实施流程,研究结果为合理分配既有建筑节能改造项目收益提供理论与方法支撑. 相似文献
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建设工程项目质量实施能力评价研究 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
建设工程项目质量实施能力评价是建设工程施工前质量监督的重要措施,本文论述了建设工程项目质量实施能力评价的意义,分析了影响质量实施能力的主要因素,构架了实施能力综合评价的指标体系,阐述了综合评价的三个基本功能:反映功能、监测预测功能和比较功能;综合评价的五个特点:具体性、模糊量化性、解释说明性、时间性、综合性和可比性,提出了实施能力评价的组织与机制要求。 相似文献
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依附于总公司下的资产经营企业在激烈的市场竞争中处于不利地位,其实质是经营战略、经营体制、运行机制、经营方法、管理理念、产业规划不能适应市场发展的需要。资产经营企业实现其社会服务功能和经营管理效益,必须树立资产经营企业化观念,深化企业体制与机制改革,改变经营方式,优化产业规划,拓宽资产经营范围。资产经营企业要获得可持续发展的源动力,需要系统地实现经营管理、规划、品牌、文化、营销、环境的观念创新以及企业与资产市场、企业与总公司之间的良性互动。 相似文献