分析师关注的外部监督效应研究

证券分析师作为投资者与上市公司之间重要的信息中介,其所发挥的外部监督作用越来越受到学术界与实务界的关注。为探索我国分析师关注是否存在外部监督效应,文章在相关研究基础上,结合中国实际情况,选取沪深两市A股市场953家上市公司的2007~2010年财务数据为研究样本,以分析师剩余关注度作为分析师关注强度的代理变量,采用多变量回归方法研究了分析师关注对公司价值和盈余管理的影响。结果表明:在我国证券市场中,分析师的外部监督效应确实存在,即分析师通过对上市公司关注,抑制了管理层盈余操纵的程度,进而减少了代理成本,提升了上市公司的公司价值。

Research on External Monitoring Effect of Analyst Coverage

Securities analysts＇ external monitoring role has obtained much attention by academic and practic circles due to its intermediation between investors and listed companies. For searching whether there is an external monitoring effect between analysts and listed companies in China, based on foreign research, this paper takes 953 listed companies from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share exchange in 2007-2010 as samples. It adopts coverage residual as the proxy variable of analyst coverage to study the effect of analyst coverage on corporate value and earnings management using regression. The results indicate that there is truly an external monitoring effect between analysts and listed companies in China, which means that analysts have restrained earnings management through coverage on listed companies, and then reduced agency costs and enhanced the value of listed companies.