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渠道冲突中的均衡分析
引用本文:陈舜.渠道冲突中的均衡分析[J].学术探索,2012(2):84-86.
作者姓名:陈舜
作者单位:广东商学院工商管理学院
摘    要:在信息对称的情况下,渠道成员结成战略联盟是一个"囚徒困境",渠道冲突由博弈的均衡结果来反映;而在信息不对称时,由于渠道成员之间的激励不相容及各自核心资源优势,渠道成员之间的合作变成不可置信,渠道成员博弈的最优相机决策是建立在对对方溢出量的预期和事先竞争力的对比,此时,渠道成员结成战略联盟也变成不稳定。渠道冲突由博弈策略以外的相关均衡来反映,即根据特定相关信号机制进行决策选择而实现均衡。

关 键 词:渠道冲突  均衡

The Balance Analysis of the Channel Conflict
CHEN Shun.The Balance Analysis of the Channel Conflict[J].Academic Research,2012(2):84-86.
Authors:CHEN Shun
Institution:CHEN Shun(School of Business Administration,Guangdong University,Guangzhou,510320,Guangdong,China)
Abstract:In the information symmetry,alliance of channel members is a "prisoner′s dilemma".The channel conflict is reflected by the balanced result of game.In the information asymmetry,due to the incentive incompatibilities between channel members and their respective core resources advantage,the cooperation between channel members becomes incredible,the optimal camera decision between channel members game is based on the amount of each other’s overflow expectations and prior competitive contrast.At this time,the channel member alliance also becomes unstable.The channel conflict is reflected by the related balance outside of game strategy,or it is based on the specific related signal mechanism and balanced decisions.
Keywords:channel conflict  balance
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