| 两个监督人之间的博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 余星,张胜文.两个监督人之间的博弈[J].湖南人文科技学院学报,2007,12(6):77-78. |
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| 作者姓名： | 余星 张胜文 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 湖南人文科技学院,湖南,娄底,417000
2. 湖南娄底职业技术学院,湖南,娄底,417000 |
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| 摘 要： | 假设两个监督人有可能串通起来损害委托人利益,讨论了防范监督人和代理人共谋问题,推广了共谋防范模型。
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| 关 键 词： | 激励机制 监督 共谋防范 |
| 文章编号： | 1673-0712(2007)06-0077-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年6月2日 |
The Game between Two Supervisors |
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| YU Xing,ZHANG Sheng-wen.The Game between Two Supervisors[J].Journal of Hunan Institute of Humanities,Science and Technology,2007,12(6):77-78. |
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| Authors: | YU Xing ZHANG Sheng-wen |
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| Institution: | YU Xing1,ZHANG Sheng-wen2 |
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| Abstract: | It is supposed that two superviors are probably in collusion to damage the client's benefit.That the supervisor of keeping a lookout and the agent conspire questions is discussed.The model of conspiring being on guard is promoted. |
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| Keywords: | inspiring mechanism supervisory conspire keeping a lookout |
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