Addiction science and the perception of freewill

Do people think individuals with Substance Use Disorder (SUD) have freewill? How does addiction science inform views on the issue? We distinguish between two senses of freewill: 1) libertarian freewill , in which freedom turns on a particular metaphysical conception of action (sometimes operationalized as “could have done otherwise”), and 2) compatibilist freewill , in which freedom depends on the relation between the actor's psychology and her actions (e.g., “was the act what she wanted to do?”). We argue that, in different ways, scientific accounts can impact conceived freewill by linking addictive behavior to mechanisms that observers view as peripheral to the actor ( motivation modularity) . While a variety of impacts on conceived compatibilist freewill are plausible, we argue that contemporary addiction science has no direct bearing on conceived libertarian freewill. Addiction science may, however, indirectly impact conceived libertarian freewill by priming an explanatory framework in which intention is superfluous (especially materialism).     

Autonomous Agency in Anti-Dualistic Social Ontologies: A Compatibilist Notion

Anti-dualistic social ontologies, those highlighting the intrinsic interdependency of agency and structure as two sides of the same coin, are sometimes criticized for failing to provide a satisfactory account of autonomous – capable and free – agency, or even denying the reality of such agency. This paper contests these claims, arguing that anti-dualistic ontologies only conflict with autonomous agency when the latter is understood in a highly voluntaristic sense, whose ideational roots go to what philosophers of free will call “incompatibilist” intuitions of freedom. Those intuitions suggest that actions (intentions, decisions) ultimately determined by extrinsic causes lack the kind of freedom presupposed by moral responsibility, so when agentive autonomy is presumed to involve such freedom, it does indeed cohere poorly with the anti-dualistic picture of intrinsically structured agency. Herein, however, an alternative, “compatibilist” notion of autonomy is advanced, such that does not conflict with extrinsic determination and is therefore congruent with anti-dualistic social ontologies.