| 电力行业输配分开的福利效应——基于完全信息动态博弈模型的分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 李鹏飞.电力行业输配分开的福利效应——基于完全信息动态博弈模型的分析[J].南京大学学报(哲学．人文科学．社会科学 ),2009,46(3). |
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| 作者姓名： | 李鹏飞 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国社会科学院,工业经济研究所,北京,100836 |
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| 基金项目： | 中国社会科学院重点课题“我国能源管理体制改革研究” |
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| 摘 要： | 电力行业输配分开对于建设竞争性电力市场,提高电力市场资源配置效率至关重要。将配电业务从输电网络中分离后,不同的输电价格形成机制会产生不同的福利效应。若输电价格由垄断性输电企业自行决定,则在配电业务边际成本递增且电力需求具有弹性的条件下,社会福利水平会提高;若输电价格由竞争性配电企业竞标确定,则在配电业务边际成本递增的情况下,不管电力需求是否具有弹性,输配分开都会增进社会福利。与垄断性输电企业自行决定输电价格的机制相比,由竞争性配电企业竞标确定输电价格的机制,更有利于提高社会福利水平。而且,输配分开后,在配电业务边际成本递增的条件下,直购电安排确实可能会使社会福利得以改善,但这种可能性会非常小。
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| 关 键 词： | 电力行业改革 输配分开 福利效应 完全信息动态博弈 |
Welfare Effects of Unbundled Transmission and Distribution Network in Electricity Industry: An Analysis Based on a Dynamic Game Model with Complete Information |
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| LI Peng-fei.Welfare Effects of Unbundled Transmission and Distribution Network in Electricity Industry: An Analysis Based on a Dynamic Game Model with Complete Information[J].Journal of Nanjing University(Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences),2009,46(3). |
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| Authors: | LI Peng-fei |
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| Abstract: | Unbundled transmission and distribution network is pivotal for establishing a competitive market of electricity and for improving its allocation efficiency.Different pricing mechanisms in transmission,as a result of unbundling electricity distribution from transmission network,may bring about different welfare effects.When price for transmission is determined by monopolistic transmission firm,social welfare will be improved by performing unbundling only if an increase has been seen in both marginal cost of ... |
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